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Strategic Communication
This thesis develops and tests game theoretic models of communication and bargaining. These models 
can be used to analyze strategic aspects of negotiations, such as those that arise between managers and 
workers, divorcing spouses or political parties. While the foundations may be somewhat technical, the 
essence can often be captured by a simple example. If you want to experience strategic communication, 
try your hand at the setting below during the public exposé of this thesis. (You can contact the author at 
adrian@degrootruiz.nl for questions.)
Do it yourself
You play Don Miguel, the Mayor of the village of Tamamdrés and local surf expert. Tamamdrés lies at 
the beautiful coast of Oaxaca (México) and is surrounded by five beaches, all a kilometer apart from each 
other. You have heard that a guy called Thomas, a visiting mathematician from New York, has fallen in 
love with the place and wants to open a surf resort at one of the beaches. He already has a construction 
permit from the state authorities.
This Thomas wants to maximize his resort’s earnings and faces the following problem. He has heard that 
there is one ‘surf beach,’ which provides a good surf, and that the other four beaches offer less reliable 
surf conditions. He does not know which one is the surf beach, but he believes it must be either the most 
western beach (a. Revolcadero) or the most eastern one (e. Positano). Both are equally likely to be the 
surf beach in his opinion. The closer the resort is to the surf beach, the better it is for business. The resort 
cannot be more than 2 km away from the surf beach, because otherwise not enough customers will show 
up. Hence, Thomas has made an appointment with you to find out the best location for his  resort.
You, however, want to maximize the earnings of your village and face the following dilemma. You know 
the surf beach is                                    . However, a surf resort at that place will cost the village dearly, as 
tourists will stay away from the village center due to the distance and force local businesses to close. On 
the other hand, a successful resort closer to the village center would bring in loads of tourists, meaning 
booming business for your village. 
You can play this situation as follows with the person sitting next to you, who will play the role of 
Thomas. Both you and Thomas base the choices on the (same) table below.
1. Thomas asks you which beach is the surf beach. 
2. You give one of the following answers: (i) “it’s a. Revolcadero”, (ii) “It’s e. Positano” or (iii) “I’m not 
     going to tell you” (you do not need to be honest). 
3. Thomas chooses at which beach he wants to open the resort.
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
1.1 Overview 
Communication and bargaining are social activities that permeate many as-
pects of life. We negotiate with strangers, friends and foes alike: We strike 
political and business deals, try to cajole our friends into the restaurant we like 
and haggle in the family about the small (who changes the diapers) and big 
(who gets the children after divorce). The two activities are intimately linked: 
Bargaining is done through communication and many instances of communica-
tion involve a certain degree of strategic behavior and bargaining.  
This thesis is a collection of four essays on bargaining and strategic commu-
nication from the perspective of behavioral economics. These two topics have a 
rich tradition in standard economics, in particular in game theory. In recent 
years, behavioral economists have been able to improve on the predictions of 
standard economics by relaxing its assumptions and supplementing theory with 
experimental data. A common thread running through this thesis is its focus on 
strategic situations (games) where strict adherence to traditional assumptions of 
rationality and equilibrium fail to yield helpful predictions. As such, it falls 
within the domain of behavioral game theory. In particular, it belongs to the 
branch that focuses on predicting aggregate behavior of boundedly rational 
individuals in dynamic settings. The ﬁrst and last study we present are applica-
tions of behavioral methods to economic and political questions (in Chapters 2 
and 5). Chapter 3 and 4 provide a methodological contribution by introducing 
and testing a behavioral stability measure for cheap talk equilibria. In the 
remainder of this introduction, we ﬁrst provide an overview showing the com-
mon threads running through the chapters. Subsequently, we discuss each study 
and its contribution to the literature in more detail. 
In Chapter 2 we study how bargaining power inﬂuences the clarity of com-
munication. In other ﬁelds the relation between power and communication is 
widely recognized, but in economics this relation is a largely untouched research 
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area. By modeling communication as a cheap talk game, we get a remarkable 
theoretical result: The informed party cannot transmit much information if she 
has little power, as the uninformed party can use that information to exploit 
her. Increasing the informed party’s power reduces the extent to which she can 
be exploited. This, in turn, increases the maximum amount of information 
transmission possible in equilibrium. The analysis leaves one issue open: increas-
ing the informed party’s power does not eliminate equilibria with little infor-
mation transmission. Hence, to make a prediction we need an equilibrium 
reﬁnement. However, cheap talk equilibria are hard to reﬁne and existing re-
ﬁnements have little predictive force in this model.  
This leads us to the open problem that no equilibrium reﬁnement exists that 
is generally predictive in cheap talk games. We take up this challenge in Chapter 
3, which introduces the Average Credible Deviation Criterion (ACDC), a stabil-
ity measure for cheap talk equilibria. ACDC builds on previous rational theories 
of credible deviations. It manages to be generally predictive by relaxing the 
common rationalistic assumptions that stability is binary and that an equilibri-
um is completely upset by any (credible) deviation. We show that the predic-
tions of ACDC are sensible across a wide range of games and that it can organ-
ize data well from earlier experiments. One application is that ACDC selects a 
most informative equilibrium in the class of games studied in Chapter 2. This 
allows us to substantiate the prediction that an increase in the Sender’s relative 
power leads to an increase in actual information transmission.  
In Chapter 4, we put ACDC to the test in a new set of experiments. This 
experiment is the ﬁrst to systematically test whether and to which extent 
credible deviations matter. We use the class of cheap talk games introduced in 
Chapter 2, as this allows for large equilibrium sets and hence provides a good 
testing ground for reﬁnements. We ﬁnd clear support for the predictions of 
ACDC. In addition, we designed the experiment in such a manner that we can 
also directly test the hypothesis of Chapter 2. The data shows that increasing 
power indeed increases information transmission. 
Finally, in Chapter 5 we study how the formality of (legislative) bargaining 
aﬀects its outcome. Whereas Chapters 2, 3 and 4 focus on information transmis-
sion during bargaining, Chapter 5 assumes complete information and zooms in 
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on the bargaining process itself. The bargaining problem studied here shares 
important characteristics with that of Chapter 2 (and 4): both have a non-
convex outcome set that consists of the real line on which preferences are single 
peaked and a disagreement point outside of the line. Chapter 5 starts with the 
observation that political agreement is typically forged in a mix of formal 
bargaining in parliamentary session and informal bargaining outside of it. A 
major challenge in studying informal bargaining is the strategic richness of such 
situations. We show that standard game theory is silent about the inﬂuence of 
formality in the setting we study. Using an experiment, we are able to show that 
formality matters: informal bargaining is better for the party in the superior 
bargaining position.  
Below we describe our contributions in more detail. 
1.2 Chapter 2: Power and the Privilege of Clarity 
Chapter 2 addresses an issue that has largely gone unnoticed in economics: 
the relation between power and communication. In other ﬁelds, in contrast, it 
has been widely recognized that power has an important impact on communica-
tion. One particular idea is that clarity is a privilege of the powerful: People 
belonging to a more powerful social, economic or political group seem to be able 
to communicate their preferences more clearly than those with less power. Social 
psychologists have found, for instance, that workers are more assertive in com-
municating their desires towards lower ranked co-workers than towards higher 
ranked co-workers (Kipnis, Schmidt & Wilkinson (1980), Yukl & Falbe (1990)). 
Similarly, gender studies have found that women in patriarchal societies are 
more hesitant in stating their wishes and interests than men (Baer (1976), 
Butler (1976), Maltz & Borker (1982), Henley & Kramarae (2001)).  
It could be that the relation between power and clarity is entirely historical 
and cultural. In Chapter 2, however, we explore the possibility that there is a 
strategic foundation to this relation as well. We model the interaction in an 
asymmetric information continuous cheap talk (veto threats) bargaining game. 
It consists of one round of communication between an informed Sender and an 
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uninformed Receiver, followed by an ultimatum game where the Receiver makes 
a proposal to the Sender. Using game theory has the virtue that we can opera-
tionalize our concepts precisely: We deﬁne power as the attractiveness of the 
outside option and clarity as the degree of information transmission in equilibri-
um. Our main result is that the maximum amount of information transmission 
in equilibrium is increasing in the power of the Sender and decreasing in that of 
the Receiver. The intuition is that having power allows the Sender to be more 
open: Information transmission is limited because the Receiver can exploit the 
Sender with information the latter provides and increasing the Sender’s power 
reduces the extent to which she can be exploited. In Chapter 4, we provide 
experimental evidence that the Sender’s relative power increases information 
transmission. 
In addition to casting game theoretic light on the relation between power and 
communication, this chapter also contributes to the existing cheap talk litera-
ture. Our model diﬀers from previous ones in that the private information of the 
Sender does not determine her bargaining power. This allows us to capture the 
power individuals have due to the social, political or economic position of the 
group they belong to. This is what sets it apart from Matthew’s model of veto 
threats (1989) and buyer-seller models (e.g. Matthews & Postlewaite (1989) and 
Farrell & Gibbons (1989)). The modeling choice also has profound implications 
for information transmission. Whereas in Matthews’ model, information trans-
mission is limited, a full range of partition equilibria exists in our set-up. In 
particular, the role of power in our model mirrors the role of interest-alignment 
in the model of Crawford and Sobel (1982).  
Finally, we provide testable implications of our model for labor contracts and 
for remedy negotiations between ﬁrms and competition authorities. 
1.3 Chapter 3: ACDC Rocks When Other Criteria 
Remain Silent 
Chapter 3 proposes a solution to the important equilibrium selection problem 
in cheap talk games. Crawford & Sobel (1982) introduced asymmetric infor-
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mation games with cheap talk communication. The main question in such games 
is how much information can be transmitted in pre-play costless communication 
between an informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver when interests are 
partially aligned. This class of games proved to have many real world applica-
tions in economics and politics, ranging from stock recommendations (Morgan & 
Stocken, 2003) to the presidential veto (Matthews, 1989). A major problem in 
applying such models is that they have multiple equilibria, which diﬀer drasti-
cally in their predictions about how much information will be transmitted. 
Furthermore, the set of equilibria has proven to be very hard to reﬁne, since – in   
contrast to signaling games – messages are costless. Currently, no reﬁnement 
exists that successfully selects equilibria across a wider range of cheap talk 
games. Our model in Chapter 2 is one example where existing reﬁnements are 
not predictive. We believe that existing reﬁnements lose predictive power be-
cause they impose a binary distinction between stable and unstable equilibria, 
whereas the success of equilibria to organize behavior is typically a matter of 
degree. 
This study proposes a generalization of reﬁnements based on credible devia-
tions, such as neologism proofness (Farrell, 1993) and announcement proofness 
(Matthews, Okuno-Fujiwara & Postlewaite, 1991). These reﬁnements are 
grounded on the observation that messages can have a literal meaning. In 
particular, such messages can urge the Receiver to play an out-of-equilibrium 
action in a manner that is credible to rational players. Neologism proofness and 
announcement proofness select equilibria that do not admit credible deviations. 
Unfortunately, these reﬁnements tend to eliminate all equilibria. According to 
our Average Credible Deviation Criterion (ACDC), the stability of a cheap talk 
equilibrium is a continuous quantity determined by the frequency and the size of 
credible deviations. An equilibrium is an ‘ACDC equilibrium’ if it minimizes the 
amount of credible deviations. This provides a way to rank equilibria that are 
unstable in a strict sense and to guarantee the existence of a most plausible 
equilibrium.  
ACDC provides a contribution relative to existing concepts as neologism 
proofness, announcement proofness, Partial Common Interest (Blume, Kim & 
Sobel, 1993) and No Incentive to Separate (Chen, Kartik & Sobel, 2008). We 
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show that ACDC organizes behavioral data equally well as the other criteria in 
the settings for which these criteria were designed, improves upon them in other 
settings and makes sensible predictions where all previous criteria are silent. 
1.4 Chapter 4: An Experimental Study of ACDC 
Chapter 4 puts ACDC to the test in a new experiment. The experiment tests 
the predictions of ACDC that credible deviations matter and matter gradually. 
In addition, it tests directly whether the ACDC equilibrium predicts best. In the 
experiment, we study ﬁve games that belong to the model of Chapter 2. These 
games are a suitable testing ground for selection criteria, as they allow for a 
clean manipulation of the size and frequency of credible deviations and can have 
a large equilibrium set. Our key results are that credible deviations matter 
gradually and that the ACDC equilibrium predicts best in each game. More 
generally, the data provides evidence that ACDC can predict the stability of 
equilibria within and across games, even if all equilibria admit credible devia-
tions and if all existing criteria are silent. We introduce a neologism dynamic 
that supports the conclusions of ACDC and explains important dynamic aspects 
of our data. In addition, our design is such that the experiment allows us to test 
the main hypothesis from Chapter 2 about power and clarity. We ﬁnd that 
increasing the relative power of the Sender indeed increases information trans-
mission. 
Our experiment adds to the recent experimental literature on equilibrium 
selection in cheap talk games. Blume, DeJong & Sprinkle (2001) study equilibri-
um selection in discrete games, whereas Dickhaut, McCabe & Mukherji (1995)1 
look at the Crawford-Sobel uniform quadratic game. Both studies support the 
conclusions of ACDC, although the results of the former are also consistent with 
the PCI criterion (Blume, Kim & Sobel, 1993) and those of the latter with the 
NITS criterion (Chen, Kartik & Sobel, 2008). In the current experiment we 
employ a setting where both other concepts are silent. 
                                     
1 Cai & Wang (2006) and Wang, Spezio & Camerer (2010) perform comparable experiments 
to Dickhaut, McCabe & Mukherji (1995) and reach similar conclusions.  
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1.5 Chapter 5: Formal versus Informal Legislative 
Bargaining 
Whereas the previous chapters focused on information transmission, Chapter 
5 examines the bargaining process itself. It deals with the question of how the 
formality of the legislative bargaining process can aﬀect the outcome. When 
parliament is in session, parliamentary procedures strictly govern what members 
can do at what time; hence, bargaining is highly formalized. After oﬃcial 
sessions have been adjourned, however, bargaining often continues informally in 
oﬃces, corridors and backrooms, where formal rules barely exist. As a conse-
quence, the outcome of the legislative process is usually a result of both formal 
and informal bargaining. How the degree of formality aﬀects the bargaining 
outcome is an open question. 
That the bargaining procedure can drastically aﬀect the outcome and favor 
speciﬁc negotiators through the order of voting, agenda-setting power, or pro-
posal and voting rights has been recognized since the research boom on spatial 
voting in the late 1970s (e.g., McKelvey (1976; 1979), Schoﬁeld (1978), McCarty 
(2000)). The diﬀerence between a formal and an informal procedure, however, 
cannot be captured by a diﬀerence in voting or proposal rights. In addition, if 
both procedures provide equal rights to each player, then no procedure prima 
facie favors a speciﬁc player. Rather, the diﬀerence is that informal bargaining 
provides much more ﬂexibility to all the bargaining parties. Players can use this 
ﬂexibility both to make more oﬀers and to communicate more, since any pro-
posal also conveys credible information about what a player is willing to accept. 
To answer our research question, this study compares a formal alternating 
oﬀers game to an informal continuous-time bargaining game. Both non-
cooperative games correspond to the same cooperative game: a three-player 
median voter setting with an external disagreement point. The divergence of 
interests (polarization) determines whether the core is empty (if so, we consider 
the uncovered set). In the formal game, the (reﬁned) subgame perfect equilibri-
um converges to the core if this exists. The informal game is strategically so rich 
that a large range of outcomes can be supported in equilibrium, including the 
ESSAYS ON BARGAINING AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION  
8 
 
equilibrium outcomes of the formal game. As a consequence, theory is silent 
about the inﬂuence of formality on the outcome and an experiment can shed 
light on this issue. Our main experimental ﬁnding is that formality matters. In 
particular, the median player is signiﬁcantly better oﬀ under an informal bar-
gaining procedure. Our interpretation is that the informal game provides the 
median player more room to exploit her superior bargaining position by allowing 
her to play oﬀ the other players against each other. Another interesting result 
we get is that the median player is harmed by polarization, even if her ideal is 
the unique core, probably due to inter-coalitional fairness concerns.  
The study in Chapter 5 is the ﬁrst to provide evidence that the formality of 
bargaining matters to the outcome. In particular, it suggests that parties in a 
superior bargaining position are better oﬀ under an informal structure. Our 
ﬁnding is relevant for the study of institutional choice, because it suggests that 
political agents (should) have strategic preferences over the weight they wish to 
put on formal versus informal bargaining. To put this far-reaching conclusion on 
a stronger footing, more research is needed as we compare two representative 
but still speciﬁc procedures. Recently, this conclusion has received support from 
Drouvelis, Montero & Sefton (2010).  
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Chapter 2 Power and the Privilege of Clarity2 
2.1 Introduction 
Clarity seems to be a privilege of the powerful. The less fortunate among us 
are typically vaguer about their desires and need to think harder about what 
they say or do not say. Social psychologists have found that workers are more 
assertive in communicating their desires towards lower ranked co-workers than 
towards higher ranked co-workers (Kipnis, Schmidt & Wilkinson (1980), Yukl & 
Falbe (1990)). Gender studies point to a similar pattern in patriarchal societies, 
where women are found to be more hesitant in stating their wishes and interests 
than men.3 The relation between power and clarity could be shaped primarily by 
history and culture. In the communication literature, the link between power 
and communication is widely recognized (Keating, 2009) and believed to be 
strongly mediated by culture (Gudykunst & Lee, 2003). High status individuals 
are typically approached with more respect and too clear a message by a lower 
ranked individual about her preferences might simply be seen as ‘disrespectful.’ 
Similarly, direct communication of preferences may result in the loss of face of 
the powerful person if it openly contradicts her wishes or of the less powerful 
person if her wishes are ignored. In contrast to the above disciplines, in econom-
ics the relation between power and communication is a largely untouched re-
search area.4 
In this chapter, we explore the possibility that there is a fundamental strate-
gic foundation to the relation between power and clarity. In particular, we are 
interested in the communication between members belonging to diﬀerent groups 
of a society (or organization or community) with diﬀerent levels of power. We 
                                     
2 This chapter is based on De Groot Ruiz, Oﬀerman & Onderstal (2011a). 
3 When discussing the source of miscommunication between men and women, some authors 
emphasize the role of power relations while others stress the role of culture (Baer (1976), Butler 
(1976), Maltz & Borker (1982), Henley & Kramarae (2001)). 
4 As far as we know, in economics the only research touching on this subject concerns how 
the level of connectedness in a network aﬀects the bargaining power of individuals in bilateral 
negotiations (Calvó-Armengol, 2001). 
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focus on bargaining under asymmetric information, as this is a common type of 
social interaction where clarity matters. One can think of divorce negotiations 
between men and women, managers and workers discussing the worker’s tasks, 
members of diﬀerent castes in India bargaining over the provision of a service or 
competition authorities discussing merger remedies with multinationals.  
How does power come into play in such situations? Importantly, the conse-
quences of disagreement diﬀer among individuals coming from groups with 
diﬀerent levels of power. Simply put, people in a more powerful position have 
better outside options. This can ﬁrstly be due to the fact that people who 
belong to a powerful group beneﬁt from institutional or cultural rules. For 
instance, in countries with Islamic law, men have more rights than women at 
divorce. Secondly, people with more power tend to have more social, political or 
economic resources. Even in communities where women have equal legal rights 
but do not perform (much) paid work, men tend to have a superior economic 
position when ﬁling for divorce. In sum, power aﬀects the costs of disagreeing 
for agents in bargaining settings.  
We think about clarity as informational clarity: how much does someone 
learn about the state of the world from a message? The informational clarity of 
a message can ﬁrstly depend on its literal clarity: the indirectness, inexplicitness, 
vagueness or ambiguity of the words used (Cheng & Warren (2003), Agranov & 
Schotter (2010)).5 In a single interaction with a stranger from a culture one does 
not know, the literal meaning is all one can go by. Secondly, if people share a 
cultural and social history, the information messages convey also depends on 
how messages are used. For instance, the precise statement “I’ll be there at 
seven o’clock” is in some cultures not at all informative, because people use it 
under a wide range of intentions as when to come. By contrast, in some coun-
tries the ambiguous phrase “I may prefer if you stopped making noise” can be 
very informative if such a formulation is only used when people are really upset. 
The more history people share, the more the clarity of messages will depend on 
their use. In equilibrium, informational meaning is completely determined by 
use: what message is used in what state of the world? 
                                     
5 One may of course be mainly interested in literal clarity, for instance for linguistic purposes. 
We are chieﬂy interested in informational clarity as this determines the actions people take. 
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Language and its interpretation evolve and as such are subject to strategic 
forces. Hence, in the long run, there will be a tendency towards some strategic 
equilibrium. This tendency is strongest in dynamic settings where members of 
one power-group frequently interact with diﬀerent members of the other group 
and reputational concerns play a small role.6 One implication is that in a stable 
culture, the informational clarity of messages is largely determined by their use. 
Hence, one should be careful when providing purely cultural explanations for a 
lack of informational clarity on the side of individuals with little power. If 
politeness requires vague messages, then a group may start using several polite 
(and vague) messages. Over time, these messages may evolve to encode harder 
information if there is a strategic pressure – such as eﬃciency gains – to do so. 
For example, consider a wife and husband who can go to the theater or a con-
cert. The wife knows they both prefer the theater. In a Western society, the wife 
may reply to her husband’s question “Shall we go to the concert” with “Nah, 
let’s go to the theater.” In a more patriarchal society where it is impolite for the 
wife to contradict her husband openly, she may instead say “Well, Sir, are you 
sure you do not feel like going to the theater?” with the same outcome. Another 
example is the Iranian practice of Taarof civility, which requires among other 
things that a shopkeeper says his products are ‘worthless’ when asked for the 
price. Still, despite such politeness, the price is revealed in the end. Customers 
have learned they should repeat the question a couple of times to get a real 
answer and cannot just walk away without paying.7 
                                     
6 Hence, we focus on one-shot situations where people have social information. Other fasci-
nating possibilities are to study the relation between power and clarity in one-shot interactions 
without social information or in repeated interactions. Although an equilibrium analysis may be 
informative here, we have to be careful when generalizing our ﬁndings to such settings. In 
interactions without social informaiton, out-of-equilibrium behavior in cheap talk games cannot 
be ruled out. In such cases, approaches based on rationalizability and some focal meaning of 
messages, such as Rabin (1990), may be more appropriate. This means that one needs to look at 
the literal meaning to derive its information content in such cases. One problem is that in these 
settings we are as of yet only able to theoretically predict only rather conservative lower bounds 
on information transmission. Another problem is that it is not always clear what the relation 
between the literal and focal meaning of messages is. Analyzing repeated interactions between 
the same players is even more challenging. Strictly speaking, it is just a very complex one-shot 
game, possibly involving an endogenous form of reputation building (Sobel, 1985). In real life, 
myopic strategic reasoning may give it a dynamic ﬂavor, so that messages may acquire a 
consistent meaning justifying some equilibrium concept.  
7 For more on Taarof and the power-language relationship in Iran, see Beeman (1986). 
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It is now possible to translate our original question of how power inﬂuences 
clarity into a precise game-theoretic one: how does bargaining power inﬂuence 
information transmission in equilibrium? We study this question in an elemen-
tary bargaining setting. A Sender with private preferences and a Receiver with 
commonly known preferences bargain over a one-dimensional issue.8 The Sender 
sends a costless message to the Receiver, after which they play an ultimatum 
game in which the Sender can reject or accept the proposal of the Receiver.  
We ﬁnd that bargaining power is a key determinant of how much information 
can be transmitted: information transmission is increasing in the Sender’s power 
and decreasing in that of the Receiver. In other words, the higher the relative 
power of an informed agent, the clearer she will be. There is one exception in 
which full revelation is possible. Senders who are closely aligned with the Re-
ceivers or have no bargaining power can fully reveal their type since they will be 
oﬀered the Receiver’s preferred outcome anyway in equilibrium. The range of 
Senders who can reveal their type without costs decreases with the relative 
power of the Sender. 
We see our results primarily as a proof-of-principle, as many power relations 
and strategic settings are more complex in practice. At the same time, we 
believe that the intuition behind our results holds more generally. If you hold 
little power, it is not in your best interest to reveal too much information, 
because that can be exploited. Hence, you better be kind of vague and strategic 
about what you communicate. If you are powerful, the potential for exploitation 
is limited and you can aﬀord to be clear.  
In addition to shedding light on power relations, this chapter contributes to 
the theoretical literature on bargaining and information transmission. Our 
model diﬀers from previous models in that the private information of the Sender 
does not determine her bargaining power. This allows us to capture the power 
individuals have due to the social, political or economic position of the group 
they belong to. Our model is close to that of Matthews (1989), who was the ﬁrst 
to study veto threats. In Matthews’ model, however, the Sender’s type deter-
mines her disagreement payoﬀ, whereas in our model the disagreement payoﬀ is 
an exogenous variable which is the same for all Sender types. Hence, we can 
                                     
8 We will refer to the Sender as a ‘she’ and the Receiver as ‘he.’  
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model members of the same group having commonly known and similar power 
levels but diﬀering in their private preferences. For example, consider men ﬁling 
for divorce in Saudi Arabia and entering into custody negotiations. They all 
have the same legal position but diﬀer in their preferences to see their children. 
Our modeling choice has profound implications for information transmission. 
In Matthews’ model, information transmission is limited: the maximum equilib-
rium size is two. In our setup, a full range of Crawford-Sobel-like partition 
equilibria exists, potentially allowing for more reﬁned communication. In partic-
ular, the role of power in our model mirrors the role of interest-alignment in the 
Crawford-Sobel game.  
The literature on economic bargaining and information transmission has 
mostly focused on buyer-seller situations, where the outcome-set is zero sum 
conditional on trade (e.g. Matthews & Postlewaite (1989) and Farrell & Gibbons 
(1989)). In these models, the bargaining power of the other party is typically 
unknown, so that power and private information again coincide.9 
Finally, our model applies to various interesting situations. Consider, for ex-
ample, custody negotiations between lawyers of divorcing parents. A common 
situation is that the mother would like to see the children as much as possible, 
whereas the father’s preferences are not precisely known. If they do not manage 
to agree, they will have to go through a costly court procedure. In these situa-
tions, one can ask how the power of the father relative to the mother aﬀects the 
ability of his lawyer to communicate the preferences of his client. In the conclu-
sion, we discuss testable economic implications for labor contracts and for 
remedies merging ﬁrms propose to competition authorities. 
The remainder of this chapter has the following structure. Section 2.2 pre-
sents a simple example of our model that serves to illustrate our set-up and 
results. Section 2.3 presents the model and the results. Section 2.4 concludes.  
                                     
9 For a literature-review on bargaining with incomplete information see Ausubel, Cramton & 
Deneckere (2002). 
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2.2 Example 
2.2.1 Game 
Consider a cheap talk game with veto threats between an informed Sender 
and an uninformed Receiver. The outcome of the game x is a point on the 
interval [0,1] or the disagreement point [0,1]E  . The Sender’s payoﬀ on the 
interval depends on the state of the world t (her type): ( , ) | | .SU x t x t    
The larger the distance between the outcome x and her type t, the lower the 
Sender’s payoﬀ. Her type t is private information of the Sender and it is com-
mon knowledge that t is drawn from the uniform distribution on [0,1]. The 
Receiver’s payoﬀ on the interval, ( ) ,RU x x   is independent of t: he always 
prefers smaller outcomes to larger ones. We vary the payoﬀ of the disagreement 
point to the players: ( )R RU dE   and ( )S SU dE   with , 0.R Sd d   (Note that 
Rd and Sd  are the size of the “harm” if bargaining breaks down.) In particular, 
we have:  
 
( ) ( )   for all [0,1]R R RU x U d x xE     
( , ) ( ) | |  for all [0,1]S S SU x t U d x t xE      
 
Observe that the Receiver prefers E  to all outcomes more than Rd  away from 
the origin and that the Sender prefers E  to all outcomes on the line more than 
Sd  away from her type t. 
The game proceeds as follows. First, the Sender is informed of her type t. 
Subsequently, she sends a costless message m M  to the Receiver, where M  is 
some suﬃciently rich message set. Then, the Receiver proposes an action 
[0,1]a   to the Sender. Finally, the Sender accepts or rejects a. If she accepts, a 
is the outcome and if she rejects, E  is the outcome.  
The game is an elementary bargaining setting under asymmetric information 
and models some important aspects of real interactions. The one-dimensional 
bargaining set allows us to capture partially aligned and partially conﬂicting 
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interests of the players. The one-sided information asymmetry and single round 
of ‘pre-play communication’ captures the essence of biased information transmis-
sion. The game is similar to Matthews’ (1989), except that the disagreement 
point lies on the real line in Matthews’ model. The disagreement point being 
now outside of the line allows us to model diﬀerences in bargaining power 
independent of player’s preferences on the line. Hence, the disagreement payoﬀ 
reﬂects power individuals have due to their (commonly known) social, political 
or economic position and which they share with other members of their group.10 
The bargaining power of the players in our game is determined by how attrac-
tive the disagreement point E  is to them. As Sd  [ Rd ] becomes smaller, the 
Sender’s [Receiver’s] payoﬀ of the disagreement point increases and the interval 
of points that the player prefers to E  narrows. Hence, the larger Sd  [ Rd ], the 
smaller the bargaining power of the Sender [Receiver].  
2.2.2 Equilibria 
We look at a reﬁnement of perfect Bayesian equilibria that restricts the Re-
ceiver to pure strategies and lets the Sender consider that she may tremble at 
the veto stage. Hence, for the Receiver we need to specify which message elicits 
which action, and for each Sender a probability distribution over messages she 
sends. In equilibrium, the Receiver best responds to his correctly updated 
posterior beliefs and each Sender type induces the action(s) that give her the 
highest payoﬀ, even if she plans to veto anyway (since she might tremble). From 
now on we refer to a perfect Bayesian equilibrium satisfying these two require-
ments simply as an equilibrium. 
It turns out that all equilibria are partition equilibria. In a partition equilib-
rium, types separate into disjunct intervals. A partition equilibrium can be 
characterized by the ﬁnite set of actions 1 2 ... naa a    the Receiver proposes 
in equilibrium.11 The number of equilibrium actions n is called the size of the 
                                     
10 In theory, the disagreement point could be determined both by social position and private 
preferences. We assume for simplicity that it only depends on a player’s social position, as this is 
suﬃcient to address the relationship between power and information transmission. 
11 To be precise, the action set characterizes an (inﬁnite) class of essentially equivalent equi-
libria that induce the same equilibrium outcome and diﬀer only in the messages that are used. 
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equilibrium. Each type then simply induces that action that is closest to her 
type, so that the type space can be partitioned into intervals of types who 
induce the same action. The main intuition for this result is that full separation 
is impossible in any type-interval contained in ( ,1]Sd : a revealed type would get 
zero, such that she has an incentive to mimic a higher type. In fact, there is a 
minimum distance between any two equilibrium actions, so that the equilibrium 
action set is ﬁnite. Together with the fact that Senders elicit the action closest 
to their type, this results in a well-ordered partition.  
In games with only partition equilibria, the size of the equilibrium provides a 
natural measure of information transmission, which is invariant to scaling (of 
the payoﬀ, action or type space). Equilibrium size will correlate well with other 
measures, such as conditional variance, prediction error, ex-ante eﬃciency or ex-
post eﬃciency – with the suitability of each depending on the context.12 In all 
cheap talk games, a size-1 (pooling) equilibrium exists in which no information 
is transmitted. We say that more information is transmitted as the size of the 
equilibrium increases.  
In this chapter we focus on the relation between power and the maximum 
information transmission possible in equilibrium. In particular, we look at how 
power aﬀects the maximum equilibrium size. Like in other continuous cheap talk 
games, such as Crawford & Sobel (1982) and Matthews (1989), the maximum 
size equilibrium seems the most plausible one although the equilibrium set is 
actually hard to reﬁne.13 Chapters 3 and 4 provide a theoretical and experi-
mental justiﬁcation to focus on the maximum size equilibrium. In Chapter 3, we 
introduce the Average Credible Deviation Criterion (ACDC). This criterion 
                                     
12 A problem of these measures is that they lack a natural dimension, such that they are 
typically not invariant to immaterial transformations of the game. For instance, the average 
prediction error or the conditional variance is not invariant to scaling of the type space and ex-
ante utility is not invariant to immaterial transformation of payoﬀs of subsets of the type set. 
The fraction of outcomes that is ex-post eﬃcient does not suﬀer from this invariance problem, 
but is a rather crude measure.  
13 Traditional signaling reﬁnements have no bite in cheap talk games, as messages are cost-
less. In Chapter 3, we show that in the current game also the cheap talk reﬁnements neologism 
proofness (Farrell, 1993), announcement proofness (Matthews, Okuno-Fujiwara & Postlewaite, 
1991), communication proofness (Blume & Sobel, 1995), the recurrent mop (Rabin & Sobel, 
1996) and NITS (Chen, Kartik & Sobel, 2008) are not selective and the non-equilibrium 
concepts  of Credible Message Rationalizability (Rabin, 1990) and Partial Common Interest 
(Blume, Kim & Sobel, 1993) are not predictive. 
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generalizes credible deviations approaches as neologism proofness (Farrell, 1993) 
and announcement proofness (Matthews, Okuno-Fujiwara & Postlewaite, 1991). 
ACDC does not suﬀer from non-existence and organizes data from previous 
experiments successfully. We show in Chapter 3 that, under some additional 
assumptions, ACDC selects in the model we present in this chapter a unique 
maximum-size equilibrium. In Chapter 4, we conduct an experiment with games 
belonging to the current model and ﬁnd that the maximum size equilibrium 
indeed predicts behavior best.  
As an illustration of what the equilibria look like, consider the case where 
1
2
Sd   and 54Rd  . This game has two equilibria. In the pooling equilibrium, 
the Receiver always proposes action 38 . In this equilibrium, the Receiver ignores 
all messages and best responds to his prior beliefs. The optimal action of the 
Receiver always involves a trade-oﬀ between maximizing the probability that the 
proposal is accepted and maximizing the payoﬀ of the proposal conditional on 
acceptance. Senders all have the same message strategy, which is optimal for 
each type as it does not matter what they send. The game also has a size-2 
equilibrium with actions 1 0a   and 12 2a  . Senders in 14[0, ) could, for instance, 
send the message “My type is low,” inducing the Receiver to propose 0 and 
those in 14[ ,1]  the message “My type is high,” inducing the Receiver to propose 
1
2 . When the Receiver receives the message “My type is low” he correctly infers 
that types are in the interval 14[0, ) and proposes 0, as all types in 
1
4[0, ) accept 0. 
If he receives the message “My type is high,” he infers 14[ ,1].t   Her expected 
payoﬀ from proposing action a now is ( )REU a   Pr{a is accepted} q
	 
( ) ( )R RU a U E  = 	 
 	 
51 1 12 4 2 4min{1, } max{ , } ,a a a   q   which is maximized 
at 12 .a   We can characterize the equilibrium set as follows for general 
, 0.S Rd d   
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Equilibrium Characterization Example  
Let max{0,min{ 2 ,1 }}.R S Sx d d d    Any equilibrium of the game described 
in section 2.2.1 is a partition equilibrium that can be described by a natural 
number {1,..., }n n and a set of equilibrium actions 1{ ,..., }na a , such that 
(i) 11 2max{0,min{1 , , ( )}}
S S R Sa d d d d    if 1n   
(ii) 1 2min{ ,max{0, 2 }}
S Sa d a d   if 2n p   
(iii) 22 3min{ ( ),2 ,1 }
R S S Sa d d d d    if 2n   and 1 0a   
(iv) 1 2
S
k ka a d   if 1ka   exists and 1 0ka    
(v) na xb  if 4R Sd dp  
The maximum size n  is equal to 1 if 1.Sd p If 1,Sd   max 2,
2 S
Rd
n
d
£ ²  ¯¦ ¦¦ ¦¡ ° ¤ »¡ °¦ ¦¦ ¡ °¦¥ ¼
if 
1R Sd db   and 3 1max 2,
2 2 S
n
d
£ ²  ¯¦ ¦¦ ¦¡ ° ¤ »¦ ¦¡ °¡ °¦ ¦¥ ¼
otherwise, where  .   ¯¡ °  is the ceiling 
function.14   
2.2.3 Power and Clarity 
We can now turn to the central question of this chapter: how does power 
aﬀect information transmission in equilibrium? To determine this, we vary Sd  
and .Rd  For instance, suppose that relative to 12
Sd   and 54Rd  , we increase 
the bargaining power of the Sender to 14 .
Sd   This results in more information 
transmission that can be supported in equilibrium: the maximum equilibrium 
size goes from 2 to 3. This illustrates the key result that the maximum infor-
mation transmission possible in equilibrium increases with the power of the 
Sender and decreases with that of the Receiver: 
 
Maximum Equilibrium size. n  is decreasing in Sd and increasing in .Rd  
 
                                     
14 We provide the proof at the end of the appendix. 
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This follows directly from the characterization of the equilibria. If the Sender 
has no power ( 1Sd p ) and all types would accept the Receiver’s optimal action, 
only a pooling equilibrium exists. If the Sender has some power ( 1Sd  ), at 
least a size 2 equilibrium exists. If the Receiver has very little power 
( 1R Sd d  ), the maximum size only depends on (and is increasing in) the 
power of the Sender. If the Receiver has some power as well ( 1R Sd db   ), 
then the maximum size n  increases in the relative power of the Sender: 
max 2, .
2
R
S
d
n
d
£ ²  ¯¦ ¦¦ ¦¡ ° ¤ »¡ °¦ ¦¦ ¡ °¦¥ ¼
 Therefore, n  jumps to a higher level if 
2
R
S
d
d
  ¯¡ °¡ °¡ °
 increases 
suﬃciently. As the power of the Sender relative to that of the Receiver becomes 
large, the maximum equilibrium size also becomes large. 
The intuition for this result is the following. The highest action the Receiver 
prefers to E  (in our game Rd )  and the type density close to this point impose 
an upper limit on the highest action. The fact that the Receiver always wants to 
oﬀer a lower action than the Sender imposes a lower bound on how close equi-
librium actions can be together. A Sender prefers t, whereas the Receiver would 
oﬀer max{0, },St d  if he would know t. In our example, the smallest distance 
between two positive equilibrium actions is 2 .Sd  
If the Sender is suﬃciently powerful (and the Receiver has some power as 
well), we can construct the maximum size equilibrium as follows. We set na  
equal to the highest action possible in an equilibrium, which is 2R Sd d . From 
there, we create the tightest partition by iteratively setting 1ia   as close as 
possible to ia  as long as 1 0.ia    In this example, we need to set 
1 2 .
S
i ia a d    Finally, we set 1 0.a   We can show that this tightest partition 
is in fact an equilibrium. As a consequence, the maximum equilibrium size is 
2
R
S
d
d
  ¯¡ °¡ °¡ °
; namely 1 for 1 0,a   plus 22
R S
S
d d
d
¡ °¡ °¡ °¢ ±
 positive actions minus 1 if 2R Sd d  
is divisible by 2 .Sd  
Hence, an increase of the Receiver’s power (decreasing Rd ) leads to a de-
crease of information transmission by lowering the highest possible equilibrium 
ESSAYS ON BARGAINING AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION  
20 
 
action ( 2 ).R Sd d  An increase of the Sender’s power (decreasing Sd ) increases 
information transmission ﬁrstly by increasing the highest possible equilibrium 
action. Secondly and more importantly, it lowers the minimum distance between 
equilibrium actions (2 Sd ). In the next section, we show that this result holds for 
a broader class of payoﬀ functions and type distributions. The underlying 
intuition is twofold. First, the power of a Receiver limits the range of potentially 
mutually proﬁtable actions. Second, the conﬂict of interest between Sender and 
Receiver puts a fundamental upper bound on information transmission, as the 
Receiver has an incentive to exploit the Sender’s information. However, the 
bargaining power of the Sender raises this upper bound by limiting how much a 
Receiver can exploit the Sender. 
2.3 Theory 
2.3.1 Model 
A Sender and Receiver play the following game with an outcome in 
{ }.X E \  First, the Sender privately observes her one dimensional type t. It 
is common knowledge that t  is drawn from the uniform distribution on the 
interval [0,1].15 Second, the Sender sends a message ,m M  where .M\  
Third, the Receiver receives m  and proposes an action a   \ . Finally, the 
Sender accepts or rejects a. If the Sender accepts [rejects], the proposed action a 
[E ] is the outcome of the game. 
Let :RU X l \  be the utility function of the Receiver and :SU X Tq l \  
that of the Sender. We model the players’ bargaining power as the payoﬀ of the 
disagreement point ( )RU E  and ( ),SU E  where we assume ( , ) ( )S SU t UE E  does 
not depend on t.  RU  and 
SU  satisfy the following assumptions:  
 
                                     
15 Given that types t  are drawn from a smooth distribution function F, we can make the 
assumption of uniformly distributed types without further loss of generality: t  can be replaced 
by ( )t F tw , which is uniformly distributed. Of course, all other variables should be redeﬁned 
accordingly. 
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(A1)  RU  is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, unimodal with a peak at 0 and 
concave on \ . 
(A2) (·,·)SU  is continuous, unimodal at t  for each t  on \ ; ( , )SU x t  is strictly 
increasing [decreasing] in x  for x t  [x t ]; 
(A3) If a Sender type t  is indiﬀerent between outcomes 1x  and 2 1x x , then 
higher types than t  prefer 2x  and lower types prefer 1x . 
 
Let the outcomes ( , ( ))St U tM E   and ( , ( ))St U tS E   be the indiﬀerence points 
to the left respectively right of t  with respect to the disagreement point, i.e. 
 
( ( , ( )), ) ( ( , ( )), ) ( , ).S S S S SU t U t U t U t U tM E S E E   
 
Let 1( , ( ))Sx UM E  and 1( , ( ))Sx US E  be the inverse functions of M  and S  with 
respect to t. Finally, we assume that  
 
(A4) M  and S  exist and are twice continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly 
increasing in t. 
(A5) 1 1,x xM S s ss sp  
2
2
1 0
x
Mss b  and 
2 1
( )
0Sx U E Mss s  . 
 
If it is clear that we talk about a particular game with ﬁxed ( )SU E , we will 
suppress the dependency on ( )SU E  and write ( ),tM  ( ),tS  1( )xM  and 1( ).xS  A 
simple condition on the Sender’s preferences such that they satisfy (A2)-(A5) is 
the following: 
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( , )SU x t  can be written as a function ( ),f t x  for all x in \ , t in [0,1], 
where f is continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing in \ , strictly 
decreasing in \  and for all y  \  there is a 0z   such that ( )f z y   
and ( ) .f z y  Finally, we require ( ) (0).SU fE  16  
 
Our results will often hold even when the Receiver’s utility is not concave and 
(A5) does not hold, but these assumptions will greatly facilitate the construc-
tion of equilibria in Proposition 2.2. In particular, let RS  be the point x in \  
where the Receiver is indiﬀerent between x and E  and deﬁne the function 
 
(2.1) 	 
1 1 1( ) ( )( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ) ( )R R Rh x x U x U x x U xM E M S  w  a a  
 
where a prime ( )a  denotes a derivative with respect to x.  
 
(A4) and (A5) imply that h  is strictly decreasing on [0, )RS  for all values of 
( )RU E  and ( ).SU E 17 Since ( ) 0,Rh S   this implies that for all ( )RU E  and ( )SU E  
there is an [0, (1)]x M  such that 
 
(2.2) 
  ( ) 0 for all [0, ) and
( ) 0 for all ( , (1)]
h x x x
h x x x M
 
   
 
(2.2) imposes regularity on the Receiver’s best response. Suppose the Receiver 
infers from a message that a type lies in the interval [ , ].t t  As long as 
min{ ( ), ( )}a t tM S , increasing a involves the tradeoﬀ between decreasing ( )RU a  
if a is accepted and increasing the acceptance probability by increasing the 
                                     
16 Due to the invariance of games to aﬃne payoﬀ transformations, it is actually only required 
that ( , )SU x t  can be written as a function ( )a b f t x ¸  , where 0b   and f should adhere to 
the conditions speciﬁed (with ( ) (0)SU a b fE   ¸ ). 
17  Under (A4) and (A5), all terms in ( )h xa  1 1( )( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( )R R Rx U x U x U xM E M  aa a a  
	 
1 1( ) ( ) ( )Rx x U xM S a a a  	 
1 1( ) ( ) ( )Rx x U xM S  aa   are negative on [0, )RS . 
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highest type that accepts a. (2.2) will ensure that there is a point x  independ-
ent of t  and t  such that (in a few important cases) for min{ ( ),, ( )}a x t tM S  
it pays to increase a and for min{ ( ),, ( )}a x t tM S  it does not. 
We follow Matthews (1989) in the reﬁnement of the perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium that we employ. First, we restrict the Receiver to play pure strategies. 
Second, we require that also Sender types who plan to veto any equilibrium 
action send a message inducing an action a that maximizes ( , ).SU a t  This 
reﬁnement is motivated on the basis of Selten’s (1975) trembling hand perfec-
tion argument: the Sender considers that she might tremble with a small proba-
bility and accept the Receiver’s proposed action.  
Let for any set ,S  S%  denote the set of probability distributions on S. A 
strategy for the Sender consists of a message function :T MN l%  and an 
acceptance probability function : [0,1].TO q\ |  A strategy of the Receiver is a 
function : .MB \|  Let { , , }T N O Bw  be a strategy proﬁle and 4  the set of all 
strategy proﬁles. The Receiver has correct prior beliefs 0.C  Finally, the Receiver 
has posterior beliefs : .M TC %|  An equilibrium { , , , }aT N O C      is charac-
terized by the following four conditions: 
 
 
We say that a type t  induces action ˆ,a  and write ˆ( ) ,a t a  if ˆ( )t aB   for all 
messages m that type sends.  
2.3.2 Results 
As in Matthews’ (1989) and Crawford and Sobel’s (1982) cheap talk game, all 
equilibria of our game are partition equilibria. 
(2.3) 
(i) ( ) arg max [( ( ) ( )) ( , ) | ] for all  R Ra tm E U a U a t mB E O C   \  
(ii) argmax ( ( ), ) for all  in the support of ( ) for all   S
m M
m U m t m t tB N 


 
(iii) ( , ) 1 if ( , ) 0 and ( , ) 0 if ( , ) 0S Sa t U a t a t U a tO O      
(iv) 0 is derived from  and  using Bayes' rule whenever possibleC N C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Deﬁnition 2.1 An equilibrium T  is called a partition equilibrium if there is a 
partition 0 1 10 1n nt t t t    "  of the type space such that each type in 
1( , )i it t  induces action an ia  with 1 2 ... .na a a    
 
Note that any partition equilibrium outcome can be characterized by the ac-
tions 1 2 ... naa a    the Receiver proposes in equilibrium. Due to (A3), the 
partition is then ﬁxed by 1( , ) ( , ).
S S
k k k kU a t U a t  The number of actions n is 
called the size of the equilibrium.  
 
Proposition 2.1 Any equilibrium of the cheap talk game is a partition equilib-
rium. 
 
The intuition behind the proof is that the conﬂict of interest between the 
Sender and the Receiver puts a limit on information transmission. After all, the 
Receiver would prefer to propose max{0, ( )}tM  if he knew the Sender’s type, 
whereas the Sender prefers to receive proposal t. This means that the highest 
type (supremum) inducing an action 0ia   must get zero payoﬀ in equilibrium, 
because otherwise the Receiver can do better by proposing a lower action 
instead of .ia  This means that 1ia   cannot be smaller than 
1( ( )),iaS M  because 
otherwise the highest type inducing ia  would prefer 1ia   over .ia  Hence, there is 
a minimum distance between any two strictly positive equilibrium actions. Since 
the Receiver never makes a proposal higher than ,RS  this means that the equi-
librium action set is ﬁnite. As Senders elicit the action closest to their type, this 
results in a well-ordered partition. 
We model an increase in a player’s bargaining power as an increase in her 
disagreement point payoﬀ. Power inﬂuences maximum information transmission: 
 
Proposition 2.2 (i) If the Receiver’s bargaining power increases, the maxi-
mum size of the equilibrium decreases. (ii) If the Sender’s bargaining power 
increases, the maximum size of the equilibrium increases. 
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Hence, the higher the bargaining power of the Sender relative to that of the 
Receiver, the more information that can be transmitted in equilibrium. In the 
proof, we construct a maximum size equilibrium. Using a similar reasoning as in 
the proof of Proposition 2.1, we show that in equilibrium 1( ) ( )k k kt a tM M  b  for 
all 2,...,k n  (Lemma 2.1) and 1( )k kt aS  b  for 3,...,k n  (Lemma 2.2). In the 
most interesting case, when 1 1(0) ( ),xM S   at least a size-3 equilibrium exists. 
Furthermore, the highest possible value an equilibrium action can take is then 
x , the point where ( )h x  is zero. We can in this case construct a maximum size 
equilibrium by 
- Setting the highest equilibrium action na  equal to ;x  
- Iteratively adding equilibrium actions 11 ( ( ))k ka aM S   until it ‘does not 
ﬁt anymore’ ( 1( ( )) 0kaM S  ); 
- Setting 1 0.a   
Increasing the Receiver’s bargaining power decreases ,x  so that the number 
of equilibrium actions that ‘ﬁt’ in this equilibrium becomes smaller (or remains 
the same). Increasing the Sender’s bargaining power ﬁrstly increases .x  In 
addition, increasing the Sender’s power decreases the distance between equilibri-
um actions because the function 1( ( ))a aM S  becomes smaller.  
There are two features of the relation between power and information trans-
mission that deserve further attention. First, Senders who induce 0 could reveal 
their type. We can use the number of equilibrium actions as a proxy for infor-
mation transmission in so far as all Sender types who induce an equilibrium 
action a send the same message. For each equilibrium outcome, always an 
equilibrium exists where this holds for all types. However, also pay-oﬀ equivalent 
equilibria exist where types inducing 1 0a  reveal their type. The reason is that 
they are protected by the fact that the Sender does not want to propose an 
action below 0. This means that Senders who are closely aligned to the Receiver 
can fully separate. In addition, this implies that if the Sender has no power (if 
(1) 0M b ), then an equilibrium exists with full separation. In this case the 
Receiver always proposes 0 and Senders can send any message they want in 
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equilibrium. Observe that they do not have an actual incentive to reveal their 
type. 
Second, complete power in the Sender’s hands may lead to less information 
transmission. If the Sender becomes very powerful ( E( )SU  approaches ( , )SU t t ), 
her  incentive to communicate becomes small. In our model this is not relevant 
as long as E( )SU b ( , )SU t t . However, one can imagine a model where sending a 
message has a small positive cost. In this case, increasing the power of the 
Sender will increase information transmission until the costs of communicating 
outweigh the beneﬁts.  
2.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we examined how power shapes communication under infor-
mation asymmetry. Our interest was to explore the levels of clarity that are 
likely to arise between members of groups with diﬀerent levels of power. We 
expect cultural patterns to evolve to a strategic equilibrium over time and, 
hence, we investigated whether there is a strategic relationship between power 
and clarity. In a game-theoretic bargaining model, we showed that clarity is 
indeed a privilege of the powerful. When negotiating an outcome, an informed 
bargainer with (relatively) little bargaining power cannot aﬀord to reveal too 
much information, as that can be used against her. How much information can 
be transmitted depends crucially on the relative power of the informed party, 
the Sender: less information can be transmitted if either the Sender’s power 
decreases or the Receiver’s power increases.   
We see our one-dimensional model with one-sided asymmetric information as 
a proof of principle providing a more general intuition. The conﬂict of interest 
between the two parties imposes an upper bound on information transmission in 
equilibrium; the informed party cannot reveal too much information, as infor-
mation allows the uninformed party to exploit her. Crucially, the informed 
party’s bargaining power limits how much she can be exploited and hence 
enhances information transmission in equilibrium. In contrast, bargaining power 
of the uninformed party limits the range of mutually attractive actions where 
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information transmission is meaningful. Crawford & Sobel (1982) found that 
information transmission is determined by the alignment of interests when the 
Sender has no inﬂuence on the outcome. We have identiﬁed another key deter-
minant of information transmission if the Sender does have some inﬂuence on 
the outcome: bargaining power. 
In addition to providing a proof-of-principle, our analysis has testable impli-
cations for communication and outcomes. In Chapter 3, we test our predictions 
in a controlled laboratory experiment and ﬁnd that the relative power of the 
Sender increases information transmission. Furthermore, the type of bargaining 
situations we study often occur in the ﬁeld.  
One application concerns contract negotiations between employers and em-
ployees. Here, asymmetric information and bargaining power play a signiﬁcant 
role. One can think of an employee’s preference for the work-life balance (salary 
versus ﬂexibility) or the type of activities she is required to do. For instance, 
when a department negotiates with a potential new professor about her admin-
istrative and teaching duties, the preference of the professor for administration 
versus teaching are typically unknown. One implication of our analysis is that 
when the employee has more bargaining power, she will be able to convey her 
preferences more precisely. As a measure of bargaining power one could use the 
level of skill of employees or the unemployment rate in a given sector and/or 
year. Our model predicts that as information transmission increases, the variety 
of outcomes also increases. As a consequence, our model predicts that the 
variety of labor contracts in a speciﬁc job market should be increasing with the 
employment rate (in the sector) and the skill-level required for the job. 
Another application where our model has testable implications is negotiations 
between a competition authority and two ﬁrms planning a merger. If the merger 
creates or strengthens market power in the relevant market, the competition 
authority can demand remedies, such as requiring the ﬁrms to sell some produc-
tion-lines to a third party. Firms always want as few remedies as possible. 
Preferences of competition authorities are less clear, as they have to weigh 
economies of scale against market power.18 Competition authorities provide 
                                     
18 Another possible trade-oﬀ for competition authorities concerns collusion (Compte, Jenny & 
Rey, 2002). A merger reduces the number of competing ﬁrms, which can make collusion easier. 
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information about their preferences to ﬁrms before they submit their ﬁnal 
proposal, often already in the pre-notiﬁcation phase. Our model predicts that 
the variability of the proposals a competition authority receives is increasing in 
her power. A competition authority with little power always gets the same kind 
of proposal (across comparable cases), for instance a proposal without remedies. 
A competition authority with more power can expect to receive proposals that 
sometimes include remedies and sometimes not. Indicators exist about the 
strength of competition authorities, such as the OECD’s Competition Law and 
Policy (CLP) indicators (Høj, 2007) or those developed by Voigt (2006) for a 
broader set of countries. Such indicators include the formal and factual inde-
pendence of competition authorities. These proxies for bargaining power could 
be related to how often ﬁnal proposals include remedies (or even to the variety 
of remedies included). A relevant comparison would be between competition 
authorities in (old) EU member states and the US with those in Latin America 
or Eastern Europe.19 
2.5 Appendix: Proofs 
Proof of Proposition 2.1 Let T  be an equilibrium. First, suppose the Re-
ceiver plays at least three actions in equilibrium and let a aa  be two strictly 
positive equilibrium actions. Let ( )t a  be the supremum of types that induce 
action a. Then 0 ( ( ))a t aM b , because otherwise the Receiver would be better 
oﬀ by playing ( ( ))t aM  instead of a. Furthermore, ( ( )),a t aSa p  because otherwise 
( , ( ))SU a t aa ( , ( )).SU a t a This means that aa  ( ( )) ( ( )).a t a t aS Mp  Consequent-
ly, an upper bound on the number of equilibrium actions is 1 1/ I , where 
[0,1]min { ( ) ( )}t t tI S M  . This means that the set of equilibrium actions, A , is 
ﬁnite. Hence, we can write 1 2{ , ,..., }nA a a a
   with 1 2 ... .na a a    
                                                                                                           
However, if a merger involves the largest ﬁrm, it can also increase asymmetries in capacity 
constraints, making collusion more diﬃcult. 
19 For comparative work on competition authorities in Latin America see Schatan & Rivera 
(2008) and Qaqaya & Lipmile (2008); For competition authorities in Europe see Cseres (2010). 
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Second, (A2)-(A3) imply that for each consecutive action pair 1,k ka a   a triple 
of types 1 1k k kt t t    exists such that 
 
1( , ) ( , )
S S
k k k kU a t U a t  and  
la  argmax ( , )Sa A U a t  iﬀ 1 ][ ,l lt t t  for l = k, k+1 
 
Consequently, a partition of the type space 0 1 1 10 n nt t t t     "  exists 
such that for each k  all types in 1( , )k kt t  induce the same action ka  and that 
k lv  implies that ka lav . Q.E.D. 
 
The following two lemmas are useful for the proof of Proposition 2.2. 
 
Lemma 2.1 In equilibrium, 1( ) ( )k k kt a tM M  b  for all 2,...,k n . 
Proof. Note that by construction, 1 2 ... na a a   . It must be the case that 
1 0ka a p  for all 2,..., .k n  Moreover, ( )k ka tM  cannot occur in equilibrium, 
because if the Sender type is in the interval < >1,k kt t , the Receiver is better oﬀ by 
oﬀering ( )ka tM  instead of ka a . Finally, 1( )k ka tM  because otherwise none 
of the types in < >1,k kt t  will accept ka . Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma 2.2 1( )k kt aS  b  for 3,...,k n . 
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Lemma 2.1 shows that 1 1( )k ka tM b , so 
that type 1kt  ’s utility is equal to the utility of the disagreement point if she 
induces 1.ka  Suppose that 1( ) .k kt aS    Then type 1kt   is strictly better oﬀ 
inducing ka  instead of 1ka  . This constitutes a contradiction, because types just 
below 1kt   would strictly prefer sending ka  instead of 1ka  , while they induce 
1ka   in equilibrium. Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2.2 We ﬁrst prove (i).  If (1) 0M b , the game only 
has a pooling equilibrium in which 0 0t  , 1 1t  , and 1 0a  . Otherwise, if 
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1 1(0) ( )xM S p , the maximum size equilibrium has size 2 with 0 0t  , 2 1t  , 
1 0a  , and 1t  and 2a  simultaneously solve 
 
	 
	 
1 12 [0, (1)] 1argmax ( ) ( ) ( ) max{ , ( )}  a  ndR Raa U a U a t aM E M S     
1 2 1 ( , ) ( ,0).
S SU t a U t 20 
 
Finally, if 1 1(0) ( ),xM S   the maximum size equilibrium has at least size 3 and 
can be constructed using the following algorithm: 
1. Let n  be some natural number. Deﬁne 1nt  , 11 ( )nt xS  , na x , and 
assign value 2n   to counter k . 
2. Deﬁne (0,1]kt   such that 1( ) ( )k kt tS M  . If such a kt  does not exist, go to 
step 3. Otherwise, 1 ( )k ka tS  , 1k kk   and return to step 2. 
3. Relabel 1,...,k nt t  and 2,...,k na a  such that 1k k , 1 2k  k , ..., n nk . 
Let 0 0,t   1 0,a   2 2( )a tM  and deﬁne 1t  such that 
1 1 2( ,0) ( , ).
S SU t U t a  
In step 2, 1ka   follows from the requirement that actions maximize ex-
pected utility \ ^1( ( ) ( )) ( , ) ( , ) | [ , ]R R S S k kU x U P U x t U t t t tE E    , which in our case 
implies 
 
	 
	 
1 11 [0,1] 1argmax ( ) ( ) min{ , ( )} max{ , ( )}R Rk a k ka U a U t a t aE M S       
 
Due to Lemma 2.1, for all 2,..., 1k n   it must hold that 
1 1( ) ( )k k ka t tM S b  , and hence the condition reduces to  
 
	 
	 

1
1
1 ( )argmax ( ) ( ) ( ) .k
R R
k a t ka U a U a tM E M  b    
 
                                     
20 These two equations have a solution. Let 1( )t a  be the point where 1 1( , ) (0 ) , .S SU a t U t  
Then there exists a continuous function 2( )a a  such that 2( )a a
	 
 \ ^	 
1 1[0, (1)] 1argmax ( ) ( ) ( ) max ( ), ( ) .R Ra U a U a t a aM E M S     Observe that 2(0) 0a p  and 
2(1) (1).a Mb  Hence 2( )a a  has a ﬁxed point on [0,1]. 
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If 1 1( )k ka tM   for 2k p , 1ka   maximizes expected utility if 
 
	 
 	 
1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 for ( )R R Rk ka U a U a t U a a tM E M M     p ba a  
 
From (2.2) it follows that 	 
 	 
1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )R R Rka U a U a t U aM E M   aa 
	 
1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0Rkh a a t U a h aS  pa  for 1( ) ( ) .k ka t t xS M     Similarly, we 
can justify setting na x  in step 1 by observing that (1)x Mb  and  setting 
2 2( )a tM  in step 3 by observing that 1 1( ) ( )k k ka t tM S b  . 
In addition, no equilibrium exists with an na x . Suppose, to the contrary 
that .na x  Observe that (1) ( ).n na tM Mb   Furthermore, 1( )n nt aS  b  by Lem-
ma 2.2, since the equilibrium size is at least 3.  We can show that the ﬁrst order 
condition for na  to be optimal cannot be met, since ( ) 0h a   for ( , ] :a x a  
First, let 1( ) .n nt aS    Now, 1 1( ( ) ( ))a aM S a a
	 
 	 
1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )R R RU a U a a U aE M S   a  	 
1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0R Rh a a U a US E a    for 
1(max{ , ( )}, ].n na x t aS   (Observe that 	 
1 ( ) ( ) ( ) 0R Ra U a US E  a  for 
1(max{ , ( )}, ].)n na x t aS   Second, let 1( ) .n nt aS    In this case, the derivative for 
the expected utility for 1[ ( ), ]n na t aM   is  1 ( )aM a
	 
 	 
1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )R R RnU a U a t U aE M    a  	 
1 1( ) ( ) ( ).Rnh a a t U aS   a  Since the 
ﬁrst term is strictly negative and the second term is 0 for 1( ),n na a tS    there 
is an interval ( , ]n na aF  where the derivative is negative. Hence, na  cannot be 
optimal if it is larger than x . 
Because ( )tM  and ( )tS  are monotonic by assumption, this algorithm results in 
the tightest partition which satisﬁes the equilibrium properties from Lemma 2.1 
and Lemma 2.2 so that it implements an equilibrium of the highest possible size. 
Suppose the Receiver’s bargaining power ( )RU E  increases from 1  to .1  Now 
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1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )R Rx U x x x U xM M S  1  a a   
	 
 	 
1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 0.R Rx U x x x U x xM M S M   a a 1    11 a   
 
Hence, for the new threshold x

 following from (2.2), it holds that x x . If 
1 1(0) ( ),xM S p  observe that 1 1 1( ) ( ) (0)x xS S M  b b . If 1 1(0) ( ),xM S   then 
with the above algorithm we can get a maximum size equilibrium with partition 
0 10 1.nt t t    
  " Furthermore, when running the above algorithm, all 
new threshold types will be lower than for the original game ( n k n kt t  

 for all 
1 k nb   ). Therefore, the maximum size of the equilibrium decreases if the 
Receiver’s bargaining power increases.  
 
Now we proof (ii). Suppose that the Sender’s bargaining power ( )SU E  increases 
from 4  to ˆ .4  If (1, ) 0,M 4 b observe that ˆ(1, ) (1, ).M M4  4 If 1 1(0, ) ( , ),xM S 4 p 4  
note that 1 1 1 1ˆ ˆ(0, ) ( , ) (0, ) ( , ),x xM S M S     4  44 4  and 1 1( , ) (ˆ , ),x xS S  44
since 1 1(0, ) (0, )ˆM M  44  and 1 1( , ) (ˆ , ).x xS S  44   
Finally, let 1 1(0, ) ( , ).xM S 4  4  Analogous to the proof of (i), we can show 
that increasing the Sender’s bargaining power results in a higher xˆ : 
 
	 
 	 
1 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( )RR Rx U x U x x U xM E M S  4   4 a 4a  
	 
 	 
1 1 1( , )) ( ) ( ) ( , )) ( , )) ( )R R Rx U x U x x U xM E M S   4   4 a 4a  
	 
1 1ˆ( ( , ) ( , )) ( ) ( )R Rx x U x UM M E  4 4 a a
  
	 
1 1 1 1ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( )Rx x x x U xM M S S    4  4  4  a4
 
> 0 
  
Observe for the third term in the middle expression that 1 1ˆ( , ) ( , )x xM M 4  a 4a  
by (A5); and for fourth term that 1 1ˆ( , ) ( , )x xM M 4  4  and 1 1ˆ( , ) ( , )x xS S 4  4  
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due to the shrinking interval of points the Sender accepts when her power 
increases. 
Hence, with the above algorithm we can get a new maximum size equilibrium 
partition ˆ0 1ˆ ˆ ˆ0 1.nt t t   " There are now two reasons why all  threshold 
types will be higher than for the original game ( ˆnˆ k n kt t   for all 1 k nb  ), 
possibly resulting in extra equilibrium actions. First, the highest equilibrium 
action can be higher, since ˆ .x x  Second, the equilibrium actions will be closer 
together, since for each type it holds that ˆ( , ) ( , )t tM M4  4  and ˆ( , ) ( , ).t tS S4  4   
Hence, the number of equilibrium actions in the maximum size equilibrium is 
(weakly) higher when ˆ( )SU E  4  than when ( ) .SU E  4  Q.E.D. 
 
Proof Equilibrium Characterization Example section 2.2. Observe 
that in the example assumptions (A2)-(A5) are satisﬁed. By Proposition 2.1, all 
equilibria are partition equilibria. Condition (iv) can be shown to follow Lemma 
2.1 and Lemma 2.2, and the other conditions follow from the proof of Proposi-
tion 2.2. The characterization of the maximum equilibrium-size is a direct result 
from conditions (i)-(v). Observe that if 1,Sd  max 2, 1 .
2 S
x
n
d
£ ²  ¯¦ ¦¦ ¦¡ ° ¤ »¦ ¦¡ °¡ °¦ ¦¥ ¼
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Chapter 3 ACDC Rocks When Other Criteria 
Remain Silent21 
3.1 Introduction 
Crawford & Sobel (1982) showed how meaningful costless communication 
between an informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver can be supported in 
equilibrium. Their seminal paper inspired many applications ranging from the 
presidential veto (Matthews, 1989), legislative committees (Gilligan & Krehbiel, 
1990) and political correctness (Morris, 2001) to double auctions (Matthews & 
Postlewaite (1989); Farrell & Gibbons (1989)), stock recommendations (Morgan 
& Stocken, 2003) and matching markets (Coles, Kushnir & Niederle, 2010). 
These cheap talk games are characterized by multiple equilibria which diﬀer 
crucially in their prediction about how much information will be transmitted. 
Standard signaling reﬁnements such as Kohlberg & Merten’s strategic stability 
(1986) have no bite in this setting, as messages are costless. Hence, this raises 
the important issue of equilibrium selection. As of yet, however, no satisfying 
reﬁnement exists that works well across a wide range of cheap talk games.22 
 To overcome the selection problem, Farrell (1993) pioneered the approach of 
what we call credible deviations. Farrell observed that, in contrast to what is 
assumed in standard game theory, communication in real life is based on a pre-
existing natural language.23 Hence, it is possible to send out-of-equilibrium 
messages that will be understood, although they will not necessarily be believed. 
Farrell proposes a criterion under which such out-of-equilibrium messages, or 
neologisms, are credible and, hence, should be believed by a Receiver. Arguably, 
an equilibrium is not stable if some Senders can send a credible neologism that 
would induce a rational Receiver to deviate from equilibrium. Equilibria that do 
                                     
21 This chapter is based on De Groot Ruiz, Oﬀerman & Onderstal (2011b). 
22 For a comprehensive review of Sender-Receiver games, see Sobel (2010). 
23 See Blume, DeJong, Kim & Sprinkle (1998) and Agranov & Schotter (2010) for studies on 
the role of natural language in cheap talk games. 
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not admit credible neologisms are ‘neologism proof.’ Alas, neologism proofness 
tends to be too eﬀective and regularly eliminates all equilibria. Matthews, 
Okuno-Fujiwara & Postlewaite (1991) address important conceptual issues with 
neologism proofness and propose three alternative accounts of what constitutes 
a credible deviation. Unfortunately, these ‘announcement proofness’ criteria also 
fail to be predictive in many games (such as the Crawford-Sobel (1982) model). 
Partly for this reason, several other types of concepts have been proposed that 
distinguish between stable and unstable equilibria (or proﬁles), such as Partial 
Common Interest (PCI) (Blume, Kim & Sobel, 1993), the recurrent mop (Rabin 
& Sobel, 1996) and No Incentive To Separate (NITS) (Chen, Kartik & Sobel, 
2008). These criteria often work well in speciﬁc settings, but fail to discriminate 
successfully across across a wider range of cheap talk games. 
We take a diﬀerent tack: we propose a criterion that is based on credible de-
viations but allows for a continuous instead of a binary stability concept. Our 
ﬁrst conjecture is that credible deviations matter, in the sense that an equilibri-
um which does not admit credible deviations is more stable than one that does. 
Our second conjecture is that credible deviations matter gradually: of two 
equilibria that allow for credible deviations, the one with smaller deviations will 
predict better. A binary stability criterion is appropriate for rational agents, but 
may unnecessarily lose predictive power when applied to human behavior, which 
is seldom completely in (or out of) equilibrium. 
We formalize this idea in the Average Credible Deviation Criterion (ACDC). 
According to ACDC, the behavioral stability of an equilibrium is a decreasing 
function of its Average Credible Deviation (ACD), a measure of the frequency 
and intensity of credible deviations. The ACD measures the mass of types that 
can credibly deviate and the size of those induced deviations (as measured by 
the diﬀerence in Sender payoﬀ between the equilibrium and deviating action). 
Comparable equilibria will perform better if they have a lower ACD on this 
account. In particular, we call an equilibrium that minimizes the ACD in a 
game an ‘ACDC equilibrium.’ This allows us to select equilibria, even in games 
where no equilibrium is completely stable.  
We show that an ACDC equilibrium exists under general conditions. In addi-
tion, ACDC makes meaningful predictions in a variety of settings that have 
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previously been analyzed theoretically and experimentally. We look at how 
ACDC performs in a range of discrete games analyzed by Blume, DeJong, Kim 
& Sprinkle (2001) in the laboratory and ﬁnd that ACDC organizes the main 
features of the data. We illustrate the predictive capability of ACDC in a veto 
threats model with a large equilibrium set where existing criteria fail. This game 
belongs to the class of veto threats games introduced in Chapter 2 and we show 
here that ACDC selects a unique most informative equilibrium in this class. In 
Chapter 4, we study this class of games experimentally and ﬁnd that the results 
corroborate the predictions of ACDC. Furthermore, we show that ACDC selects 
the unique maximum size equilibrium in the leading uniform quadratic case of 
the Crawford-Sobel game for a large range of bias parameters. Until now, only 
NITS (Chen, Kartik & Sobel, 2008) was able to select (this equilibrium) in the 
Crawford-Sobel setting. In addition, the maximum size equilibrium becomes 
more stable as the bias parameter becomes smaller according to ACDC, which is 
not predicted by existing criteria. Both results are qualitatively supported by 
experimental work on (discrete) Crawford-Sobel games (Dickhaut, McCabe & 
Mukherji (1995), Cai & Wang (2006) and Wang, Spezio & Camerer (2010)).   
ACDC is meant to solve a practical problem: how to select the most plausible 
equilibrium in cheap talk games? It constitutes an intuitive, generally applicable 
and experimentally validated selection criterion. In addition to selecting the 
most plausible equilibrium, ACDC can be informative about how well this 
equilibrium will perform if it is not completely stable. A major advantage is that 
it can easily be applied in almost all cheap talk games and provides meaningful 
results. Wherever experimental evidence exists, the predictions of ACDC are in 
line with the data: it performs at least as well as other criteria, when they are 
predictive, and also makes predictions when other criteria are silent. We believe 
these characteristics make it a valuable contribution to the current literature. 
This chapter has the following structure. In section 3.2, we motivate and in-
troduce ACDC and compare it to neologism proofness and announcement 
proofness. In section 3.3, we illustrate how ACDC works in some simple discrete 
games. In section 3.4, we compare ACDC to other concepts in a veto threats 
game with a large equilibrium set. In section 3.5, we analyze the ACDC-
properties of the uniform quadratic Crawford-Sobel model. In section 3.6, we 
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look at the performance of ACDC in experiments. Finally, section 3.7 concludes. 
All proofs are relegated to Appendix 3.8. 
3.2 ACDC 
ACDC is based on theories of credible deviations. To illustrate the idea be-
hind credible deviations, we start with Game A, a simple game taken from 
Farrell (1993). A Sender sends a costless message m to the Receiver, who then 
takes one of three actions: 1 2,a a  or 3.a  Both players’ payoﬀ functions depend on 
the Receiver’s action and the Sender’s type. The Sender’s type, drawn from 
1 2{ , }t t with equal probability, is private information of the Sender. Table 3.1 
shows the payoﬀs.  
 
TABLE 3.1
GAME A 
1a  2a  3a  
1t (
1
2 ) 3, 3 0, 0 2, 2 
2t (
1
2 ) 0, 0 3, 3 2, 2 
Notes: The left column shows the Sender’s type and between brackets 
the probability that it is drawn. The top row shows the Receiver’s actions. 
The remaining cells provide the Sender’s payoﬀ in the ﬁrst entry and the 
Receiver’s payoﬀs in the second entry.  
 
The game has two (perfect Bayesian) equilibria: a pooling and a separating 
equilibrium.24 In the pooling equilibrium, all Senders use the same message 
strategy and the Receiver always proposes 3,a  regardless of the message. In the 
separating equilibrium, 1t  sends a message inducing 1a  whereas 2t  sends a 
diﬀerent message that induces 2.a
25 The separating equilibrium seems more 
plausible, as it Pareto-dominates the pooling equilibrium. Still, standard signal-
ing reﬁnements in the vein of Kohlberg and Mertens’ (1986) strategic stability 
                                     
24 An equilibrium outcome speciﬁes which action(s) are played by the Receiver given each 
type. Each equilibrium outcome is induced by a whole class of essentially equivalent equilibria, 
which only diﬀer in the messages used. For simplicity, we will refer to an equilibrium outcome 
simply by ‘equilibrium.’ 
25 We say a type t induces an action a, if she always sends a message to which the Receiver 
always responds with action a. 
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are silent in cheap talk games, since all messages are equally costless. For a 
similar reason, the (Agent) Quantal Response Equilibrium (McKelvey & Palfrey, 
1998), which can often select equilibria in signaling games, is not predictive in 
cheap talk games.26 
To overcome the selection problem, Farrell (1993) pioneered the idea of credi-
ble deviations and introduced the neologism proofness criterion. Neologisms are 
out-of-equilibrium messages which are assumed to have a literal meaning in a 
pre-existing natural language. Farrell considers neologisms which literally say: 
“play action ,a  because my type is in set N.” Farrell deems a neologism credible 
if and only if (i) all types t  in N  prefer a  to their equilibrium action ( )a tT , (ii) 
all types t  not in N  prefer their equilibrium action ( )a tT  to a  and (iii) the 
best reply of the Receiver after restricting the support of his prior to N  is to 
play .a  We will denote neologisms by , .a N  According to Farrell, credible 
deviations lead rational players to deviate from equilibrium. An equilibrium is 
neologism proof, and stable on this account, if and only if it does not admit any 
credible neologism.  
Matthews, Okuno-Fujiwara & Postlewaite (1991) identify two potential prob-
lems with this credibility criterion. First, it can sometimes be too strict, as it 
does not allow diﬀerent deviating types to separate. Second, it is sometimes not 
strict enough. The credibility of a neologism is not aﬀected by the existence of 
other credible neologisms, although the choice of the Sender about which neolo-
gism she sends potentially reveals information. To solve these problems they 
consider more elaborate credible deviations, called announcements. Like a 
neologism, an announcement speciﬁes a type-subset N  to which the deviating 
Sender claims to belong. An announcement also provides a strategy specifying 
for each types if and how they deviate. Let ( )N t  be the set N type t claims to 
be in and & the set of all ( ).N t  Let 0C  be the Receiver’s prior beliefs and 0NC  
                                     
26 The Agent Quantal Response Equilibrium (A-QRE) is the extensive form game variant of 
the Quantal Response Equilibrium. The problem in cheap talk games is that the A-QRE does 
not eliminate the pooling equilibrium, which is often implausible. The pooling equilibrium is 
always a limiting, principal branch A-QRE: For any rationality parameter , there is an A-QRE 
where all Senders mix uniformly over the message space and the Receiver ignores all messages. 
As  increases, the Senders strategy remains unchanged, and the Receiver’s best response 
smoothly approaches its actual best response to her prior. 
M
M
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her prior beliefs 0C  restricted to have support N. Finally, let ( )BR C  be the 
Receiver’s best response set if she has beliefs .C  An announcement is credible if 
(i) each deviating type prefers any action in 	 
( )0N tBR C  to her equilibrium 
action, (ii) each deviating type prefers any action in 	 
( )0N tBR C  to any action in 
	 

\{
0
( )}
,N
N N t
BR C

*
&
 (iii) each non-deviating type prefers her equilibrium action to 
any action in 	 
0N
N
BR C

*
&
 and (iv) for each deviating type no announcements 
exist satisfying (i)-(iii) where she earns more than in the current announce-
ment.27 They also deﬁne a weaker and a stronger credibility criterion. A weakly 
credible announcement only satisﬁes (i)-(iii), whereas a strongly credible an-
nouncement also must propose an equilibrium. Matthews and coauthors express 
a preference for (ordinary) credible announcements.28 
In game A, the pooling equilibrium admits two credible neologisms, 1 1, { }a t  
and 2 2, { } .a t  These deviations also form a credible announcement. Hence, the 
pooling equilibrium is neither neologism proof nor announcement proof. The 
separating equilibrium, on the other hand, must be neologism and announce-
ment proof since all types receive their maximum payoﬀ. Hence, neologism and 
announcement proofness provide a compelling strategic reason why rational 
players would play the separating equilibrium.  
Unfortunately, neologism and announcement proofness are often too eﬀective 
and eliminate all equilibria, as Game B in Table 3.2 illustrates. Now three types 
can be drawn, 1t  and 2t  each with probability (1 ) / 2E  and 3t  with probabil-
ity .E  The Receiver’s best response is to play ia  if he knows the Sender is .it  
His best response is to play 5a  if he holds his prior beliefs and to play 4a  if he 
restricts his prior to have support 2 3{ , }t t  (for 
1
2E  ). 1t  prefers 5a  over all other 
actions and hence would prefer to pool with the other types. 3t  prefers to be 
identiﬁed as herself, as she prefers 3.a  2t  prefers to pool with 3t  (as she prefers 
                                     
27 We use a somewhat simpler deﬁnition than Matthews et al. for ease of exposition. 
28 Another approach similar to credible neologisms is Myerson’s (1989) credible negotiation 
statements. Myerson is able to obtain a solution concept that guarantees existence but at the 
cost of assuming the presence of a mediator. 
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4a ) and the worst case for her is to be identiﬁed. The game has two equilibria. 
In the pooling equilibrium, all Senders induce 5.a  In the semi-separating equi-
librium, 1t  induces 1,a  whereas 2t  and 3t  induce 4.a  Neither equilibrium is 
neologism or announcement proof (if 0 1).F   The pooling equilibrium admits 
the credible neologism 4 2 3, { , } .a t t  The semi-separating equilibrium admits the 
credible neologism 3 3, { } .a t  In this game, (weakly) credible announcements 
coincide with credible neologisms.29 
 
TABLE 3.2
GAME B
 1a  2a  3a  4a  5a  
  1t  (
1
2
E ) 1, 4 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 2, 3 
  2t (
1
2
E ) 0, 0 0, 2 + E 1 + F , 0 2, 2 1, 1 
  3t  (E ) 0, 0 0, 0 2 + F , 3 2, 2 1, 1 
Notes: We use the same notation as in Table 3.1. 120 E  and 0 1F   
 
For entirely rational agents, the fact that neither equilibrium is stable might be 
all there is to be said. When explaining or predicting human behavior, however, 
we feel we can go further. Human behavior is hardly ever completely in or out of 
equilibrium, and by imposing a binary distinction between stable and unstable 
equilibria one may lose predictive power.30 
In game B, even though the separating equilibrium is not entirely stable, it 
seems more plausible than the pooling equilibrium if either 3t  is infrequent (E  
small) or 3t has a very small incentive to deviate (F  small). If E  is small, then 
the separating equilibrium will be upset with a small probability, whereas the 
pooling equilibrium will be upset almost half of the time. Similarly, if F  is small, 
                                     
29 Neither equilibrium admits strongly credible announcements, since the deviations proﬁle 
does not comprise an equilibrium in itself. This is typical for many cheap talk games. Due to the 
strong credibility requirement of strongly credible announcements, in most games no equilibrium 
admits them. 
30 We consider equilibrium, when applied to human behavior, to be most meaningful in a 
dynamic context, where members of a group interact frequently with diﬀerent other members. In 
this context language evolves and behavior is shaped by strategic forces in the direction of 
equilibrium. For a one-shot game between rational individuals without social information, an 
approach based on rationalizability and some focal meaning of messages, such as that in Rabin 
(1990), may be appropriate. 
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then 3t  has a small incentive to deviate in the separating equilibrium and may 
choose to stick to it, lest she be misunderstood and get a payoﬀ lower than she 
gets by sticking to equilibrium. Hence, we would expect to observe behavior 
close to the separating equilibrium more frequently than behavior close to the 
pooling equilibrium. 
Our intuition is that the behavioral stability of an equilibrium is a decreasing 
function of the average intensity of the credible deviations it admits. This 
depends, ﬁrstly, on the mass of types that can credibly induce a deviation and, 
secondly, on the intensity of the deviation, measured by the incentive the Sender 
has to deviate. As a consequence, if the deviating mass and the induced devia-
tions from equilibrium are small, the equilibrium is likely to be a good predictor 
of behavior. We formalize this intuition in our ACDC criterion. 
We will now deﬁne ACDC for a general setting that allows for a discrete and 
continuous type set, and covers both pure advising and veto threats bargaining 
games. We consider the following two-player cheap talk game. The game is 
played by a Sender and a Receiver. Nature draws the Sender type t from distri-
bution f on T, where T  is a compact metric space. The Sender then privately 
observes her type t and chooses a message .m M After having observed the 
Sender’s message, the Receiver chooses an action ,a A  where A  is a compact 
metric space.31 After seeing the action, the Sender chooses between accepting 
( 1v  ) or rejecting ( 0v  ) the action. If she rejects, the outcome is the disa-
greement point .E  If ,AE   the game has an interior veto threat and otherwise 
it has an exterior veto threat. In cheap talk games without veto threats, the 
Sender is forced to accept the action so that v  is always equal to 1. The out-
come set is { }.X A E   Let :RU X Tq l \  be the utility function of the 
Receiver :SU X Tq l \  that of the Sender. We assume both are bounded from 
above and below. For a set ,S  let S%  denote the set of probability distributions 
on S. Then, a strategy for the Sender consists of a function :T MN %|  and a 
function : [0,1]A TO q |  and a strategy of the Receiver is a function 
                                     
31 This representation allows for T and A to be de facto discrete, by having ( , )SU t x  and 
( , )RU t x  be constant on regions of the type and outcome space. 
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: M AB %| . Let S4  be the set of Sender strategies and R4  the set of Receiver 
strategies. Let { , , }T N O Bw  be a strategy proﬁle and 4  the set of all strategy 
proﬁles. ( )m t  will denote the random variable of the Sender’s message after 
learning t  (determined by N ) and ( )a m  will denote the random variable of the 
Receiver’s action after receiving m  (determined by B ). Finally, let the Receiver 
have prior and posterior beliefs (a function : M TC %| ) over the Sender’s 
type, 0 fC   and ( )mC  respectively. 
The Sender’s expected payoﬀ is ( , , | )SEU t N O B = 
	 
	 
( ( ( )), )· ( ( ( )), ) 1 ( ( ( )), ) · ( , )  .S Sa m t t U a m t t a m t t U t dO O E T4  ¨  The Receiver´s 
expected payoﬀ given her beliefs and message m is ( , | , )REU mB O C  = 
	 
	 
	 

[0,1]
( ( ( )), )· ( ( ), ) 1 ( ( ( )), ) · ( , ) ( ) .
R
R
T
Ra m t t U da m t a m t t U dt dmO O E C O B
4
 ¨ ¨ ¨ A 
perfect Bayesian equilibrium T  = ,{{ , }, }N O B C     speciﬁes a strategy proﬁle 
together with Receiver beliefs and is characterized by the following three condi-
tions: 
 
{ , }
{ , } argmax ( , , | ) for all S Svv EU t t TNN N O B  4    
(3.1) argmax ( , |, , ) for all R REU m m MBB B O C  4   
0( ) is derived from  and using Bayes Rule whenever pos ible smC N C  
 
Let 4  be the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria (from now on just ‘equilibria’). 
ACDC provides a stability measure and a selection criterion for equilibria. The 
starting point of ACDC is a theory of credible deviations .H  Such a theory 
associates a deviating proﬁle ( )H T  4  with an equilibrium .T  (For conven-
ience, we write ( ) { , },H H HH T N O B    ) A deviating proﬁle speciﬁes ﬁrstly which 
Sender types would deviate and in which way, and secondly, how the Receiver 
would react. If no type can send a credible deviation according to ,H  then 
( )H T T  .  
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The following step is to measure the intensity of each type’s credible devia-
tion, which we denote by ( , ).CD tH T  We would like this measure to have some 
properties. It should be 
- invariant to aﬃne transformations of payoﬀs; 
- increasing in the diﬀerence between the deviating and equilibrium payoﬀ; 
- 0 if the diﬀerence between deviating and equilibrium payoﬀ is zero; 
- 1 if the diﬀerence between deviating and equilibrium payoﬀ is maximal. 
We then deﬁne the Average Credible Deviation (ACD) of an equilibrium T  
relative to H  as: 
 
(3.2)  ( ) [ ( , )]tACD E CD tH HT T   
 
Speciﬁcations of ( , )CD tH T  adhering to the properties above will lead to simi-
lar conclusions. We propose the following function for ( , )CD tH T . Let †4  be the 
set of rationalizable strategy proﬁles. Then, 
†
( ) infSU t
T4
w ( , , | )SEU t vN B  and 
†
( ) supSU t
T4
w  ( , , | )SEU t vN B  are the lowest and highest rationalizable payoﬀ for 
Sender type t. We deﬁne the credible deviation of type t  in equilibrium T  
relative to H  as  
 
 (3.3)  
( , , | ) ( , , | )
( , )
( ) ( )
S S
S S
EU t v EU t v
CD t
U t U t
H H H
H
N B N BT
     
    
 
if ( , , | ) ( ).S SEU t v U tN B     If ( , , | ) ( ),S SEU t v U tN B     then ( , ) 1,CD tH T   
as in this case the Sender has no incentive to adhere to her equilibrium strategy. 
A deviation theory can be based on credible neologisms or credible an-
nouncements (or, in principle, on any theory of credible deviations). In the case 
that types can send multiple credible deviations, a deviating theory should also 
specify which one(s) Senders would use.32 In many games, credible neologisms 
                                     
32 In the case of credible neologisms, a reasonable speciﬁcation is that types coordinate on 
the credible neologism with the highest total intensity (mass-weighted sum of credible devia-
tions). Results will in most games be qualitatively the same for diﬀerent coordination rules.  
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and credible announcements coincide. Which theory predicts behavior best when 
they do not coincide, is an empirical question about which actually very little is 
known. We prefer credible announcements for ‘simple’ games and credible 
neologisms for ‘complex’ games. Credible neologisms have the virtue of simplici-
ty, whereas credible announcements meet the soundest criterion of credibility. In 
simple games, human agents will be able to reason according to the logic of 
credible announcements and credible announcements seem most appropriate.  In 
addition, a deviation theory based on credible announcements has the elegant 
property that it need not specify which credible announcement a type will play 
if she can send more than one, as they all must yield an identical payoﬀ for each 
deviating Sender.  In complex games, however, the complexity of announcements 
and the strict credibility criteria seem too demanding for boundedly rational 
agents. This can lead to counterintuitive predictions. For example, in the Craw-
ford-Sobel game, announcement proofness may only select the pooling equilibri-
um, which seems an unlikely outcome for people to play.33 Hence, here the 
simplicity of credible neologisms seems more appropriate. A rule of the thumb is 
to use credible announcements in discrete games and credible neologisms in 
continuous games.34 We adhere to this rule of thumb in this chapter and, hence, 
when we apply ACDC we will suppress .H  
Based on the ACD, we formulate the ACD-Criterion (ACDC), which says 
that an equilibrium T  will on average predict better than equilibrium T  if 
( ) ( )ACD ACDH HT T  . In particular, based on ACDC we can formulate the 
following selection criterion: 
                                     
33 For instance, in the uniform quadratic game for 	 
1 124 16,b  , the pooling equilibrium is an-
nouncement proof, while the size-2 and size-3 equilibria are not. For these values of b, the 
pooling equilibrium admits the weakly credible announcement composed of the neologisms at 
the beginning and end, characterized by the set of intervals of deviating types sending the same 
message \ ^51 4 46 6 6 60, , ,1 .b b  ¯   ¯ ¢ ± ¢ ± In addition, however, it admits the weakly credible announce-
ment \ ^16 16 3 16 161 1 2 12 12 4 45 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 50, , , , , , ,1 .b b b b b b  ¯   ¯   ¯   ¯     ¢ ± ¢ ± ¢ ± ¢ ±  Since for all weakly credible 
announcements deviating types exist that prefer another weakly credible announcement, none is 
a credible announcement. The size-2 and size-3 equilibria only admit weakly credible announce-
ments composed of the non-overlapping credible neologisms, which are thus credible announce-
ments. Observe that the computational demands on agents to determine whether credible 
announcements exist and how they look like are quite high in this game. 
34 Admittedly, this rule is somewhat coarse, but does prevent ex-post determination as to 
what constitutes a ‘simple’ game.  
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Deﬁnition 3.1 An equilibrium T  is an ACDC equilibrium relative to devia-
tion theory H  if ( ) ( )ACD ACDH HT T b  for all .T 4  
 
Note that this selection criterion selects the equilibrium that will predict best 
on average rather than the equilibrium that will always be played.  
A simple implication is that T  is an ACDC equilibrium if ( ) .H T T   Hence, 
the prediction of ACDC coincides with that of the underlying deviation theory if 
the latter identiﬁes a stable equilibrium. The following result is immediate. 
 
Proposition 3.1 If the number of equilibrium outcomes is ﬁnite, the cheap 
talk game has an ACDC equilibrium relative to .H  
 
Hence, existence of an ACDC equilibrium is guaranteed by a ﬁnite set of equi-
librium-outcomes. This is a relevant result, as Park (1997) has shown that ﬁnite 
Sender-Receiver games have a ﬁnite set of equilibrium outcomes under generic 
conditions. Before, Crawford and Sobel (1982) showed a similar result for their 
setting with a continuous type-space.  
Even when games do not have a ﬁnite outcome set (as our continuous veto 
threats model in section 3.4), mild conditions can be formulated in order to 
guarantee existence of an ACDC equilibrium: 
 
Proposition 3.2 Let s be an equilibrium outcome and ( )ACD sH  the ACD of 
equilibria inducing s. Suppose the equilibrium outcome set S can be represented by 
a ﬁnite union of compact metric spaces ,ii NS S*  such that ( )ACD sH  is 
continuous in s on all subsets .iS  Then, an ACDC equilibrium exists with respect 
to .H  
 
For instance, this means that continuous games with an equilibrium set consist-
ing of partition equilibria that are well-behaved with respect to their ACD will 
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have an ACDC equilibrium.35 In almost all applications we have come across, a 
unique ACDC equilibrium outcome exists. Still, one can construct games with 
multiple ACDC equilibrium outcomes (for instance when multiple outcomes are 
completely stable). In such cases, we are content with the conclusion that 
several equilibrium outcomes are equally plausible. 
3.3 Discrete games 
To illustrate ACDC, let us ﬁrst put it to work in Game B (Table 3.2).  In the 
pooling equilibrium, all types induce 5.a  It admits the credible announcement 
where types 2t  and 3t  deviate to 4.a  (Credible announcements and credible 
neologisms coincide in all games presented in this section.) In a discrete game, 
the ACD of a pure equilibrium T (with a pure ( ))H T  reduces to  
 
(3.4)  
( )( ( ), ) ( ( ), )
( ) ,
( ) ( )
S S
S S
t T
U a t t U a t t
f t
U t U t
H T T


   
 
where ( )f t  is type t’s prior probability, and ( ),a tT  
( )( )a tH T  the equilibrium 
respectively deviating action type t induces. Hence, the ACD of the pooling 
equilibrium is 
(1 ) (2 1)
2 2 0
E  
2 1
2 0
E F
  
1 2
.
4 8 4
FE F
   The ACD of the 
separating equilibrium is 
(2 2)
2 0
FE F
    .2
EF
F  The separating equilibrium is 
always ACDC. In addition, the ACD of the separating equilibrium goes to zero 
if E  or F  goes to zero. 
One may be worried that ACDC always selects the most informative equilib-
rium. This is not the case, as the following two examples show. First consider 
                                     
35 An equilibrium of a game with a one-dimensional type and action set is a partition equilib-
rium if there exists a partition 0 1 1n nt t t t  "  of T such that each type in 1( , )i it t  
induces action ia  with 1 2 ... naa a   . Hence, a partition equilibrium is characterized by a 
vector 1,..., )( na a a  and a partition equilibrium outcome set can be represented by a ﬁnite 
union of compact subsets of 1,..., .n\ \  
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Game C in Table 3.3, which is a reproduction of game 2 in Farrell (1993) and 
example 2 of Matthews, Okuno-Fujiwara & Postlewaite (1991). In this game, the 
two types occur with equal probability. The game has a separating equilibrium 
where type 1t  induces 1a  and type 2t  induces 2.a  In addition, the game has a 
pooling equilibrium where both types elicit 3.a  Here, the separating equilibrium 
is not announcement proof because it admits the credible announcement “I am 
not going to tell you my type.” In contrast, no type would want to send an 
announcement in the pooling equilibrium, which is thus announcement proof. 
We share the intuition of Farrell and Matthews et al. that the announcement 
(and neologism) proofness criteria (and hence ACDC) appropriately reject the 
communication outcome.  
 
TABLE 3.3
GAME C
 1a  2a  3a  
1
1 2( )t  1, 3 0, 0 2, 2 
1
2 2( )t  0, 0 1, 3 2, 2 
 
 
Game D (Table 3.4) extends the previous game to three Sender types with a 
twist. For 0F  , we get an equivalent result as in the previous game. Game D 
then has a separating equilibrium, where it  induces ia  and which admits the 
credible announcement where 1 2 3 a, nd t t t  deviate to 4.a  It also has an an-
nouncement proof pooling equilibrium, where all types induce 4.a  For small but 
positive ,F  the two equilibria remain intact, but the pooling equilibrium admits 
a credible announcement where 1 2and t t  deviate to 5.a  Hence, announcement 
proofness is silent here. ACDC selects the pooling equilibrium: The ACD of the 
separating equilibrium is 
1 1
2 6 3
FF   and that of the pooling equilibrium 
2
.
6 3
FF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TABLE 3.4
GAME D
 1a  2a  3a  4a  5a  
1
1 3( )t  1, 3 0, 0 0, 0 2, 2 2 ,  2F F   
1
2 3( )t  0, 0 1, 3 0, 0 2, 2 2 ,  2F F   
1
3 3( )t  0, 0 0, 0 1, 3 2, 2     2 ,  0F  
Notes: 0 1.Fb   
 
3.4 ACDC versus Other Criteria in a Veto Threats 
Game 
We illustrate the comparative advantage of ACDC over other criteria in a 
simple continuous external veto threats game (Game E in Table 3.5). At the end 
of this section, we show that ACDC selects a unique equilibrium in the class of 
external veto threats games to which this game belongs. The model is close to 
Matthews’ (1989) model, who introduced veto threat games. The diﬀerence is 
that in our model, the disagreement point is external, in the sense that the 
Sender’s payoﬀ does not depend on her type. Whereas in Matthews’ model the 
maximum equilibrium size is two, these games can have a large equilibrium set, 
with ﬁne partitions and continua of equilibria. This makes them a good testing 
ground for reﬁnements.  
In Game E (Table 3.5), the outcome of the game x is a point on the interval 
[0,1] or the disagreement point [0,1]E  . The Sender’s payoﬀ on the interval 
depends on t: ( , ) | | .SU x t x t    The larger the distance between the outcome 
x and her type t, the lower the Sender’s payoﬀ. The Sender’s type t is drawn 
from the uniform distribution on [0,1]. The Receiver’s payoﬀ on the interval, 
( ) ,RU x x   is independent of t: he always prefers smaller outcomes to larger 
ones. It is a veto threats game, because the Sender can veto the Receiver’s 
action, in which case the outcome is the disagreement point .E  The disagree-
ment point payoﬀs are 54( )
RU E    and 15( , ) ( ) .S SU t UE E    Observe that 
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the Receiver prefers E  to all outcomes on the line larger than 54  and that the 
Sender prefers E  to all outcomes on the line more than 15  away from her type t. 
 
TABLE 3.5
GAME E
t ~ U[0,1]  
( )RU x x   for  x  \  
( , ) | |SU x t x t   for  x  \  
5
4( )
RU E    and 15( )SU E      
 
 
Like Matthews (1989), we look at a reﬁnement of perfect Bayesian equilibri-
um that restricts the Receiver to pure strategies and lets the Sender take into 
account that she may tremble at the veto stage (with epsilon probability). As 
we showed in Chapter 2, in this game all equilibria are partition equilibria which 
can be characterized by a ﬁnite set of Receiver actions 1 2 ... ,na a a    where 
n is called the size of the equilibrium. Senders simply induce that action closest 
to their type and accept it if it gives them positive payoﬀ. 
The game has a unique pooling equilibrium, in which the Receiver always 
proposes action 15 . This optimal action involves a trade-oﬀ between maximizing 
the probability that the action is accepted and maximizing the payoﬀ of the 
action once it is accepted. In addition, the game has continua of size-2 and size-
3 equilibria. The set of size-2 equilibria is characterized by 1 2
2
51{ , }a a a  , with 
1
1 5[0, ],a   whereas the set of size-3 equilibria is characterized by
1 2 3 2
2
50, , }{a a a a    with 12 5(0, ].a   In this game, credible neologisms coin-
cide with (weakly and ordinary) credible announcements. Both equilibria admit 
credible neologisms. All equilibria have a credible neologism ‘at the end’: 
3 2
10 5,[ ,1)  in the pooling equilibrium and 
4 2 1
5 5 2,( ,1]na  in the other equilibria. 
If 1 0a  , also a credible neologism ‘at the beginning’ of the form 1 120,[0, )a  
exists. The game has a unique ACDC equilibrium, which is 315 5{0, , }.  The intui-
tion is that this equilibrium does not have a neologism at the beginning and 
minimizes both the frequency and intensity of deviations at the end by maximiz-
ing .na   
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We now turn to other reﬁnements and non-equilibrium solution concepts. 
From our analysis above, it follows that no equilibrium in Game E is neologism 
or announcement proof.36 Rabin & Sobel (1996) propose the recurrent mop 
criterion, which can select equilibria that, although not impervious to credible 
deviations, are likely to recur in the long run, because they are frequently 
deviated to. The authors restrict their deﬁnition of the recurrent mop to games 
with a ﬁnite number of actions as it may run into problems in continuous 
games, amongst others because the deviation correspondence may not converge 
in these settings. In Game E, it is hard to evaluate the solution concept. In a 
similar game with just two equilibria (e.g. when 52( )
RU E   and 14( )SU E  ) one 
can show that even if the deviation correspondence would converge, neither 
equilibrium is stable and both are recurrent.37 
We now turn to approaches that are not based on credible deviations. The 
simplest are ex-ante eﬃciency and inﬂuentiality, both of which are not very 
attractive. Ex-ante eﬃciency selects the equilibrium with the highest ex-ante 
payoﬀ for the Sender. One problem with this is that it is not clear how the 
Sender type can commit ex-post to an ex-ante optimal strategy. Furthermore, 
which equilibrium is ex-ante optimal is not invariant to aﬃne transformations of 
payoﬀs of a subset of types (which should not aﬀect the game). Hence, as long 
as some types receive less in equilibrium A than in Equilibrium B and the other 
way around, one can make either equilibrium ex-ante more eﬃcient. In Game E, 
we can make any size-3 equilibrium eﬃcient by multiplying the payoﬀs of types 
around 2a  and 3a  with a suitably large number. (In other games, e.g. with
5
2( )
RU E   and 14( , ) ,SU tE   one can also make the pooling equilibrium ex-ante 
eﬃcient.) Inﬂuentiality selects the equilibrium with the largest equilibrium 
action set. As Games C and D showed, the most inﬂuential equilibria need not 
be the most plausible. Furthermore, Game E has a whole continuum of size-3 
equilibria. 
The Communication Proofness (CP) criterion of Blume & Sobel (1995) sin-
gles out equilibria that would not be destabilized if new opportunities to com-
                                     
36 As in most cheap talk games, neither equilibrium admits strongly credible announcements. 
37 In particular, one can show that for both equilibria it must hold that neither equilibrium 
lies in the deviation correspondence of that equilibrium.  
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municate arose. CP looks for partitions that distinguish good and bad equilibria, 
where in each partition good equilibria cannot be destabilized by other good 
equilibria. An equilibrium survives CP if it is a good equilibrium in some such 
partition. In Game E all equilibria are stable according to CP, as in each equi-
librium some Sender-type in each partition-element receives her maximum 
payoﬀ, so that no equilibrium can ever be destabilized. 
The No Incentive to Separate (NITS) criterion (Chen, Kartik, & Sobel, 2008) 
is up till now the only reﬁnement based on some notion of stability that can 
successfully select an equilibrium in the Crawford-Sobel (1982) setting. NITS 
starts by specifying a ‘lowest type,’ a type with the property that all other types 
prefer to be revealed as themselves rather than as that lowest type. An equilib-
rium survives NITS if the lowest type has no incentive to separate, i.e. if the 
lowest type prefers her equilibrium outcome to the outcome she would get if she 
could reveal her type. In the Crawford-Sobel model, only the maximum size 
equilibrium outcome satisﬁes NITS (under some general monotonicity assump-
tion). In Game E, such a ‘lowest type’ cannot easily be formulated. All types in 
1
5[0, ] are lowest types according to Chen et al.’s deﬁnition. Still, one can argue 
that 0t   is a natural lowest type in our game. Under this assumption, the 
size-2 equilibrium 25{0, }  and all size-3 equilibria survive NITS. (By making 
( ) / ( )S RU UE E  arbitrarily close to zero, one can make the maximum size arbitrar-
ily high and there will be a NITS equilibrium of each size 2,...,n.)  
Also non-equilibrium concepts exist. Rabin (1990) introduced the concept of 
Credible Message Rationalizability (CMR). This non-equilibrium concept pro-
poses conditions under which communication can be guaranteed to happen. It 
assumes that rational players take truth-telling as a focal point, but use the 
strategic incentives of the game to check whether truth-telling is rational. In 
Game E, CMR can only guarantee that the 0 type can send a credible message 
(and is silent about what other types do). CMR requires that all Sender-types 
who send a credible message receive an action in which they achieve their 
maximum payoﬀ. This would imply that the Receiver does not best respond to 
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credible messages (of all types except 0), which cannot be the case under 
CMR.38 
Blume, Kim & Sobel (1993) put forward the Partial Common Interest (PCI) 
concept. A partition of the typeset satisﬁes PCI “if types in each partition 
element unambiguously prefer to be identiﬁed as members of that element, and 
there is no ﬁner partition with that property.” PCI does not make a deﬁnite 
prediction in Game E, as no partition of the type space (except 0 10 1t t   ) 
satisﬁes PCI. The main reason is that the highest Sender-type of a partition-
element always prefers the Receiver to believe that the upper boundary is higher 
than the true boundary (except for types 0t   or 1t  ). Finally, the ‘parti-
tion’ 0 and (0, ]B  is not PCI, as 0 (which is the best response if the Sender is 0) 
is also a best response to some Receiver-beliefs with support on the interval 
(0,1]. 
We ﬁnish this section by showing that the uniqueness of the ACDC equilibri-
um is not an artifact of the speciﬁc characteristics of Game E. Game E belongs 
to a wider class of veto threat games introduced in Chapter 2. Here we show 
that ACDC, under somewhat stricter conditions, selects a unique equilibrium. 
This result is interesting in its own right, as these games model relevant settings 
of information transmission under power diﬀerences. We assume the Sender’s 
type t  is uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1]. We model the player’s 
bargaining power as the payoﬀ of the disagreement point ( )RU E  and ( ),SU E  
where we assume ( , ) ( )S SU t UE E  does not depend on t. RU  and SU  satisfy the 
following assumptions:  
 
(3.5) RU  on \  is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, unimodal with a peak at 0 
and concave. 
                                     
38 Rabin also introduces an equilibrium version of CMR, Credible Message Equilibria (CME), 
but as a consequence of the previous analysis, neither equilibrium in Game E can be a CME. 
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(3.6)  ( , )
SU x t  can be written as a function ( )f t x , for all x in \ , t in [0,1], 
where f is continuously diﬀerentiable, symmetric, concave, strictly in-
creasing in \  and for all y  \  there is a 0z   such that ( )f z y  and 
( ) ;f z y   ( ) (0).SU fE  39, 40 
 
In Chapter 2, we show that only partition equilibria exist. Here we show that 
there is a unique ACDC equilibrium: 
 
Proposition 3.3 Under assumptions (3.5) and (3.6), the unique ACDC equi-
librium is the maximum size equilibrium with the highest equilibrium action. 
 
In sum, Game E illustrates that current criteria can fail to be predictive for 
various reasons. Our intuition is that this is due to the fact that they are based 
on a dichotomous notion of stability. In contrast, ACDC selects a unique equi-
librium in the class of games Game E belongs to. 
3.5 Crawford-Sobel Game 
In this section, we apply ACDC to select equilibria in the leading uniform-
quadratic case of Crawford & Sobel’s (1982) cheap talk game (henceforth ‘CS 
game’). In this CS game, types are uniformly distributed on [0,1], the action 
space is [0,1], 	 
2( , )RU a t a t   and 	 
2( , ) ( ) ,SU a t a t b    with 0b   
capturing the Sender bias. (The Sender has no veto in this game.) 
Crawford and Sobel (1982) show that this game only has (perfect Bayesian) 
partition equilibria and that the maximum equilibrium size ( )n b  is the largest 
integer n for which  
 
                                     
39 Due to the invariance of games (and the ACDC) to aﬃne payoﬀ transformations, it is 
actually only required that ( , )SU x t  can be written as a function ( ) ( ) ( ),a t b t f t x ¸  where 0b 
and f  should adhere to the conditions in (3.6) (with ( ) (0)SU a b fE   ¸ ). 
40 Observe that (3.6) implies assumptions (A2)-(A5) in Chapter 2. Our assumptions here are 
stricter. In particular, they require a uniform type distribution and a symmetric and concave 
payoﬀ function for the Sender. 
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(3.7) 2 ( 1) 1n n b  .  
 
In addition, the game has a unique size-n equilibrium for each {1,..., ( )}n n b . 
Let 
 
(3.8) 2 ( ).ni
i
t bi n i
n
w     
 
for 0,...,i n  and 1,..., ( )n n b . In the size-n  equilibrium, types in 1[ , )n ni it t  
send the same equilibrium message, which induces the Receiver to choose action  
 
(3.9) 1
1
( )
2
n n n
i i ia t t  , 1,...,i n . 
 
We start by deriving all credible neologisms the equilibria admit. For each 
credible neologism ,a N , the set of deviating types N  turns out to be an 
interval between some U  and .U  Hence, we can characterize neologisms by [ , ]U U  
alone, since the Receiver’s best response is .
2
a
U U  An equilibrium can 
admit three types of credible neologisms. First of all, there may be a credible 
neologism which includes 0.t   If this credible neologism exists, then it has the 
shape 0[0, )
nU  where  
 
	 
0 12 4 1 2 1 .3 3 3 3
n na b b n
n
U        
 
Chen, Kartik & Sobel (2008) show that an equilibrium that fails NITS has a 
credible neologism of this kind. They also prove that only the size- ( )n b  equilib-
rium satisﬁes NITS, so that the credible neologism 0[0, )
nU  exists if and only if 
( )n n b . 
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Second, Farrell (1993) shows that if 
1
,
2
b   the game has a credible neologism 
on the right-end of the type space of the form ( ,1]nnU  where 
 
1 2
1 ( 1).
3 3
n
n b nn
U      
 
Finally, if {2,..., ( ) 1},n n b   there are 1n  credible neologisms “in the 
middle.” These take the form ( , )n ni iU U  for 1,..., 1,i n   where niU  [ niU ] is 
indiﬀerent between the equilibrium action nia  [
1n
ia
 ] and the neologism action 
( ) / 2.n n ni i ia U U   We obtain: 
 
(3.10) 
1
3 1
2
4 4
n n n
i i ia a bU     and  
1
1 3
2 ,
4 4
n n n
i i ia a bU     
 
1,..., 1.i n   If ( ),n n b  the game has the same types of credible neologisms 
“in the middle,” with the exception that the neologism 	 
( ) ( )1 1,n b n bU U  need not 
exist.41 Observe that 1
n n
i iU U   for 1,...,i n , so that none of the credible 
neologisms overlap. Figure 3.1 illustrates the results for 
1
.
18
b   
It seems intuitive that the highest size equilibrium is the ACDC equilibrium, 
since the deviations seem to get smaller and smaller as the size increases. This 
indeed turns out to be the case. Although one can obtain analytical results for 
the ACD for speciﬁc parameter values, ﬁnding the ACDC equilibrium for 
general b  deﬁes an analytical approach. Hence, we calculated the ACD for a 
very ﬁne grid of b  and obtain the following result.  
 
                                     
41 If (and only if) 22 ( ) 1bn b p , there is no credible neologism of the form ( ) ( )1 1( , )n b n bU U  because  
	 
( ) ( ) ( ) 21 1 23 1 32 2 ( ) 1 0,4 4 4 ( )n b n b n ba a b bn bn bU       b which is inconsistent with all types 
being in the interval [0,1] or the interval 	 
 	 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1, 0,n b n b n btU U   being a neologism. 
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Proposition 3.4 For all 
1 2 1
, ,...,
10000 10000 4
b
£ ²¦ ¦¦ ¦ ¤ »¦ ¦¦ ¦¥ ¼
 it holds that the ACD of the 
size-n  equilibrium in the CS game is decreasing in n.  
 
Corollary 3.1 For all 
1 2 1
, ,..., ,
10000 10000 4
b
£ ²¦ ¦¦ ¦ ¤ »¦ ¦¦ ¦¥ ¼
 the size- ( )n b  equilibrium is 
the unique ACDC equilibrium.  
 
We also derive the following property of the maximum size equilibrium (for 
which we do not need to calculate the ACD’s for each b): 
 
Proposition 3.5 The ACD of the size- ( )n b  equilibrium tends to zero if b
tends to zero in the CS game.  
 
Hence, the ACD of this equilibrium converges to zero if b  approaches zero, 
i.e. if the interests of the players are almost perfectly aligned. This ﬁnding is 
intuitive because the Sender obtains almost her ideal outcome when b  is close to 
zero, so she will not gain much in the case of deviation, and even if she deviates, 
the deviation will hardly change the equilibrium. 
Proposition 3.4 is in line with NITS (Chen, Kartik & Sobel, 2008), which also 
selects the size- ( )n b  equilibrium. If the bias parameter is large, however, the 
maximum size equilibrium can still have a large ACD, so it may not be all that 
stable. The prediction of ACDC that the maximum size equilibrium becomes 
more stable as b becomes smaller (Proposition 3.5) is not made by previous 
concepts. NITS does not predict this, as it assumes that no type separates if the 
lowest type does not separate. 
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Figure 3.1 
The size-1, size-2 and (maximum) size-3 equilibria with the credible neologisms they admit 
for 
1
.
18
b   The area of the neologisms give an impression of their contribution to the 
ACD, although there height contributes quadratically to the ACD. 
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3.6 Experimental Evidence 
In this section, we look at the experimental support for ACDC. 
3.6.1 Discrete games 
Blume, DeJong, Kim & Sprinkle (2001) provide an experimental analysis of 4 
discrete cheap talk games, in which they compare the predictive power of re-
ﬁnements as neologism proofness, inﬂuentiality and ex-ante eﬃciency with PCI. 
(Credible announcements coincide with credible neologisms in Blume et al.’s 
games.) They ﬁnd that PCI is a reliable predictor of when communication takes 
place and that the equilibrium reﬁnements sometimes but not always improve 
on PCI. In their Games 1 and 3, the predictions of PCI and announcement 
proofness (and ACDC) are very much aligned, and borne out by the data. In 
their Game 2 (see Table 3.6) announcement proofness predicts complete separa-
tion while the ﬁnest partition consistent with PCI entails partial separation. The 
data are in line with separation, as a clear majority of 88% of the outcomes is 
consistent with the separating equilibrium. One could argue that this result does 
not contradict PCI, because PCI allows multiple patterns including separation 
(see their footnote 10). As the authors note (in footnote 19), one needs to add 
neologism proofness to PCI to actually predict that separation happens. 
 
TABLE 3.6
REPRODUCTION OF GAMES 2 AND 4 OF BLUME ET AL. (2001) 
 1a  2a  3a  4a  5a  
1t  800, 800 100, 100 0, 0 500, 500 0, 400
2t  x, 100 y, 800 0, 0 500, 500 0, 400
3t  0, 0 0, 0 500, 800 0, 0 0, 400
Notes: All the three types 1 2 3{ , , }t t t  of the Sender are equally likely and the Receiver can 
implement one of the actions 1 5{ ,..., }a a . Entry i,j, represents ( , ), ( , )
S R
i j i jU t a U t a .  Games 2 and 
4 are identical, except that 100, 300x y   in game 2, whereas 300, 100x y   in game 4. 
 
Their Game 4 (Table 3.6) is interesting because no equilibrium is announce-
ment proof while PCI makes a prediction. This game has two equilibrium 
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outcomes. Besides the pooling equilibrium where action 5a  is induced there is a 
partially separating equilibrium where types 1t  and  2t  send a common message 
that diﬀers from the message of 3.t  Types 1t  and 2t  induce 4a  while type 3t  
induces 3.a  Full separation is not an equilibrium because 2t  prefers to mimic 1.t  
None of the equilibria satisﬁes announcement proofness. PCI predicts meaning-
ful communication because the ﬁnest partition consistent with PCI is given by 
\ ^1 2 3{ , }, { } .t t t  The partially separating equilibrium only has a credible an-
nouncement where 1t  deviates to 1.a  Thus, its ACD equals 
1 (800 500) 1
3 800 8
  . 
The pooling equilibrium admits the credible announcement where 1t  and 2t  
deviate to 4a  and 3t  deviates to 3.a  Consequently, its ACD is 
1 (500 0) (500 0) (500 0) 7
3 800 500 500 8
 ¬   ­   ­ ­ ® . So ACDC predicts that the partially 
separating equilibrium will be the most observed equilibrium outcome but that 
it will not be completely stable. 
In line with this prediction, Blume et al. ﬁnd that 37% of the outcomes are 
consistent with the partially separating equilibrium but no outcome is consistent 
with the pooling equilibrium. Thus, of the two equilibria, the one with the 
lowest ACD performs best. Consistent with the ACD measures, much fewer 
outcomes are in line with the equilibrium selected by ACDC in game 4 than in 
game 2. In line with the fact that types 1t  have a credible announcement, they 
turn out to be the ones that are able to credibly identify themselves. 
Our conclusion is that our ACDC concept improves the predictions of an-
nouncement proofness and that it does at least as well as PCI in explaining the 
data of Blume, DeJong, Kim & Sprinkle (2001). The extra mileage for ACDC 
comes from continuous games like the Crawford-Sobel game and the veto threat 
game. PCI fails to predict any communication at all in these settings, while in 
accordance with ACDC subjects are able to communicate meaningfully to a 
large extent, as we will see next. 
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3.6.2 Crawford-Sobel game 
Several experimental studies have been done in discrete versions of the CS 
game. Cai & Wang (2006) test a discrete version of this game where the Send-
er’s type is uniformly drawn from {1, 3, 5, 7, 9}. They report the results of four 
treatments that diﬀer in the disalignment between the Sender’s and Receiver’s 
preferences. The treatment with the smallest disalignment has the full range of 
equilibria from pooling to fully separating, while the treatment with the largest 
disalignment parameter only allows for the pooling equilibrium. In the two 
treatments in between, the most informative equilibrium is a size- 2  equilibrium. 
Both NITS and ACDC select a most informative equilibrium in each treat-
ment.42 
The experimental results are relatively closest to the most informative equi-
librium. Except in the case where complete separation is supported in equilibri-
um, subjects over-communicate compared to the most informative equilibrium, 
and overcommunication increases as the bias parameter increases. Hence, in 
agreement with ACDC, behavior departs more from the most informative 
equilibrium, as its ACD increases.43  
3.6.3 Veto Threats Game 
In Chapter 4, we present new experimental data. We test the predictions of 
ACDC in ﬁve games belonging to the class of veto threat games discussed in 
section 3.4. We ﬁnd that ACDC organizes the data well. The ACDC equilibrium 
performs best, even if it admits credible deviations. Furthermore, in comparable 
games, the ACDC equilibrium performs better as its ACD decreases. Finally, in 
                                     
42 In their treatment with the disalignment parameter equal to 1.2 there is an additional 
most informative equilibrium {1} , {3579} , besides the reported most informative equilibrium 
{13},{579}.  Both equilibria are NITS, while ACDC selects the latter equilibrium. The data are 
not suﬃciently informative to discriminate between these equilibria.  
43 The results of Dickhaut, McCabe & Mukherji (1995) on a Crawford-Sobel game are similar 
to those reported by Cai and Wang, although they do not interpret their results in terms of 
overcommunication. More recently, Wang, Spezio & Camerer (2010)  replicate the results of Cai 
& Wang (2006) and ﬁnd that look-up patterns of Senders (as measured by eye-tracking) reveals 
a signiﬁcant amount of information about their type. 
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a setting with continua of equilibria similar to Game E, we ﬁnd that the closer 
equilibria are to the ACDC equilibrium, the better they perform. 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter generalizes reﬁnements based on credible deviations, in particu-
lar neologism proofness and announcement proofness. We started with an 
intuition for why the frequency and size of credible deviations could aﬀect 
equilibrium stability in a continuous rather than a binary manner. Consequently, 
we formalized this intuition in ACDC, which measures the (in)stability of cheap 
talk equilibria and determines which are most plausible. We show an ACDC 
equilibrium exists under general conditions unlike existing concepts. Further-
more, the predictions of ACDC are meaningful in previously analyzed settings 
and organize the data of previous experiments well. Finally, ACDC makes 
predictions in settings where other concepts cannot.  
In Chapter 4, we ﬁnd support for ACDC in a new experimental setting where 
other criteria remain silent. 
3.8 Appendix: Proofs 
3.8.1 Proposition 3.2 
Proof of Proposition 3.2 ( )ACD sH  achieves a minimum on each compact 
subset iS  and hence achieves a minimum on S. As a consequence, also 
min ( )ACDH T4  is nonempty, so that at an ACDC equilibrium exists. Q.E.D. 
3.8.2 Proposition 3.3 
For the proof of Proposition 3.3, we introduce some deﬁnitions and results 
from Chapter 2, and derive two helpful lemmas. 
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Observe that in this game, a neologism ,a N  is credible relative to equilibrium 
T  if and only if  
 
\ ^	 
arg max ( , ) 0 ( ) ( )S R Raa P U a t t N U a U E p  \ , and  
for all 1,...,k n it holds that 1[ , ]k kt t t N  ( , )SU taº  ( , )S kU a t  and 
1[ , ] \ ( , ) ( , )
S S
k k kt t t N U a t U a t º b . 
 
Lemma 3.1 If ,a N  is a credible neologism relative to equilibrium T , then 
N  is an interval. 
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose 1 2 30 1t t tb   b , 1 3,t t N  
and 2t N . Suppose further that in equilibrium, type it obtains action ia , 
1,2,3i  . The fact that the a type’s utility is strictly decreasing in the distance 
between t – a  implies 1 2 3a a ab b . If 2a tb  then it must be the case that 
2a ab  (otherwise type 2t  would prefer a  over 2a ). As a consequence, 
3 3 2aa t ab b   because type 3t  must prefer a  over 3a  and 3a  over 2a . A 
contradiction is established, because the fact that the indiﬀerence points t – d  
and t + d are strictly increasing in t implies that type 2t  strictly prefers a  over 
2a . This is in conﬂict with the deﬁnition of a credible neologism. Analogously, 
2a t  can be ruled out, so that N  is an interval. Q.E.D. 
 
From (3.6), it follows that there is a 0d   such that for all t and ,a \  
( , ) ( )S SU a t U Ep  if and only if [ , ].a t d t d    Hence, t d  and t d  are the 
Sender’s indiﬀerence points as to whether she accepts action a. From Lemma’s 1 
and 2 in Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 2.2 it follows that in equilibrium 
 
(3.11) 
1 0,a p  1k k kt d a t d   b   for all 2,...,k n and 1k kt d a  b  for 
3,...,k n . 
 
We can now show that under (3.6), it holds that 
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Lemma 3.2 In equilibrium, 1k k ka t dd a     for 2,..., 1k n  . 
Proof. Due to the t being uniformly distributed and (3.6), the indiﬀerence 
points t d  and  t d  are uniformly distributed as well. This means that if the 
Receiver receives a message that identiﬁes Sender types to be in the interval 
1[ , ]k kt t   ( 0,..., 1k n  ), the probability the Sender accepts an action is not 
higher for an action ka t d   than for action ,ka t da    while 
( ) ( ).R RU a U a a  Hence, for the equilibrium action ka  it holds true that 
1k ka t db   and by (3.11), this means 1k k ka t d t d  b   for 3,...,k n . 
Now, suppose that 1k kt d t d     for some 3,..., .k n  This means that 
k ka t d   and hence ,( ) 0.S k kU a t   Since 1( , ) ( , ),S Sk k k kU a t U a t  this implies, 
however, that 1 ,k ka t d    which for 3,..., 1k n  is a contradiction with 
1k ka t db   for 3,..., .k n  Hence, 1k k ka t d t d     for 3,..., 1.k n   
Consequently, 1k k ka t dd a      for 3,..., 1k n  . 
Furthermore, from the discussion above we have that 2 3t a d   and that 
2 1a t db  . In addition, from (3.11) it follows that 2 2 .a t db   Hence, a neces-
sary condition on 2a  is that 	 
	 
1 22 1argmax ( ) ( ) .R Rt a t dda U a U a d tEb b    
Analogously to our discussion in the proof of Proposition 2.2, one can show that 
this implies that 2a  must be equal to 2 .t d  As a result, 2 2 3 .a t dd a     
Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3.3  Suppose that the game has more than one equi-
librium outcome. If 2 ,x db then consider the equilibrium outcome T with 
1 0a  and 2a  such that 2 arg max ( )Raa U a \ 	 
1 22min{ ,1} .a d a   If 2 ,x d let 
n  be the natural number for which 2 0x dn b  and 	 
2 1 0,x d n    and 
consider the following :T 1 0;a   2 ( 2),ka x d n k    2,..., .k n  We now 
show that T  has the maximum equilibrium size and is the unique ACDC 
equilibrium outcome. 
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From (2.2) and (3.6), it follows that there exists an x  \  such that 
 
(3.12) 
( ) ( ) 2 ( ) 0 for all [0, ) andR R RU x U dU x x xE  p a  
( ) ( ) 2 ( ) 0 for all ( ,1 ].R R RU x U dU x x x dE    a  
 
where a prime ( )a  denotes a derivative with respect to x. Let *a  denote the 
highest equilibrium action na  in .T  Using (3.12), it can be veriﬁed that T  
constitutes the highest size equilibrium, analogously to the proof of Proposition 
2.2. Similarly, it can be veriﬁed that the highest action a  in any other equilib-
rium T  must be smaller than *a : 
 
1 .a a d b b   
 
If 1a d   , T  has at least one credible neologism: Types in the interval 
( ,1]U  are willing to send a credible neologism ( ,1],a U  , where 
	 
1 , and
2
a aU      
	 

( , (1)]
arg max ( ) ( ) .
1
R R
a a
a d
a U a U
M
UE U



     
 
To proof that T  is an ACDC equilibrium, we ﬁrst show it has at most one 
credible neologism (claim 1) and this credible neologism, if it exists, maximizes 
U and minimizes a a   (claim 2). 
In order to prove claim 1, suppose that T  has another credible neologism. 
By Lemma 3.1, the set of types that send the credible neologism relative to 
equilibrium T  is an interval. We can exclude neologisms that induce the Re-
ceiver to propose 0a  , because 1 0a   is already an equilibrium action. Hence, 
the neologism a  (with supremum neologism type U) is in between two equilibri-
um actions 1ka   and ka . Due to Lemma 3.1, 1ka a    kaU  . This implies 
that ( , ) 0SU a U b  , because if ( , ) 0SU a U   , action dU   would be better for the 
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Receiver than a  after receiving the neologism. Consequently, 
1( , ) ( , ) 0
S S
kU a U aU U  b   and ( , ) ( , ) 0S SkU a U aU U b  . This means that an 0F  
exists such that a types in ( ,U F  )U F  receive 0 payoﬀ in equilibrium. Since 
this is not the case in T , T  has no other neologisms. 
The proof of claim 2 proceeds as follows. Note that min{ ,1 }a a d   , 
where 	 
arg max ( ) ( )
1
R R
a
a d
a U a U
UE U



   \ . We know a a
  , because the 
solution to 	 
argmax ( ) ( )
1
R R
a
a d t
U a U
t
E

  \  is increasing in t  and a
  is the 
solution for 1nt t  , and a   is the solution to the problem with 1nt a t p  . 
Moreover,  
 
	 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
R R R R R R a aU a U U a a d U a U U a dE U E
 
       ¬ ­ ­    a    ®
a ­­
 = 0 implies that  
( )
2 2 .
( )
R
R
U a
a a d
U a

 

  a  
From the concavity of RU  it follows that ( )
( )
R
R
U a
U aa
 is increasing in a. Hence, 
a a   is decreasing in a . In particular, this implies that a a   is decreas-
ing in .a  Moreover, U   is increasing in a . 
Finally, to show that T  is an ACDC equilibrium, we show that it has the 
lowest ACD.  By Lemma 3.2, for equilibrium T  it must then hold that 1 0a   
or a   *a . If 1 0a  , then a neologism 0 0,[0, ]a U  exists with 0 1 .a a  44 
Suppose now that a  *a . If T  does not admit a credible neologism, it is 
                                     
44  If 1 2 ,a d
 p 0a d  and 0 1 0( , ) ( , ).S SU d U aU U  If 1 ,a d b  0 0a   and 
0 0 0( , ) (0, ).
S SU a UU U   If 1 2 ,d a d  0 0a dU    and 0 0 1 0( , ) ( , ).S SU a U aU U    This has a 
solution, because 0 0 1 0( , ) ( , ) 0
S SU d U aU U U      for 0 0U   and 0 0 1 0( , ) ( , ) 0S SU d U aU U U      
for 0 1aU  . 
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evident that 
* **( ) 0 ( ).ACD ACDT T   Hence, suppose that T  admits the 
credible neologism * *,[ ,1] .a U   
We can now compare the ACD of *T  and **.T  First, *( ) 0CD tT   for 
*[0, ).t U  Second, we show that ** ** * *( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )S S S SU a t U a t U a t U a t    for 
* **[ , ).t a dU   Due to claim 2 ** ** * *a a a a     and ** *.U U  If ** *t a ab   , 
then ** *( , ) ( , )S SU a t U a t  and ** *( , ) ( , )S SU a t U a t  , so that the result is immedi-
ate. Assume now that ** .a t  By (3.6), ( , )SU a t  is concave in a, such that for 
x y t b  and , 0b c it holds that: 
( , ) ( , )S SU y t U x t b ( , ) ( , )S SU y b t U x b t    ( , ) ( , ).S SU y b t U x b c t      
Hence, for * *[ , ]t aU   we have that * *( , ) ( , )S SU a t U a t b *( , ) ( , )S SU t t U a t  b
** * **( , ) ( , )S SU a t U a t a t     ** **( , ) ( , ).S SU a t U a t  (Observe that *t a  
* * ** **.)a a a a    Similarly, for * **( , ],t a a d    * *( , ) ( , )S SU a t U a t  b
** * * **( , ) ( , )S SU a t U a a a t      ** **( , ) ( , ).S SU a t U a t As a consequence, 
** *( ) ( )CD t CD tT T for ** **[ , ).t a dU  Finally, ** *( ) 1 ( )CD t CD tT T p for 
**[ ,1].t a d   Together, this implies that ** **( )( ) tE CDACD tTT   ¯¡ °¢ ±
*( )tE CD t
T   ¯¡ °¢ ± *( ).ACD T  
In sum, if **T is diﬀerent from *T , then either 0 0a   or a  *a and in both 
cases ( ) ( )ACD ACDT T  . Therefore, T  is the unique ACDC equilibrium. 
Q.E.D. 
3.8.3 Proposition 3.4 and Proposition 3.5 
We did the analysis in the following way. First, we obtain closed-form solu-
tions for the ACD for each value of b and second we calculate the ACD for a 
ﬁne grid of b. 
 The ACD of equilibrium T  in the CS game is equal to   
 
( ), ) ( ( ), )
( )
( ) ( )
(S S
t S S
U a t t U a t t
ACD E
U t U t
T T
T   ¯¡ ° ¡ °¢ ±

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1
0
( ( ), ) ( ( ), )
(min{ ,1}, ) min{ (0, ), (1, )}
S S
S S S
U a t t U a t t
dt
U t b t U t U t
T T  ¨

 
      
	 
 	 
2 21
2 2 2
0
( ) ( )
.
max{0, 1} max{( ) ,( 1) }
a t b a t b
dt
t b t b t b
T T           ¨

 
 
Note that 2( 1)t b   2( )t b   if and only if 1
2
t b  . Suppose ( )a tT  and 
( )a tT  are constant and ( ) 0SU t  on the interval [ , ].t t  Let 
1ˆ max{ ,min{ , }}
2
t t t bw  . Then, ( , )t
t
dC t tD T¨  is equal to 
 
	 
 	 
2 2
2 2
( ) ( )
( , , , , )
max{( ) ,( 1) }
 
t
t
a t b a t b
h b a t t dt
t b t b
T T
T TB     w   ¨

 
	 
 	 
 	 
 	 
2 2 2 2ˆ
2 2
ˆ
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( 1) ( )
t t
t t
a t b a t b a t b a t b
dt dt
t b t b
T T T T            ¨ ¨
 
  
ˆ( 2)( ) 1
( ) 2 logˆ ˆ( 1 )( 1 ) 1
a a t t b t
a a
b t b t b t
T T
T T  ¬  ¯     ­ ­¡ °   ­ ­ ¡ °      ®¢ ±

 
    
ˆ ˆ( )( )
( ) 2 log .ˆ( )( )
a a t t b t
a a
b t b t b t
T T
T T  ¬  ¯   ­ ¡ °­   ­ ¡ °­    ®¢ ±
  
 
As noted before, an equilibrium of size n  can have a neologism in the begin-
ning 0
na , a neologism at the end nna  and at most 1n  neologisms in the middle, 
, 1,..., 1nia i n  . The size-1 equilibrium has a neologism at the beginning and 
at the end. The maximum size ( )n b  equilibrium has a neologism at the end and 
neologisms in the middle , ( ),..., 1nia i i b n  , where ( ) 1i b   if 22 ( ) 1bn b   and 
( ) 2i b   if 22 ( ) 1bn b p . Size-n  equilibria with 1 ( )n n b   admit all neologisms 
speciﬁed above. Observe that 1 1
n
n bU    , such that ( ) 0SU t   except for the 
highest types of the highest neologism, such that ( , , , , )h b a a t tT T  can be used to 
calculate the contribution to the ACD for neologisms ( ) 1,..., 1i b n  . For the 
highest neologism, the contribution to the ACD is equal to 
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2
2
1
2
1
2
( ) ( )
( , ) ( , , , , 1)
( 1) ( )
 
n n
n nn n n
n n
b
n
a t b a t b
h b n h b a a b dt
t b t b
U

           ¨
   
     
1
( , , , , 1) ( )( 1)log[2 1].
2
n n n n n n n
n n n n n n nh b a a b a a a a bU          
 
Let nbT  be the size-n  equilibrium of the game with bias parameter b . Then, 
the ACD of the pooling equilibrium is  
 
1 1 1 1
1 0 0( ) ( , , , 0, ) ( ,1).bACD h b a a h bT U   
 
The ACD of the maximum-size equilibrium is 
 
	 
 ( ) 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1
( )
[ ( , , , , ) ( , , , , )] ( , ( )).
i n b
n b n b n b n b n b n b n b n b n b
b i i i i i i i i
i i b
ACD h b a a t h b a a t h b n bT U U
 


    
 
The ACD of a size-n  equilibrium with 1 ( )n n b   is equal to  
 
1
1 0 0 1
1
( ) ( , , ,0, ) [ ( , , , , ) ( , , , , )] ( , )
i n
n n n n n n n n n n n n
b i i i i i i i i
i
ACD h b a a h b a a t h b a a t h b nT U U U
 


     
 
 
Proof of Proposition 3.4  For each 
1 2 1
, ,..., ,
10000 10000 4
b
£ ²¦ ¦¦ ¦ ¤ »¦ ¦¦ ¦¥ ¼
 one can cal-
culate the (closed-form) value of ( )nbACD T  for all 1 ( ),n n bb b  and verify that 
the ACD of the size-n  equilibrium in the CS game is decreasing in n. 
  
Proof of Proposition 3.5 Let ( )( ) n bbbT Tw  be the maximum size equilibri-
um for b. Then,  
(
10 0
) ( )
0
)
4
(( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) 0 ( ( ), )
lim ( ) lim lim
min{
(
) ( )}
)
(
S S S
t tS Sb b b
t T
b b bU a t t U a t t U a t t
ACD Eb E
U t U t
T T T
T
m m m

  ¯   ¯ ¡ ° ¡ °b b¡ ° ¡ °¡ ° ¢ ±¢ ±

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2 21
2
20 0
1 ( ( ) 1)
4 lim 4 lim
12 ( ) 3
S
b b
b n b
EU b
n bm m
 ¬ ­ ­  ¸  ¸   ­ ­ ®  
	 

	 
222
2 2 2 2
220 0
21 4
4 lim ( ) 4 lim 0
( ) 42 / 1 1b b
b b b
b b n b b
n b bm m
 ¬­   ­ ¬  ­­ ­­b ¸   b ¸    ­­  ­­  ® ­  ­­ ®
 
Equality 1 follows from the speciﬁcation of SEU  in Crawford & Sobel (1982). 
Inequality 2 follows from 1 12 2 2 / 1 1( )n b b  ¯¡¡  °°  due to (3.7). The other 
manipulations are straightforward. Q.E.D. 
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Chapter 4 An Experimental Study of Credible 
Deviations and ACDC45 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we test the Average Credible Deviation Criterion (ACDC), 
which we introduced in Chapter 3. As we saw there, many equilibrium reﬁne-
ments and solution concepts have been proposed for cheap talk games. None of 
these, however, can select equilibria across a wider range of cheap talk games 
and few have been tested experimentally. In contrast, ACDC is predictive across 
a wide range of cheap talk games and has shown to organize behavior well in 
experiments meant to study other concepts. Hence, it is valuable to test ACDC 
rigorously in a new experiment.  
The idea behind ACDC is that the credible deviation approach is sound, but 
that the insistence on a binary distinction between stable and unstable equilib-
ria is problematic. In particular, ACDC generalizes the binary stability criteria 
of neologism proofness (Farrell, 1993) and announcement proofness (Matthews, 
Okuno-Fujiwara & Postlewaite, 1991). ACDC assumes that credible deviations 
matter for the stability of equilibria but that they matter in a gradual manner. 
In this study, we test this assumption. In addition, to determine its value added 
more sharply, we test the predictions of ACDC in games where existing criteria 
are not predictive. We use the class of continuous external veto threat-games 
introduced in Chapter 2. These games allow for a clean manipulation of the size 
and frequency of credible deviations. Furthermore, they can have a large equilib-
rium set, which previous concepts cannot reﬁne.  
Our experimental design consists of ﬁve veto threat games and allows us to 
test four hypotheses. First, we test whether credible deviations matter at all: do 
neologism proofness and announcement proofness have any bite indeed? Second, 
we test whether the ACDC equilibrium performs best if all equilibria are unsta-
                                     
45 This chapter is based on De Groot Ruiz, Oﬀerman & Onderstal (2011c). 
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ble according to neologism proofness and announcement proofness. Third, we 
look at whether the ACDC equilibrium in similar games performs worse when 
its stability according to ACDC decreases. Finally, we test whether ACDC can 
explain behavior in case there is a large set of equilibria. The experimental 
results are supportive of all four hypotheses. This provides evidence that ACDC 
is able to predict well. 
In addition, our design allows us to test a comparative static result concern-
ing the relationship between power and communication. In Chapter 2, we 
showed that equilibrium size is increasing in the Sender’s relative bargaining 
power. As ACDC selects the maximum size equilibrium in these games, we 
hypothesize that the Sender’s relative power increases actual information trans-
mission. One challenge is that while the equilibrium size is an appropriate 
theoretical measure for information transmission, it is less appropriate for real 
data. Hence, we develop an empirical measure of information transmission. We 
ﬁnd that increasing the Sender’s relative power indeed increases information 
transmission. 
In order to better explain the dynamics of our data, we introduce a ‘neolo-
gism dynamic.’ The neologism dynamic is a simple best response dynamic with 
the additional feature that Senders send credible neologisms, which are also 
believed by Receivers. In contrast to a best response dynamic and a level-k 
analysis, the neologism dynamic is predictive. In particular, the neologism 
dynamic supports the conclusions of ACDC and can explain the main dynamic 
characteristics of the data.  
Turning to the literature, we see that relatively little experimental work exists 
on equilibrium selection in cheap talk games. Blume, DeJong & Sprinkle (2001) 
test the predictions of PCI in a series of discrete games and compare it with 
neologism proofness. ACDC can explain Blume et al.’s experimental data at 
least as well as PCI (see Chapter 3.) Experimental work on the Crawford-Sobel 
uniform quadratic game provides evidence that the most informative equilibrium 
performs best (Dickhaut, McCabe & Mukherji (1995), Cai & Wang (2006) and 
Wang, Spezio & Camerer (2010)).46 This is predicted by NITS (Chen, Kartik & 
                                     
46 The focus of this chapter is on what makes communication of private information credible. 
A diﬀerent strand of the experimental literature deals with the question how players can 
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Sobel, 2008) as well as ACDC. Furthermore, it shows that as the bias parameter 
becomes smaller, the most informative equilibrium performs better, which is also 
predicted by ACDC. The present study is the ﬁrst systematic experimental test 
of whether and to what extent credible deviations matter for the stability of 
cheap talk equilibria. In addition, it presents a rigorous test of ACDC in new 
experiments. Our contribution on power and information transmission adds to a 
rich experimental bargaining literature.47 Even so, to the best of our knowledge 
we are the ﬁrst to experimentally address the link between bargaining power 
and information transmission.  
This chapter has the following structure. In section 4.2, we discuss the theory 
we require. We present the experimental games we study, introduce ACDC and 
discuss the issue of equilibrium selection. In section 4.3, we provide the experi-
mental design. In section 4.4 we present the experimental results in relation to 
equilibrium selection. In section 4.5, we look at the dynamic aspects of our data 
and discuss the neologism dynamic. In section 4.6, we introduce and discuss two 
additional treatments to test the robustness of our results. In section 4.7 we 
present the experimental results in relation to power and information transmis-
sion. Section 4.8 concludes.  
4.2 Theory 
In this section, we develop the theory we use to construct the hypotheses for 
our experiment. In subsection 4.2.1 we introduce the game G(B), on which our 
main treatments are based, and apply existing reﬁnements to this game. In 
4.2.2, we introduce ACDC and show how it works out in G(B). Since this 
                                                                                                           
credibly communicate their intentions (Davis & Holt (1988), Cason (1995), Charness (2000), 
Ellingsen & Johannesson (2004), Gneezy (2005), Charness & Dufwenberg (2006), Lundquist, 
Ellingsen, Gribbe & Johannesson (2009), Serra-Garcia, Van Damme & Potters (2010)). 
Crawford (1998) provides a survey of papers on cheap talk experiments and DellaVigna & 
Gentzkow (2010) review ﬁeld evidence on persuasive communication. 
47 Experimental work on bargaining games with private information includes Radner & 
Schotter (1989), Forsythe, Kennan & Sopher (1991), Rapoport & Fuller (1998), Rapoport, Erev 
& Zwick (1995), Daniel, Seale & Rapoport 1998), Valley, Moag & Bazerman (1998), Schotter, 
Snyder & Zheng (2000) and Croson, Boles & Murnighan (2003). For an overview of the theoreti-
cal and empirical literature on bargaining with incomplete information, see Ausubel, Cramton & 
Deneckere (2002). This literature does not deal with cheap talk equilibrium selection. 
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section contains all theory needed in this chapter, the material here overlaps 
with the material in the previous two chapters. 
4.2.1 G(B) 
G(B) is a two-player veto threats cheap talk game between an informed 
Sender and an uninformed Receiver. The outcome of the game x is a point in 
the interval [0, ]B  or the disagreement point ,E  \  where B  stands for bound-
ary. The payoﬀs of the Receiver and the Sender are given by ( )RU x  and 
( , ) :SU x t   
 
(4.1) 
2
( ) 60   for all [0, ]
5
RU x x x B    
( , ) 60 | |  for all [0, ]SU x t x t x B     
( ) ( ) 0R SU UE E   
 
On the interval, the Receiver prefers smaller outcomes to larger outcomes. The 
payoﬀs of the Sender on the interval depend on her type t, which is drawn from 
a uniform distribution on [0, ].B  The larger the distance between t and 
[0, ],x B  the lower the Sender’s payoﬀ. Both players receive a payoﬀ of 0 if E  is 
the outcome, regardless of t. The Receiver prefers all outcomes on the line 
smaller than 150 to ;E  the Sender prefers E  to all outcomes on the line more 
than 60 away from her type t.  
At the start of the game, nature draws a type t. Everything is common 
knowledge, except t. The game then proceeds as follows. Nature informs the 
Sender of t. Subsequently, the Sender sends a message m  to the Receiver. Next, 
the Receiver proposes action [0, ].a B  Finally, the Sender accepts or rejects. If 
the Sender accepts, a is the outcome of the game, and if she rejects, E  is the 
outcome. Note that all messages are costless for the Sender. We assume 
120B p  because under this condition the boundary does not aﬀect the set of 
equilibrium actions. The model is close to the cheap talk game with veto threats 
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of Matthews (1989). The main diﬀerence is that in our model the disagreement 
point does not lie on the interval.  
We consider the following type of equilibria. Following Matthews, we require 
the Receiver to play pure strategies and require Senders to always induce ac-
tions that are payoﬀ-maximizing (in the spirit of Selten’s (1975) trembling hand 
perfection). From now on, we will use ‘equilibrium’ to refer to a perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium satisfying these two requirements. 48 As we showed in Chapter 2, all 
equilibria in such veto threat games are partition equilibria. A partition equilib-
rium can be characterized by the ﬁnite set of actions 1 2, ,...,{ }nA a a a
   the 
Receiver proposes in equilibrium, where 1 2 ... .na a a    The number of 
equilibrium actions n is called the size of the equilibrium. Each type induces an 
action ia A
  which maximizes her payoﬀ and accepts it if and only if 
( , ) 0.S iU a t p 49 (In G(B) the payoﬀ maximizing action is simply the action 
closest to her type.) We say a type t induces an action ,a a  and write ( )a t aa , if 
the Receiver proposes aa  after any message m the Sender sends. This means 
that a partition of the type space 0 1 10 1n nt t t t    "  exists such 
that each type in 1( , )i it t  induces .ia  
It is straightforward to check that a set of actions 1 2 ... naa a    charac-
terizes a partition equilibrium if and only if 
 
(4.2)   1
{ : ( , ) 0}
argmax ( ) ( )  for all 1,..., ,
i
S
i
t
R
i a A U a
t
a U a I t dt i nU U

 p ¨  where  
  0 0, 1nt t   and 1( , ) ( , )  for all 1,..., 1.S Si i i iU a t U a t i n    
 
The game has two equilibria: a pooling (size-1) equilibrium and a 
(semi)separating size-2 equilibrium. For both equilibria, the set of equilibrium 
actions the Receiver takes does not depend on :B  
                                     
48 There is an inﬁnite number of equilibria that induce the same equilibrium outcome. These 
essentially equivalent equilibria just diﬀer in the messages that are used. For simplicity, we refer 
to a class of equilibria inducing the same equilibrium outcome simply as ‘an equilibrium.’  
49 There will be a set of measure zero of types for which 1( , ) ( , )
S S
i iU a t U a t  for some i. It 
does not matter which action they induce. 
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Proposition 4.1 G(B) has two equilibria: a pooling equilibrium PT  1{ 45}a 
and a separating equilibrium ST  1 2{ 0, 60}.a a   
 
In the pooling equilibrium, all types induce 45, whereas in the separating 
equilibrium all Sender types in the interval [0, 30) induce action 0a   and all 
Sender types in the interval (30, ]B  induce action 60.a   In the separating 
equilibrium, the Sender always accepts, and in the pooling equilibrium all 
Senders in [0, 105] accept.  
The intuition behind the proposition is the following. Since all equilibria are 
partition equilibria, the Receiver’s posterior beliefs consist of intervals. If the 
Receiver believes the Sender’s type is uniformly distributed on an interval [ , ]t t , 
he faces the following trade-oﬀ when looking for a best response. As the pro-
posed action increases (up to min{ 60, 60}t t  ), the probability of acceptance 
increases but the utility conditional on acceptance decreases. Senders best 
respond by inducing the action closest to their type. As in any cheap talk game, 
there is a pooling equilibrium in which all Senders employ the same message 
strategy and the Receiver ignores all messages. In G(B), also a size-2 equilibri-
um exists. Higher size equilibria do not exist, roughly because there is a mini-
mum distance between two positive equilibrium actions and a maximum to the 
value an equilibrium action can take. 
At this point two questions arise. Is one equilibrium more plausible than the 
other? And does B inﬂuence the stability of the equilibria? We ﬁrst turn to 
theories of credible deviations. The neologism proofness criterion of Farrell 
(1993) is based on the concept of neologisms. Neologisms are out-of-equilibrium 
messages which are assumed to have a literal meaning in a pre-existing natural 
language. Farrell considers neologisms which literally say: “propose action a , 
because my type is in set .N ” Farrell deems a neologism credible if and only if 
(i) all types t  in N  prefer a  to their equilibrium action a(t), (ii) all types t  not 
in N  prefer their equilibrium action a(t) to a  and (iii) the best response of the 
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Receiver after restricting the support of his prior to N  is to play a .50 We will 
denote credible neologisms by ,a N . An equilibrium is neologism proof if it 
does not admit any credible neologism. Farrell argues that only neologism proof 
equilibria are stable, since rational players would move away from equilibria 
which admit credible neologisms. (The predictions of announcement proofness 
(Matthews, Okuno-Fujiwara & Postlewaite, 1991) are equivalent to those of 
neologism proofness in G(B).51)  
In our game two types of credible neologisms can exist. A ‘low’ neologism 
which roughly says “I am a low type and prefer 0 to the lowest equilibrium 
action and so do you, so play 0” and ‘high’ neologism which roughly says “I am 
a high type, and it is probable that I will not accept the highest equilibrium 
action, so it is better for both of us if you propose something higher.” As the 
following proposition shows, the pooling equilibrium is never neologism proof 
and the separating equilibrium is only neologism proof if B = 120.  
 
Proposition 4.2 The pooling equilibrium admits the credible neologisms 
0,[0,22.5]  and 
15
min{ 60,75},[min{ ,60}, ] .
2
B
B B
  §  The separating equilibrium 
is neologism proof if 120.B   For 120,B  the separating equilibrium admits the 
credible neologism min{ 60,80},[min{ ,70}, ]
2
B
B B  § . 
 
So, for 120B   neologism proofness (and announcement proofness) are silent 
about the stability of the separating equilibrium relative to the pooling equilib-
                                     
50 Farrell does not consider cheap talk games with veto threats. In line with the trembling 
hand reﬁnement, we assume that types induce a neologism if ( , ) ( ( ), ).S SU a t U a t t  
51 Matthews, Okuno-Fujiwara & Postlewaite (1991) consider more elaborate messages, called 
announcements, and propose three types of credible deviations. Weakly credible announcements 
are similar to neologisms, but allow deviating types to distinguish amongst themselves. A weakly 
credible announcement that should be believed if the Receiver’s realizes that types can send 
multiple announcements is a credible announcement. A credible announcement that survives a 
rigorous Stiglitz-critique is strongly credible. Equilibria that admit no (weakly/strongly) credible 
announcements are called (strongly/weakly) announcement proof. In our game, strong an-
nouncement proofness, announcement proofness and neologism proofness coincide. The reason is 
that all weakly credible announcements are equivalent to a credible neologism (for a similar 
reason that there is at most a size-2 equilibrium) and that all types can send at most one 
credible neologism. All equilibria in G(B) are weakly announcement proof, as in almost all cheap 
talk games. 
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rium. In addition, they are silent about whether the separating equilibrium is 
more stable if 121B   than, say, if 210B  . 
The same holds for other cheap talk reﬁnements including communication 
proofness (Blume & Sobel, 1995) and the recurrent mop (Rabin & Sobel, 1996), 
as well as the non-equilibrium concepts  of Credible Message Rationalizability 
(Rabin, 1990) and Partial Common Interest (Blume, Kim & Sobel, 1993). (See 
Chapter 3 for details.) 
The NITS (Chen, Kartik & Sobel, 2008) criterion, which successfully predicts 
in the Crawford-Sobel (1982) game, is partially predictive in G(B). NITS starts 
by specifying a ‘lowest type,’ a type with the property that all other types prefer 
to be revealed as themselves rather than as that lowest type. An equilibrium 
survives NITS if the lowest type has no incentive to separate, i.e. if the lowest 
type prefers her equilibrium outcome to the outcome she would get if she could 
reveal her type. In our game, such a ‘lowest type’ cannot easily be formulated. 
All types in [0,60] are in fact lowest types according to Chen et al.’s deﬁnition. 
The pooling equilibrium survives NITS relative to types in < >22.5,105 ,  whereas 
the separating equilibrium survives NITS relative to types in [0,30]. Still, one 
can argue that 0t   is a natural lowest type in our game. Under this assump-
tion, for each B  only the separating equilibrium is NITS in our game. Hence, 
NITS would predict that the separating equilibrium is always stable regardless 
of .B   
Finally, some may argue that the most inﬂuential equilibrium (i.e. the equi-
librium which induces the largest number of actions) is the most plausible 
equilibrium, aside of any stability considerations. In our game, this criterion also 
selects the separating equilibrium regardless of .B  
In sum, existing criteria provide no or a partial answer to the question how 
stable equilibria in G(B) are for 120B  . 
4.2.2 ACDC in G(B) 
Our conjecture is that two aspects will aﬀect the behavioral stability of an 
equilibrium. The ﬁrst concerns the mass of types that can credibly induce a 
deviation. The smaller this mass becomes, the less unstable an equilibrium will 
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be, as it will be disturbed less frequently. The second aspect concerns how much 
the deviation proﬁle diﬀers from the equilibrium proﬁle in terms of Sender 
payoﬀs. The smaller this diﬀerence becomes, the smaller both the Sender’s 
incentive to deviate and the perturbation to the equilibrium if she deviates will 
be. 
For instance, the separating equilibrium is not neologism proof if B = 121. 
However, we do not expect behavior in the game G(121) to be very diﬀerent to 
behavior in G(120). After all, the induced deviations from equilibrium are very 
small: types in [60.5,121] induce 61  instead of 60. Hence, Senders can at most 
earn 1 by deviating and, if they deviate, the resulting proﬁle is very similar to 
the equilibrium proﬁle. In contrast, in the pooling equilibrium the neologism 
deviations are substantial: types from 0 to 22.5 deviate from 45 to 0, and types 
from 53 to 121 deviate from 45 to 61. As a consequence, Senders have a large 
incentive to deviate to a proﬁle which is very diﬀerent from the equilibrium 
proﬁle. Furthermore, the separating equilibrium seems more stable if 121B   
than if, say, 210B  , when types in [70,210] can credibly induce 80 rather than 
60.  
In Chapter 3, we formalized these ideas in the concept of the Average Credi-
ble Deviation (ACD).52 Let ( )a tT  be the equilibrium action induced by type t  in 
equilibrium ;T  and let ( )a tT  be the deviating action type t  induces if she plays 
a credible neologism.53 Let ( )a tT  ( )a tT  if Sender type t  cannot play a credible 
neologism. Finally, we deﬁne ( )SU t  and ( )SU t  as the lowest and highest payoﬀ a 
Sender can get if both players play a rationalizable strategy. Now, for each 
Sender type t , we specify the size of the credible deviation from equilibrium, 
( , )CD t T . The ACD is the expected value of the credible deviations. We measure 
the size of a credible deviation by the Sender’s incentive to deviate relative to 
the largest (rationalizable) incentive possible, so that it lies on a scale between 0 
and 1. The higher this incentive is, the higher the probability that a Sender will 
                                     
52 There we also provided a more general and rigorous treatment of the concept. Here we 
restrict ourselves to the deﬁnitions needed in the current setting. 
53 In G(B), ACDC gives equivalent results under weakly or ordinary credible announcements 
as under credible neologisms, as is the case in many games. For cases where the theories diﬀer, 
we prefer (ordinary) credible announcements for discrete games and credible neologisms for 
continuous games. 
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deviate and the larger the upheaval such a deviation can cause to an equilibri-
um. In particular, we deﬁne the credible deviation for type t  as 
 
(4.3)  
( , ( )) ( , ( ))
( , )  
( ) ( )
S S
S S
U t a t U t a t
CD t
U t U t
T T
T w   
 
whenever ( , ( )) ( ).S SU t a t U tT   If ( , ( )) ( ),S SU t a t U tT  the Sender has no incentive 
to adhere to her equilibrium strategy, as she can do no worse by deviating, and 
we set ( , ) 1.CD t T w The ACD of equilibrium T  is now deﬁned as  
 
(4.4)  < >( ) ( , )tACD E CD tT T  
 
Observe that ( ) [0,1].ACD T   We formulate the ACD-Criterion (ACDC) that an 
equilibrium T  is more stable than an equilibrium Ta  if ( ) ( ).ACD ACDT Ta  
Using ACDC, we can select equilibria. In particular, we call an equilibrium an 
ACDC equilibrium if there is no other equilibrium in the game with a lower 
ACD. We consider an ACDC equilibrium as the most plausible equilibrium, i.e. 
that which will predict best on average, rather than the equilibrium that will 
always be played all of the time. ACDC can select equilibria when neologism 
proofness is silent and reduces to the latter if neologism proof equilibria exist. 
The following proposition gives the results of ACDC for G(B). 
 
Proposition 4.3 The separating equilibrium ST  is the unique ACDC equilib-
rium. Furthermore, the ACD of the separating equilibrium is 0 for 120B   (in 
which case the equilibrium is neologism proof) and strictly increasing in B.   
 
We can now see why G(B) provides a good testing ground for our ideas. It 
contains the features that make (continuous) cheap talk games diﬃcult to reﬁne. 
In contrast to Crawford & Sobel’s (1982) and Matthews’ (1989) cheap talk 
models, however, in our game a parameter value exists such that there are 
multiple equilibria, of which only one is neologism proof. Hence, our model 
allows us to test the relevance of credible deviations in a continuous setting. 
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Furthermore, it allows us to test the idea that stability is not all-or-nothing. 
First, we can compare within a game two equilibria that are not neologism 
proof. Second, across games we can gradually increase the number of types that 
can credibly deviate in an equilibrium by increasing B.  
4.3 Experimental Design and Procedures 
We ran ﬁve treatments. In three treatments, we ran G(B) with an increasing 
boundary: G(120), G(130) and G(210). In addition we ran two additional 
robustness treatments T4 and T5 to which we return in section 4.6. Table 4.1 
summarizes the theoretical properties of the experimental treatments. For each 
treatment, we have six matching groups, each consisting of 10 subjects (5 
Senders and 5 Receivers). 
 
 TABLE 4.1
SUMMARY OF EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Treatment ( )RU E  ( )SU E  B Equilibria1 ACD2
G(120) 0 0 120 {45}, {0, 60}** 0 
G(130) 0 0 130 {45}, {0, 60}* 0.22 
G(210) 0 0 210 {45}, {0, 60}* 0.50 
T4 30 30 120 {45/2},{0, 30}* 0.56 
T5 0 30 120 {30}, 1 1{ , 60},a a   
2 2{0, , 60}a a  ** 3,4 
0 
Notes: In each game, t was uniformly distributed on the integers in [0,B]. 23( ) 60
RU x x 
and ( , ) 60SU x t t x   . 1An equilibrium has a * if it is ACDC and ** if it is neologism proof 
as well. 2 The ACD of the ACDC equilibrium. 3 1 [0,30]a   and 2 (0,30].a   4 Only {0,30,60} is 
ACDC. 
 
We used a standard procedure to recruit subjects from the student popula-
tion of the University of Amsterdam. The computerized experiment was run at 
the CREED lab. The software was written with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). 
At the start of the experiment, subjects were randomly assigned to the role of 
Sender (‘chooser’ in the terminology of the experiment) or Receiver (‘proposer’). 
Subjects kept the same role throughout the whole experiment. Subjects read the 
role-speciﬁc instructions on paper at their own pace. (See appendix 4.9.4 for the 
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instructions.) After reading the instructions, subjects had to answer several 
questions testing their understanding of the instructions. Only when all subjects 
had answered all questions correctly, the experiment started. 
Subjects received a starting capital of 100 points. In addition, subjects earned 
points with their decisions in each of the 50 periods. (Subjects were informed 
that the experiment would last for approximately 50 periods.) At the end of the 
experiment, total point earnings were exchanged to euros at a rate of 1.5 euros 
for 100 points. In a session, we ran 2 matching groups simultaneously, each 
consisting of 5 Senders and 5 Receivers. In every period, each Sender was ran-
domly rematched with a Receiver in the own matching group. In total, 300 
subjects participated, who on average earned 28.30 euros in approximately 2 
hours, with a minimum of 10.10 euros and a maximum of 40.47 euros. Each 
subject only participated once.  
The procedure within a period was as follows. In each period, the Sender was 
informed of her own type. All subjects knew that each individual Sender’s type 
in each period was an independent draw from the uniform distribution on [0, ].B
54 After having been informed of the own type, each Sender sent a message 
(‘suggestion’ in the terminology of the experiment) to the Receiver. The Receiv-
er was informed of the message but not of the Sender’s type. Then the Receiver 
chose an action (‘made a proposal’) that was either accepted or rejected by the 
Sender. Types, messages and actions were conﬁned to integers in [0, ].B 55 
Payoﬀs were then calculated according to the payoﬀs in Table 4.1. At the end 
of the period, Senders and Receivers were informed of the state of the world 
(the Sender type) and all the decisions made by the pair they were part of. In 
addition, each subject was shown her own payoﬀ and how it was calculated. At 
any moment, subjects were provided with information about the social history 
in order to facilitate learning.56 At the bottom of the screen they saw how play 
                                     
54 To maximize the comparability of the treatments, we drew three sets of types for one 
treatment and then rescaled these sets for each of the other treatments.  
55 We chose for this restricted message space instead of a free chat in order to be able to 
provide a history screen, facilitate learning and have data that can be interpreted clearly. Notice 
that the message space is rich enough for the communication of all credible neologisms in both 
equilibria, as in our game a neologism action uniquely identiﬁes a credible neologism. 
56 Miller & Plott (1985) showed how a social history can help subjects understand the strate-
gic nature of signaling games. 
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had unfolded in the 15 most recent periods in their own matching group. For 
Senders the information was organized as follows. The left-hand side showed a 
table summarizing the choices of the pairs in the own matching group. Each row 
contained a pair’s suggestion (message), proposal, acceptance and preferred 
outcome (type of the Sender). The table was ﬁrst sorted on suggestion, then on 
proposal, acceptance and ﬁnally on preferred outcome. The right-hand side 
showed the corresponding graph that listed the proposals as function of the 
suggestions. Figure 4.1 shows an example of the information that Senders 
received.  
 
 
For Receivers the information was communicated in a slightly diﬀerent way. 
In their table, each row listed a pair’s suggestion, preferred outcome, proposal 
and acceptance. The table was ﬁrst sorted on message, then on preferred out-
come, proposal and ﬁnally on acceptance. In their graph, preferred outcomes 
were shown as function of the suggestions.  
4.4 Experimental Results 
In this section, we deal with the issue of equilibrium performance. Therefore 
we focus exclusively on the ﬁnal 15 periods of the experiment. In section 4.5, we 
Figure 4.1 
Example of social history screen History Screen (Senders) 
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will take a closer look at the dynamics in the data and also use the data from 
early periods. All statistical tests have been done treating each matching group 
as one independent data point. For comparisons within a treatment we use 
Wilcoxon signed rank tests, and for comparisons between treatments we use 
Mann-Whitney ranksum tests. *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level respectively (for two-tailed tests). 
We start with some descriptive statistics of the ﬁnal 15 periods of the exper-
iment.  
 
Figure 4.2 plots the Receivers’ actions as a function of the Senders’ types for 
each of the three treatments together with the equilibrium predictions. Con-
sistent with the separating equilibrium we ﬁnd that Senders with low types tend 
to elicit an action of 0, while the Senders with high types tend to trigger a high 
action. Types close to the equilibrium indiﬀerent type of 30 show a more contin-
uous separation than the equilibrium step-function. In the G(120) treatment, 
where the separating equilibrium is neologism proof, the distribution of actions 
high type Senders trigger is similar and centered around 60. This is in agree-
ment with the equilibrium prediction. We see a similar pattern in G(130), 
although the mean high action is now somewhat higher than the equilibrium 
action, as expected if high types send a neologism. In G(210), the elicited 
actions by high types are far oﬀ from equilibrium and much more dispersed.  
The equilibrium analysis assumes that Senders do not leave money on the 
table, i.e., they are supposed to accept any action that gives them positive 
Figure 4.2 
This ﬁgure shows what types (x-axis) induced what action (y-axis). (Last 15 periods.) Bub-
bles are clustered on a 10-grid. Each bubble represents all observations in a 
( 5, 5] ( 5, 5]t t a a  q    neighborhood. The size of each bubble is proportional to the number 
of observations it represents. 
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payoﬀ. Overall, Senders accepted proposed actions that would give them a 
positive payoﬀ in 96% of the cases. Table 4.2 presents the actual acceptance 
frequencies as function of the Sender’s payoﬀ (in the rows) and the Sender’s 
share in the total payoﬀ (in the columns). It is remarkable that Senders almost 
always accept ‘decent’ proposals that give them at least 10, independent of their 
share in the total payoﬀ. The share in total payoﬀ only matters when Senders 
receive ‘peanuts’ proposals with payoﬀs below 10. As a result, the equilibrium 
assumption about Senders’ acceptance behavior is by and large supported in the 
data. Notice that the picture about acceptance rates diﬀers from results in 
ultimatum games, where subjects tend to reject proposed actions more often 
(Oosterbeek, Sloof & Van der Kuilen, 2004). A crucial diﬀerence between our 
bargaining game and the ultimatum game is that in our game the Receiver is 
not informed of the type of the Sender. Therefore, unlike in the ultimatum 
game, it is unclear whether an unfavorable proposal is made intentionally. 
 
TABLE 4.2 
ACCEPTANCE RATES 
  Share Sender
Payoﬀ  
Sender 
Total 0-10% 10-20% 20-30% 30-40% 40-50% >50% 
<0 0 211 -  - - - -  - 
=0 50 6 50 6 - - - -  - 
0-10 70 112 40 30 73 49 90 29 100 2 100 1 100 1
10-20 92 122 -  100 2 87 69 97 36 100 8 100 7
20-30 99 135 -  - 100 13 100 48 98 59 100 15
30-40 100 182 -  - - 100 28 100 76 100 78
40-50 100 250 -  - - - 100 89 99 161
50-60 100 332 -  - - - 100 76 100 256
Total when 
payoﬀ>0 
40 36 75 51 89 111 99 114 100 309 100 518
Notes: the cells show the acceptance rates (in percentages) as a function of the surplus pay-
oﬀ the Sender would receive if she would accept the proposed action (in the rows) and her 
share of the surplus (in the columns, cases where the surplus was not positive were dropped). 
The number of observations pertaining to the cell is listed in italics. The Sender’s share is 
deﬁned as ( , )
( , ) ( )
100 .
S
S R
U a t
U a t U aq  
 
 Table 4.3 reports how often actual play was close to equilibrium. We say that 
an outcome is consistent with equilibrium (‘correctly predicted’) if the actual 
action lies within a bandwidth of 10 and if the acceptance decision was correctly 
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predicted. The absolute numbers in the table are obviously dependent on the 
chosen bandwidth. Here, we are interested in the relative magnitudes of the 
numbers, for which the exact level of the bandwidth turns out not to matter. In 
addition, we also look at the average (absolute) prediction error of the equilib-
ria, reported in Figure 4.3. Let ( )a tT  be the equilibrium action of the Receiver 
given type t  and ˆ ( )i ia t  the observed action for observation i. The average 
prediction error (for a set of n observations I) is then 
1
ˆ| ( ) ( ) |i i i
i I
a t a t
n
T

 . The 
percentage of outcomes that are correctly predicted is an intuitive measure of 
predictive success, whereas the average prediction error a parameter-free and 
precise measure. The results are qualitatively identical (and equally signiﬁcant) 
for both measures of predictive success. 
 
TABLE 4.3
FRACTION OF OUTCOMES CORRECTLY PREDICTED BY EQUILIBRIA 
 All observations Observations with t < 120 
Treatment Equilibria Diﬀ Equilibria Dif
Pooling Separating Pooling Separating  
G(120) .39 .69 .30** .39 .69 .30**
G(130) .13 .57 .43** .14 .59 .45**
G(210) .09 .18 .09** .09 .28 .19**
Dif 120-130 .25** .12 .25** .09  
Dif 120-210 .30*** .51*** .29** .40***  
Dif 130-210 .05** .39*** .05 .31***  
Notes: The table shows per treatment the median (over matching groups) of the fraction of 
correctly predicted outcomes by the equilibrium. We classiﬁed a prediction as correct if both (i) 
the distance between the predicted and observed action was not larger than 10 and (ii) the 
acceptance decision was correctly predicted. We used the data of the last 15 periods. ‘Dif’ 
denotes ‘diﬀerence.’ 
 
We ﬁrst deal with the question whether credible deviations (and hence neolo-
gism proofness and announcement proofness) have a bite. For this question, two 
comparisons are relevant. First, within treatment G(120) the separating equilib-
rium is neologism proof while the pooling equilibrium is not. In accordance with 
neologism proofness, more outcomes are consistent with the separating equilib-
rium than with the pooling equilibrium. The diﬀerence is both substantial and 
statistically signiﬁcant. Second, when we move from treatment G(120) to 
G(210), the separating equilibrium ceases to be neologism proof. While the 
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separating equilibrium does a good job in G(120), it organizes only a bleak 
minority of the data in G(210). This conclusion is valid when we take the data 
for all types as well as when we condition on the outcomes with types less than 
120. So also when we compare the behavioral stability of the same equilibrium 
across treatments, we ﬁnd support for neologism proofness. 
To investigate whether credible deviations matter gradually and ACDC is 
relevant across games, we compare G(120), G(130) and G(210). In G(130), the 
separating equilibrium is no longer neologism proof but the ACD measure 
remains rather small relative to G(210). So if ACDC makes sense, the results of 
G(130) should be closer to G(120) than to G(210). Table 4.3 conﬁrms that this 
is indeed the case. Like in G(120), the separating equilibrium is much more 
successful than the pooling equilibrium. The separating equilibrium predicts 
behavior a bit less in G(130) than in G(120), but the diﬀerence is not signiﬁ-
cant.57 In contrast, the diﬀerence between G(130) and G(210) is much larger. In 
G(210), signiﬁcantly fewer cases are consistent with the separating equilibrium 
than in G(130). So even though the separating equilibrium is not neologism 
proof in either treatment, it traces the data much better in G(130) than in 
G(210), as predicted by ACDC. 
Regarding equilibrium selection, observe that in all treatments the ACDC 
(separating) equilibrium predicts signiﬁcantly better than the non-ACDC 
(pooling) equilibrium. This is also the case for G(130) and G(210), where 
neither equilibrium is neologism proof. Still, in G(210), the diﬀerence between 
the separating and the pooling equilibrium is much smaller than in the other 
treatments, in line with ACDC. 
The power of ACDC is further illustrated in Figure 4.3. This ﬁgure lists the 
average prediction error of a particular equilibrium and treatment as a function 
of its ACD. In agreement with ACDC, the higher the ACD measure, the larger 
the average prediction error tends to be. Notice in particular that the average 
prediction error of the separating equilibrium only rises slightly when it just 
ceases to be neologism proof (relative to the diﬀerences with G(210)). 
 
                                     
57 Since this result also holds when the analysis is restricted to observations with 120t b , 
this is not a measurement artifact due to a change in the interval of measurement. 
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4.5 Dynamics 
In this section, we look at the dynamics. In subsection 4.5.1, we describe the 
most important dynamic features of the data. In 4.5.2, we observe that an 
elementary best response model is not predictive. In 4.5.3, we introduce the 
neologism dynamic, which is able to explain important parts of the data. 
4.5.1 Dynamics in Experiment  
In this section we deal with the question how subjects adapted their behavior 
during the experiment. Figure 4.4 plots messages conditional on Sender type 
(left-hand side), actions conditional on message received (middle) and actions 
conditional on Sender type (right-hand side). We present plots for the ﬁrst 15 
and last 15 periods in each treatment. The type-message plots show that Send-
ers’ messages are higher than their types and that Senders learn gradually to 
 
Figure 4.3 
The ﬁgure plots for each equilibrium in each treatment its theoretical ACD against its empir-
ical prediction error. We report the median (over matching groups) of the average prediction 
error. We used the data of the last 15 periods. 
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exaggerate more. In the last 15 periods of each treatment, Senders overstate the 
true state more than in the ﬁrst 15 periods. Thus, there is ‘language inﬂation.’ 
Receivers’ action-message plots provide the mirror image of Senders’ type-
message plots. That is, in the ﬁrst part of the experiment Receivers tend to 
propose actions slightly below the messages received. In the ﬁnal part of the 
experiment, Receivers have learned to subtract larger amounts from the messag-
es received. The type-action plots on the right hand side illustrate how close the 
actually triggered actions are to the equilibrium predictions. For treatments 
G(130) and G(120), the data are closer to the separating equilibrium in the ﬁnal 
part of the experiment than in the ﬁrst part of the experiment. A similar trend 
is not observed in G(210). To the contrary, in this treatment the data remain far 
from equilibrium throughout the whole experiment. 
We now turn to the questions how easily subjects reached the separating 
equilibrium in the diﬀerent treatments and how likely it was that they stayed 
there. Table 4.4 presents the relevant statistics separately for the ﬁrst part (ﬁrst 
15 periods) and the ﬁnal part (last 15 periods) of the experiment. In the ﬁrst 
part of the experiment, subjects more easily reached the separating equilibrium 
from a state of disequilibrium in treatments G(120) and G(130) than in G(210). 
When subjects were approximately playing according to the separating equilib-
rium in the previous period, they were much more likely to stay there in treat-
ments G(120) and G(130) than in treatment G(210). The lower part of the table 
shows that the diﬀerences between treatment G(210) and the other treatments 
became even more pronounced in the ﬁnal part of the experiment. In particular, 
in G(120) and G(130) the separating equilibrium attracts more outcomes in the 
ﬁnal part than in the ﬁrst part (and in G(120) signiﬁcantly so). In contrast, in 
G(210) the separating equilibrium attracts less outcomes in the ﬁnal part; in 
fact, it hardly attracts any outcomes in the ﬁnal part. 
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Figure 4.4 
This ﬁgure compares the chosen strategies (type-message, message-action) and the resulting 
proﬁle for the ﬁrst 15 and last 15 rounds. The bubble plots are clustered on a grid of 10. In the 
last column, the solid line represents the separating equilibrium and the dotted line the pooling 
equilibrium. 
G(120) 
G(210) 
G(130) 
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 TABLE 4.4
FRACTION OF MATCHING GROUP OBSERVATIONS IN SEPARATING EQUILIBRIUM 
CONDITIONAL ON PREVIOUS STATE 
 Treatment Previous state 
no equilibrium 
Previous state  
equilibrium 
First Part 
(Periods 1-15) 
G(120) .46 .60 
G(130) .41 .51 
G(210) .10 .09 
Dif 120-130 .05 .09 
Dif 120-210 .36*** .51*** 
Dif 130-210 .31*** .42*** 
Final Part 
(Periods 36-50) 
G(120) .64 .74 
G(130) .50 .72 
G(210) .03 .00 
Dif 120-130 .14 .02 
Dif 120-210 .60*** .74*** 
Dif 130-210 .46*** .72** 
Diﬀerence between 
First and Final Part 
G(120) .18** .14* 
G(130) .09 .21 
G(210) .07 -.09 
Notes: A matching group observation in a given period is classiﬁed as consistent with the 
separating equilibrium prediction if and only if the acceptance decision was predicted correctly 
and |equilibrium action – observed action| ≤ 10 for at least 3 of the 5 pairs in the matching 
group; the middle column displays the fraction of equilibrium observations given that the 
previous observation was not in equilibrium; the right column displays the fraction of equilibri-
um observations given that the previous observation was in equilibrium. 
 
Summarizing, the two main features of the dynamics in the data are (i) there 
is language-inﬂation and (ii) the separating equilibrium attracts behavior over 
time in G(120) and to a slightly lesser extent in G(130), but not at all in 
G(210).  
4.5.2 Best Response Dynamic 
A ﬁrst avenue to look to explain the data is a simple best response model. 
This, however, cannot distinguish between the two equilibria or the eﬀects of B 
using natural initial conditions. (We get equivalent results for a level-k analysis.) 
Consider the simplest best response dynamic, in which Sender and Receiver best 
respond to the other’s strategy in the previous period. We again assume that 
Senders induce the action they prefer most. If Senders are indiﬀerent, they 
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randomize between their optimal actions. The outcome of the best response 
model depends very much on the initial conditions and we will look at the two 
natural starting points: a babbling strategy and a naive strategy. In the bab-
bling strategy no information is transmitted: Senders randomize in the interval 
[0,B] and Receivers take the optimal prior action 45 regardless of the message 
(this corresponds to a random level-0 in a level-k analysis). In the naive strategy 
all information is transmitted: Senders report their type and this is believed by 
Receivers (this corresponds to a truthful level-0 in a level-k analysis). It is 
readily veriﬁed that if players babble in the ﬁrst period, then the dynamic 
forever stays in this pooling equilibrium, regardless of the boundary. Similarly, if 
players use a naive strategy in the ﬁrst periods, it can be shown that the dy-
namic converges to the separating equilibrium, regardless of the boundary.  
4.5.3 Neologism Dynamic 
We introduce a small twist to create a ‘neologism dynamic’: Sender types who 
can send a credible neologism with respect to the Receiver’s strategy in the 
previous round will do so and such a credible neologism will be believed. In all 
other respects, the dynamic is the same as above. If we analyze this dynamic for 
our experimental treatments (G(120), G(130), G(210)), we get entirely diﬀerent 
results. First, the outcome becomes less dependent on the initial conditions. 
Second, the dynamic converges to behavior that resembles the separating equi-
librium when the ACD is small and only when it is small. 58 Finally, in the 
attractor of G(130) and G(210), types close 30 do not separate neatly as they 
would in the separating equilibrium. (A level-k  with neologisms analysis yields 
qualitatively the same result as the best response dynamic.)  
In G(120), the dynamic converges to a steady state that corresponds to the 
separating equilibrium for both random and naive ﬁrst-period strategies. If 
players have a naive strategy in period 1, then Senders realize in period 2 that 
they should send their type plus 60, leading to an inﬂation of language. Types 
higher than 60 pool at the highest message of 120. In period 3, Receivers recog-
                                     
58 Although (in line with ACDC) the dynamic converges in all cases to behavior that is closer 
to the separating than to the pooling equilibrium. 
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nize the language inﬂation and propose 0 to any message smaller than 120. In 
addition, they propose 60 if they receive 120. In period 4, the players are al-
ready in the separating equilibrium. Note that as long as the Receiver proposes 
0 and an action higher or equal to 60, no neologism can be played. Suppose 
players start with a babbling strategy. Then in period 2, Senders in [0,22.5) 
send a low neologism of 0 and Senders in (57.5,120] send a high neologism of 
60. In period 3, the Receiver realizes that types who do not send a neologism 
accept 0, and propose 0 to them and 60 to others. As a result, in period 4 
equilibrium is reached. 
In G(130), the dynamic starts out (for both initial conditions) similar to 
G(120) but does not converge to the separating equilibrium. Instead, the dy-
namic converges to a four-cycle that, nonetheless, stays pretty close to the 
separating equilibrium. In G(210), the dynamic converges to a (non-steady) 
state, where the Receiver proposes actions 0, 30 and 90, and the Senders in 
(90,210] send a neologism of 90. Hence, the dynamic does not come close to the 
separating equilibrium. (Although it comes closer to the separating than to the 
pooling equilibrium.) We summarize the ﬁndings in Figure 4.5. We have held 
the discussion of the neologism dynamic informal here. For details and proofs, 
we refer to appendix 4.9.3. The calculations are straightforward, but tedious. 
Observe that the results of the neologism dynamic are in line with the two 
main dynamic features of the experiment: (i) there is language-inﬂation and (ii) 
the separating equilibrium attracts behavior in G(120) and to a slightly lesser 
extent in G(130), but not at all in G(210). (See Figure 4.4.) In line with the 
neologism dynamic is, furthermore, the fact that the prediction error of the 
separating equilibrium decreases over time in G(120) and G(130), but not in 
G(210). Finally, note that in G(130) and G(210) types close to 30 (the indiﬀer-
ence type in the separating equilibrium) do not separate neatly into low and 
high types. Hence, the dynamic predicts a messy separation close to the equilib-
rium indiﬀerence type for these treatments, which we observe in the data. 
Our neologism dynamic is a parsimonious behavioral model that organizes 
the main patterns in the data even though it ignores some features that may 
also play a role. Firstly, it abstracts away from noise, which is present in the 
data (as is the case in most experiments). Hence, adding noise to our analysis, 
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in the spirit of Quantal Response (McKelvey & Palfrey, 1995; 1998) would 
certainly make it more realistic. Nonetheless, in this case formalizing noise 
would not teach us much more about the data except that agents best respond 
in a noisy manner. In particular, an Agent Quantal Response Equilibrium (A-
QRE) analysis per se cannot (meaningfully) select equilibria in cheap talk 
games: The pooling equilibrium is always a limiting principal branch A-QRE, 
while it is often implausible.59 Secondly, there is somewhat more separation close 
to the indiﬀerence type than predicted by the separating equilibrium. Although 
this is predicted by the neologism dynamic when that equilibrium is not neolo-
gism proof, other forces may also be in play here. In particular, one could think 
in the direction of lying aversion or some naivety on the part of the Receivers, 
such as in the model of Kartik, Ottaviani & Squintani (2007).60  
 
                                     
59 The pooling equilibrium of a cheap talk game is always a limiting, principal branch A-
QRE: for any rationality parameter M , there is an A-QRE where all Senders mix uniformly over 
the message space and the Receiver ignores all messages. As M increases, the Senders strategy 
remains unchanged, and the Receiver’s best response smoothly approaches its actual best 
response to her prior.  
60 Lying aversion is a topical and fascinating research ﬁeld (e.g. Gneezy (2005), Kartik 
(Strategic Communication with Lying Costs, 2009), Hurkens & Kartik (2009), Lundquist, 
Ellingsen, Gribbe & Johannesson (2009), Serra-Garcia, Van Damme & Potters (2011)). Credible 
deviations and ACDC currently do not take any potential aversion to lying people may have into 
account. We believe abstracting away from lying aversion is justiﬁed here, as a ﬁrst approxima-
tion of behavior, for two reasons. First, Senders can avoid lying by sending messages containing 
suggestions to what the Receiver should do rather than information about the state of the 
world. In the experiment, we have restricted subjects to send messages containing suggestions. 
Second, ACDC is an equilibrium theory for dynamic settings where language evolves and the 
meaning of a message, except for credible deviations, is determined by how it is used. Although 
lying may be highly relevant for one-shot interactions, it is arguably less so in such a dynamic 
setting. With language evolving or having evolved, it is not at all clear what lying could entail. 
In particular, Senders either want to use messages that have acquired a pragmatic meaning by 
its use or messages with a literal but credible meaning. In both cases, lying does not seem to be 
well-deﬁned. Furthermore, in equilibrium, players hold correct beliefs about each other, so that 
lying in equilibrium is a particularly tricky concept. Still, if one succeeds in constructing a 
consistent framework of dynamic communication with lying, then incorporating lying aversion in 
ACDC may well increase its predictive power. 
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FIGURE 4.5 
 
4.6 Robustness 
We ran two additional treatments, T4 and T5, to perform two types of ro-
bustness checks. As in section 4.4, we focus on the last 15 periods and we also 
use the same statistical methods and notation as in that section. 
4.6.1 T4 
One possible experimental risk of manipulating B in treatments G(120), 
G(130) and G(210) is that our results could be inﬂuenced (merely) by increasing 
the action and type space. In particular, one may be worried that confused 
subjects simply choose something close to the midpoint of the message or action 
space. Therefore, we ran T4, which is strategically equivalent to the game 
G(240), but where we do not shift the boundary (we keep it at 120), but change 
the disagreement point payoﬀ instead. T4 is identical to G(120), except that 
disagreement payoﬀ for both players is 30: ( ) ( ) 30.R SU UE E   We have: 
 
Proposition 4.4 T4 has a size-1 equilibrium \ ^451 2a   and a size-2 equilibri-
um \ ^1 20, 30 .a a   In addition, T4 is strategically equivalent to G(240). 
 
The ﬁgure shows the type-action plots the attractors of the neologism dynamics for bounda-
ries G(120), G(130) and G(210).  In G(120), the attractor is a steady state proﬁle equal to the 
separating equilibrium. In G(130), the attractor is a four-cycle characterized by Receiver 
actions {0, 2764 };{0,
2
764 ,70}; {0,
1
77 ,70} and {0, 
1
77 ,
2
764 }. In G(210) the attractor is the  
strategy proﬁle {0,30,90} (which is attracting but not a steady state). 
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Figure 4.6 shows a type-action bubble plot of T4 (left panel) and Table 4.5 
shows the ACDC properties of T4 together with those of G(120), G(130) and 
G(210). The results of T4 are in line with those of the three G(B) treatments. 
In particular, the data of T4 are close to G(210), except that outcomes in T4 
are even more dispersed, which is in line with the higher ACD of the separating 
equilibrium. 
 
FIGURE 4.6 
This ﬁgure shows the type action bubble plot for G(210) and T4. The bubble plots are 
clustered on a grid of 10. The solid line represents the ACDC equilibrium outcome. 
 
TABLE 4.5
PERFORMANCE POOLING VERSUS (ACDC) SEPARATING EQUILIBRIUM 
 ACD Average Prediction Error 
 Pooling Separating Pooling Separating Diﬀerence 
G(120) 0.39 0 18.3 10.7 7.5** 
G(130) 0.45 0.22 22.7 12.5 10.2** 
G(210) 0.63 0.50 42.3 33.3 9.0** 
T4 ~ G(240) 0.65 0.56 46.6 37.6 4.5** 
Notes: This table shows the theoretical ACD and the observed prediction error of each 
equilibrium. The prediction error of T4 is scaled (doubled) to make it comparable with the 
other treatments.  
4.6.2 T5 
There are a few issues we cannot test in G(B). First, we cannot test whether 
ACD also organizes data in a more complicated setting, where the equilibrium 
set is large. Secondly, our conjecture that credible deviations matter gradually 
0
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implies that, even if a neologism proof equilibrium exists, other equilibria admit-
ting few credible deviations may not perform that much worse. Finally, in G(B) 
we cannot discriminate between ACDC on the one hand and NITS and inﬂuen-
tiality on the other in terms of selection properties. For these two reasons, we 
study T5. 
T5 is the same as G(120), except that the Sender’s disagreement point payoﬀ 
is raised from 0 to 30: ( ) 0,  ( ) 30.R SU UE E   In T5, the maximum equilibrium-
size is 3 and continua of equilibria exist: 
 
Proposition 4.5 T5 has a size-1 equilibrium \ ^1 30 .a   In addition, it has a 
set of size-2 respectively size-3 equilibria characterized by 1 2 1, 60},{a a a   with 
1 [0,30]a   and 1 2 3 20, , 6 }{ 0a a a a    with 2 (0,30]a  . The ACDC equilibrium, 
which is also neologism proof, is 0, ,{ 30 90}. 
 
Observe that all size-3 equilibria survive the inﬂuentiality criterion. The size-2 
equilibrium {0,60}  and all size-3 equilibria survive NITS (relative to lowest type 
t = 0): the lowest type has no incentive to separate, because it obtains its 
highest possible utility in equilibrium. 
As Figure 4.7 shows, in T5, behavior roughly follows the predictions of the 
ACDC equilibrium, although there is excess separation. Primarily, types close to 
the boundaries between the intervals of the ACDC equilibrium tend to elicit 
diﬀerent actions than in equilibrium. 
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FIGURE 4.7 
This ﬁgure shows the type action bubble plot for T5. The bubble plots are clustered on a 
grid of 10. The solid line represents the ACDC equilibrium outcome. 
 
The ACDC equilibrium predicts signiﬁcantly better than the pooling equilib-
rium. (The prediction error of the separating equilibrium (11.4) is signiﬁcantly 
smaller at the 5% level than that of the pooling equilibrium (34.3).) Further-
more, Figure 4.8 shows that in T5 the ACDC equilibrium outperforms the other 
equilibria as well. The left hand side displays the theoretical ACD for the size-2 
and size-3 equilibria. The equilibrium that is characterized by the actions 
(0,30,90) minimizes the ACD and is thus the ACDC equilibrium. The right hand 
side of the ﬁgure shows that for this equilibrium the average prediction error of 
the action is minimized. In addition, the rank of an equilibrium’s prediction 
error (right panel in Figure 4.8) roughly follows the rank an equilibrium’s ACD 
(left panel in Figure 4.8). (The two plots have a diﬀerent curvature though.) 
This is also interesting since the ACDC equilibrium is neologism proof. Equilib-
ria that are not neologism proof, but have a small ACD perform quantitatively 
but not qualitatively worse. In sum, ACDC organizes the data quite well.  
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4.7 Power and Information Transmission 
Our additional treatments T4 and T5 also allow us to test a comparative 
statics hypothesis regarding the relation between bargaining power and infor-
mation transmission. In Chapter 2, we studied a general external veto threats 
model to which all games in this chapter belong, and found a relation between 
power and information transmission. There we model a player’s bargaining 
power by her disagreement point payoﬀ. The idea is that the more power a 
player gets, the lower the harms of disagreement are for her. We take the size of 
an equilibrium as a measure of information transmission. Our main result in 
Chapter 2 is that the maximum equilibrium size is increasing in the Sender’s 
bargaining power and decreasing in that of the Receiver. In Chapter 3 we 
showed that ACDC selects the maximum size equilibrium. Hence, we hypothe-
sized that the relative power of the Sender aﬀects actual information transmis-
sion positively. With our data we can test this.  
Observe that treatments T4, G(120) and T5 only diﬀer in the bargaining 
power of the players (See Table 4.6). In T5, the maximum equilibrium size is 3. 
If we decrease the Sender’s bargaining power relative to T5, we get G(120) and 
the maximum equilibrium size is 2. Similarly, if we increase the Receiver’s 
 
FIGURE 4.8 
ACD and performance of size-2 and size-3 equilibria in T5. The left panel plots the theoreti-
cal ACD of the size-2 and sieze-3 equilibria, whereas the right panel plots the average prediction 
error of the equilibria. These equilibria can be characterized by asize–1. There are 31 size-2 
equilibria of the form (a1, a1 + 60) with 0 ≤ a1 ≤ 30 and 30 size-3 equilibria of the form (0, a2, 
a2 + 60) with 0 < a1 ≤ 30. 
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bargaining power relative to T5, we get T4 and the maximum equilibrium size is 
again 2.  
 
 TABLE 4.6
COMPARING BARGAINING POWER
 
Treatment 
Disagreement payoﬀs Equilibrium Actions
Sender Receiver Pooling ACDC Other 
T5 30 0 30 0,30,90 Size 2 & 3 
G(120) 0 0 45 0, 60  
T4 30 30 22.5 0, 30  
 
 
The empirical challenge we face is that while equilibrium size is an appropri-
ate theoretical measure of information transmission for partition equilibria, it is 
less suitable to judge the amount of information transmitted in actual data. To 
overcome that, we operationalize information transmission in a manner that can 
be applied to empirical data as well. We identify information with the informa-
tional value messages have to the Receiver. If no information is transmitted at 
all, then the Receiver’s expected payoﬀ REU  is equal to that if he used his prior 
R
priorEU  (which is equal to his expected payoﬀ in the pooling equilibrium). If all 
information is transmitted, he earns the payoﬀ RperfectEU  he would earn if he 
always perfectly knew the Sender’s type. Information transmission in some 
(observed) proﬁle ,T ,REU T can be written as the convex combination of these 
extremes: (1 ( )) ( ) .R R Rprior perfectEU EU EUT U T U T    Hence 
( )
R R
prior
R R
perfect prior
EU EU
EU EU
TU T   is a measure of information transmission, where 
( ) 0U T   indicates no information and ( ) 1U T   perfect information transmis-
sion.61 
Table 4.7 shows the information transmission analysis for our data. We look 
at the total information transmission by calculating U  using the payoﬀs actually 
earned by the Receivers. In addition, we look at the informativeness of Sender’s 
                                     
61 Observe that U  is invariant to positive aﬃne transformations of the payoﬀs. In addition, 
note that U  could be negative in case the Receiver draws wrong inferences from messages, for 
instance if he is successfully misled systematically. 
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messages. Here, we do not use what Receivers actually earned, but estimate 
what Receivers would have earned if they optimally used the information in 
their history screen. (The table provides details about how we calculated the 
optimal action.) The diﬀerence between the two can be used as a measure of 
how successful the Receiver was in extracting the information out of the mes-
sages, i.e. his ‘decoding success.’ We also provide the benchmark values for 
information transmission in the ACDC equilibrium. 
Our main ﬁnding here is that there was signiﬁcantly more information trans-
mission in the T5 than in the other two treatments. The same holds true if we 
look at the informativeness of messages. The informativeness of the messages in 
the experiment is very close to its ACDC equilibrium benchmark. However, in 
all treatments, Receivers do not manage to perfectly decode the information in 
messages. Therefore, in all treatments, actual information transmission is lower 
than the equilibrium benchmark.  
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TABLE 4.7
INFORMATION TRANSMISSION
 Information
transmission1 
Informativeness
messages Sender2 
Decoding suc-
cess Receiver3 
 NE  Data NE Data NE  Data
T5 .60  .47** .60 .62  1 .84**
G(120) .30  .17** .30 .34*  1 .79**
T5 .17  .01** .17 .13  1 .85**
ΔT5-G(120)   .30*** .29*** -.05 
ΔT5-T4   .48*** .50***  .01 
ΔG(120)-T4   .18 .21  .06 
Notes: The table shows the informativeness of the Senders’ messages, the total information 
transmission and the decoding success of the Receiver. Per treatment, we provide the bench-
mark of the ACDC equilibrium, the statistics for the data and whether the statistics diﬀer 
signiﬁcantly from the benchmark. In addition, we calculate the treatment eﬀects and whether 
they are signiﬁcant. 
1 The information transmission (calculated per data point using the last 15 periods) is 
given by ( )dataU , where we used the average of the Receiver’s payoﬀs across observations as 
R
dataU .
 
2 The informativeness of the Senders’ messages (calculated per data point using the last 15 
periods) is given by ( )optimalU , where we used the average of the Receiver’s optimal payoﬀs 
across observations as RoptimalU . We determine the optimal action of the Receiver given their 
history screen (all observations in the previous 15 periods { , }i i i It m  in the matching group) as 
follows. If a Receiver gets message m, we estimate the probability distribution of the Sender 
type t given this message m.  Since the history screen is sparse (and not all estimates are 
identiﬁed without assumptions), we smooth the history screen as follows. The probability of a 
Sender being type t conditional on sending message m given the set of previous observations 
{ , }i i i It m  is equal to ( , ) / ( , ),s Tp m t p m s where 
2 2( , ) (1 | |) (1 | |)i ii Ip m s s s m m
 
     .Then, using this probability distribution, we 
calculate the optimal action and determine the Receiver’s payoﬀ (assuming that Senders 
accept proposals if they give positive payoﬀ).  
3 The decoding success is given by 	 
1 ( ) ( )optimal dataU U   and measures how much less the 
Receivers earned compared to what they could have maximally earned. 
4.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter we presented an experimental test of ACDC. Our main con-
clusion is that the results provide systematic support for ACDC: credible devia-
tions matter and they matter gradually. In addition, we ﬁnd that a neologism 
dynamic can organize the main dynamic characteristics of the data. In Chapter 
3, we saw ACDC performs as well as existing criteria in previously conducted 
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experiments. This study supports the predictions of ACDC in a new setting 
where existing concepts are silent.  
Finally, we used our design to study the relation between bargaining power 
and information transmission we analyzed theoretically in Chapter 2. We found 
that, as predicted, less information is transmitted as the Sender’s relative power 
decreases.   
4.9 Appendix 
4.9.1 Proofs of Proposition 4.1, Proposition 4.4 and Proposi-
tion 4.5 
G(B), T4 and T5 belong to the following game ( , )R Sd d( , which is the uni-
form linear case of the veto threats model we study in Chapter 2. ( , )R Sd d(  
proceeds as game G(B). However, the Sender’s type t is drawn from the interval 
[0,1]. The Receiver’s and Sender’s payoﬀ on the real line are given by 
( )RU x x   and ( , ) | | .SU x t x t    The disagreement point payoﬀ is 
( )R RU dE   and ( )S SU dE   with , 0.R Sd d   In Chapter 2, we provide a 
characterization of the equilibria of ( , )R Sd d( .  
 
From Proposition 3.3 it follows that 
 
Lemma 4.1 The unique ACDC equilibrium of ( , )R Sd d(  with respect to credi-
ble neologisms is the maximum size equilibrium with the highest equilibrium 
action. 
 
G(B) corresponds to ( , )R Sd d(  with 5 1204R Bd   and 12012 .S Bd   T4 corresponds to 
5 1
8 4( , )( and T5 to 5 14 4( , ).(  Proposition 4.1, Proposition 4.4 and Proposition 4.5 
are direct corollaries of the characterization of the equilibria in Chapter 2 and 
Lemma 4.1. 
ESSAYS ON BARGAINING AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION  
104 
 
 
4.9.2 Proofs of Proposition 4.2 and Proposition 4.3 
Proof of Proposition 4.2 Let ( )a t  characterize the equilibrium outcome. In 
our game, ,[ , ]a U U  is a credible neologism iﬀ ( , ) ( ( ), )S SU a t U a t t  [ , ]t U U  , 
( , ) ( ( ), ) ( , )S SU a t U a t t t U U    and [ , ]a a U U . Hence 1a a  implies 0U   and 
na a  implies U   B. 
First, let us look at pooling equilibrium .PT  Consider a low credible neolo-
gism 45.La a   Now, 0.LU   Furthermore, 1 ( 45) 60.
2
L LaU     Hence, 
[0, ]La a U  0  and LU  must be 22.5. Next, consider a high credible neolo-
gism 45,Ha   HU   B  and 1 ( 45).
2
H HaU    Solving 1[ ( 45), ]
2
Ha a B   Ha   
yields min{Ha  60,75} 45.B   Consequently, 15min{ ,60}.
2
H BU   
Second, let us look at the separating equilibrium .ST  There can be no credi-
ble equilibrium 1a a  as 1 0.a   Consider a credible neologism 60.a   Now, 
U   B  and 1 ( 60).
2
dU    Solving 1[ ( 60), ]
2
a d B  a   yields a   
min{ 60,80}.B  Hence, min{ ,70}.
2
BU   If 120,B   then 60a   and it is no 
neologism. If 120,B  it is a neologism. Finally, consider some neologism with 
1 20 60.a a a     Since 60,a   it must be that 60.U   However, if 60,U   
then [ , ] 0.a U U   Hence a  cannot be a neologism. Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4.3 First, we show that ( ) ( ).P SACD ACDT T  Let 
HU  be the lowest deviating type of the high neologism in the pooling equilibri-
um PT  and U  the lowest deviating type of the neologism in the separating 
equilibrium .ST  Due to the low credible neologism, ( , ) ( , ) 0P SCD t CD tT T   for 
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45
[0, ).
2
t   For 45[ , ),
2
Ht U  ( , ) ( , ) 0.P SCD t CD tT T   Since the distance 
between the neologism action and the equilibrium action is larger in the pooling 
equilibrium than in the separating equilibrium and ,HU U  it must hold that 
( , ) ( , )P SCD t CD tT T  for ( ,120].Ht U  Furthermore, ( , ) ( , ) 1P SCD t CD tT T   
for [120, ].t B  Hence, [ ( , )] [ ( , )].P St tE CD t E CD tT T  
For the second result, observe that the set of rationalizable actions for the 
Receiver is [0, 60]B  and that the Sender can always guarantee herself a payoﬀ 
of 0 by rejecting the proposed action. This means that 
( ) (min{ , 60}, )S SU t U t B t   and ( ) max{0,min{ (0, ),S SU t U t  ( 60, )}}.SU B t  
Using Proposition 4.1 and Proposition 4.2, we get for the ACD of the separating 
equilibrium 
120
min{70, /2}
{(60 (min{80, 60} ) (60 | 60 |)}1
( )
( ) ( )
S
S S
B
t B t
ACD dt
B U t U t
T       ¨
120
.
B
B
  It is readily veriﬁed that this function is zero for 120B   and 
strictly increasing in B for 120.B p  Q.E.D. 
4.9.3 Neologism Dynamic 
We ﬁrst describe the standard, simple, best response dynamic. In each period 
all Sender types and the Receiver choose a strategy. We assume that the Sender 
in the acceptance stage accepts all actions that yield her nonnegative payoﬀ: 
( , ) 1a tO   if ( , ) 0SU a t p  and ( , ) 0a tO   otherwise. The strategy of the Sender 
in period r  is then given by :r T MN l %  and that of the Receiver by 
: .r M AB l  Let ( )rm t  denote the message Sender type t  sends (which may be 
a random variable) and ( )ra m  denote the Receiver’s action after receiving 
message m . Both players best respond to the strategy of the other player in the 
previous round. First, the support of ( )r tN  is equal to 1arg max ( ( ), ).Sm M rU a m t 
In particular, we assume the Sender randomizes uniformly over the set of best 
responses. Second, ( ) arg max ( , ) [ ( , ) | ( )],R rr a A ta m U a t E a t mO C  where ( )r mC  is 
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derived from 1rN  by Bayes rule whenever possible.62 If rC  cannot be derived 
from 1rN  , then ( )r r mC C  for some randomly chosen m t T supp 1( ).r tN   
The neologism dynamic diﬀers from the best response dynamic on one crucial 
aspect: Senders can send credible neologisms, which will be believed. We deﬁne 
,a N  as a credible neologism with respect to Receiver strategy rB  if (i) 
( , ) arg max ( ( ), )· ( ( ), )S Sm M r rU a t U a m t a m tO  for all ,t N  (ii) 
(( , ) arg max ( ), )· ( ( ), )S Sm M r rU a t U a m t a m tOb  for all t N  and (iii) 
arg max ( , ) [ ( , ) | ].Ra A ta U a t E a t t NO  63 
Now, in the neologism dynamic all Senders that can send a credible neologism 
in round r  with respect to 1,rB   will do so and such credible neologisms will be 
believed by the Receivers in round r. In all other cases, the dynamic is identical 
to a best response dynamic. We call the neologism dynamic ( , ).r rf aN  
This best response dynamic bears similarities to a level-k analysis. The diﬀer-
ence is that in level-k, in each iteration just one player (Sender or Receiver) 
changes her strategy. In the best response dynamic, both players change their 
strategy each period. Still, the best response dynamic converges in all cases 
below to very similar outcomes as the outcomes a level-k analysis would con-
verge to. 
Before analyzing the dynamic, we characterize the best responses and neolo-
gisms. The Sender’s best response is simply to induce the action closest to her 
type. We call the Receiver’s best response [ , ]a t t  if Sender types are uniformly 
distributed in the interval [ , ].t t  [ , ]a t t  is single-valued and equal to 
1
min{ 60,45 }.
2
t t   Let max { ( )}m M ra a m  be the highest action of a Re-
ceiver’s strategy. Then, for 120B   and 130,B   there exists a high credible 
neologism with respect to ra  if and only if 60.a B   In particular, it is equal 
                                     
62 We assume (for ease of exposition) that there is one unique best response for the Receiver, 
which is generically the case in our game. In case there are more optimal actions one could let 
the Receiver randomize. 
63 We need to point out the following subtlety. If a credible neologism was used in the previ-
ous period, it becomes just a message (which may have acquired a new ‘meaning’). If the same 
credible neologism has to be made in the following period, it cannot be the same literal message, 
as then it would not be a neologism. Hence, the Sender can add for instance Really! or Really, 
Really! etc. to make it a neologism and distinguish it from the old message. 
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to 
60
60,( ,130]
2
B a
B
   if 3( 120) 60B a B b    and 
2
60 / 3,( (45 ),130]
3
a a   if 3( 120).a B   For 210,B   there exists a high 
credible neologism if and only if 90,a   and in this case it is equal to 
1 2
60 ,( (45 ),130] .
3 3
a a   
We restrict our analysis to two natural initial strategy proﬁles: babbling 
(where no information is transmitted) and naive (where all possible information 
is transmitted). 
For G(120), G(130) and G(210), we (i) give the attractor,64 (ii) show that 
both the babbling and naive initial proﬁles lie in its basis of attraction and (iii) 
calculate the average prediction error of the pooling and separating equilibria for 
the attractor.   
G(120) 
For G(120) it is easy to check that the equilibrium proﬁle is a steady state of 
the neologism dynamic: 1( )rm t m  for [0,30]t   and 2 1( )rm t m m v  for 
[30,120]t  , and 1( ) 0ra m   and 2( ) 60.ra m   It is a steady state of the best 
response dynamic and no neologism relative to ra  exists. 
 
If we start with a babbling proﬁle in period 1, the neologism dynamic pro-
ceeds as follows: 
 
Strategy Sender period 1 (Babbling) Strategy Receiver period 1 (Babbling) 
1( ) [0,120]m t U_  if [0,120]t   1( ) 45a m  for all [0,120]m   
where all Senders randomize uniformly over the interval [1,120]. 
 
                                     
64 An attractor is roughly speaking a set in the phase-space the neighborhood of which the 
dynamic evolves to after suﬃcient time. This can be, for instance, a steady state or a higher n-
cycle. 
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Strategy Sender period 2 (Babbling)   Strategy Receiver period 2 (Babbling) 
1
2( )m t n  if [0,45 / 2)t     2( ) 0a m   if 1m n  
2( ) [0,120]m t U_  if 160 10 15t      2( ) 45a m   if [0,120]m   
2
2( )m t n  if (105 /2,120]t     2( ) 60a m   if r a  
where 1 0,[0,45 / 2)n   and 2 60,[105 / 2,120)n   
 
Strategy Sender period 3 (Babbling)   Strategy Receiver period 3 (Babbling) 
1
3( )m t n  if [0,45 / 2)t     285 40.7
7
  if 1[0,120] { }m n   
3( ) [0,120]m t U_  if [45 /2,105 /2)t     3( ) 60a m   if 2m n  
2
3( )m t n  if [105 / 2,120]t  . 
 
Strategy Sender period 4  (Babbling)   Strategy Receiver period 4  (Babbling) 
1
4( ) [0,120] { }m t U n_   if [0,30)t    4( ) 0a m   if 1[0,120] { }m n   
2
4( )m t n  if [30,120]t     4( ) 60a m   if 2m n  
 
Hence, from period 4, the dynamic is and stays in the separating equilibrium. 
If we start with a naive proﬁle in period 1, the neologism dynamic proceeds 
as follows: 
 
Strategy Sender period 1  (Naive)   Strategy Receiver period 1 (Naive) 
1( )m t t  if [0,120]t   1( ) 0a m   if [0,60]m   
 
1( ) 60a m m   if [60,120]m   
where all Senders randomize uniformly over the interval [1,120] 
 
Strategy Sender period 2 (Naive)   Strategy Receiver period 2(Naive) 
2( ) [0,60]m t U_  if 0t     2( ) 0a m   for all [0,60]m   
2( ) 60m t t   if (0,60)t     2( ) 60a m m   for all [60,120]m   
2( ) 120m t   if [60,120]t    
 
[Strategy Sender period 3 (Naive)   Strategy Receiver period 3 (Naive) 
3( ) [0,60]m t U_  if 0t     3( ) 0a m   if [0,120)m   
3( ) 60m t t   if [0,60)t     3( ) 60a m   if 120m   
3( ) 120m t   if [60,120]t    
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Strategy Sender period 4  (Naive)   Strategy Receiver period 4 (Naive) 
4( ) [0,120)m t U_  if [0,30)t     4( ) 0a m   if [0,120)m   
4( ) 120m t   if [30,120]t     4( ) 60a m   if 120m   
 
Hence, from period 4, the dynamic is and stays in the separating equilibrium. 
Now we turn to the prediction error. Let the equilibrium proﬁle be eT  and 
the attracting proﬁle aT . Then, the average (or expected) prediction error of an 
equilibrium for the attracting proﬁle is ( ( )) ( ( ))e e a aE a m t a m t  ¯¡ °¢ ± . The average 
prediction error of the separating equilibrium is obviously 0. The prediction 
error of the pooling equilibrium is 
30 120
0 30
1
45 0 45 60 45 / 2
120
dt dt
 ¬­    ­ ­ ®¨ ¨ . 
G(130)  
For G(130), consider the following state r a :  
Strategy Sender period r a    Strategy Receiver period r a   
 1( )
r
m t ma   if 1[0, )t t    ( ) 0ra ma   if 1 2{ , }m m m   
2( )
r
m t ma   if 1 2[ , )t t t    1( )
r
a m aa   if 3m m   
3( )
r
m t ma   if 2[ ,130]t t    
with the restriction that 1 20 50t tb    and 50 1 70a  . 1 2 3, ,m m m  can be any 
three messages.  
 
Then, by straightforwardly applying the neologism dynamic, we get the fol-
lowing for rounds 1,  2,  3r r ra a a    and 4r a 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 Strategy Sender period 1r a     Strategy Receiver period 1r a    
 1 21( ) { , }rm t U m ma _  if 1[0, / 2)t a    1( ) 0ra ma   if 1 2{ , }m m m   
3
1( )rm t ma   if 1 1[ / 2,35 / 2]t a a     21( ) 45 / 4ra m ta    if 3m m   
1
1( )rm t na   if 1(35 / 2,130]t a     1( ) 70ra ma   if 1m n   
where 1n  is the credible neologism  170,(35 / 2,130]a . Furthermore, a Sender in 
1[0, / 2)a , will randomize uniformly over 1m  and 2m .  
    
 Strategy Sender period 2r     Strategy Receiver period 2r a    
 1 22( ) { , }rm t U m ma _  if 
2[0,45 / 2 / 4)t t    
 1( ) 0ra ma   if 1 2{ , }m m m   
3
2( )rm t ma   if 
2 2[45 / 2 / 4,115 / 2 / 4)t t t     
 11( ) / 2 25ra m aa     if 3m m   
1
2( )rm t na   if 
2[115 / 2 / 4,130]t t    
 1( ) 70ra ma   if 1m n   
   
Hence, if player type is in 1[0, / 2)a , then she will randomize uniformly over 
1m  and 2m .  
 
Strategy Sender period 3r a     Strategy Receiver period 3r a    
 1 23( ) { , }rm t U m ma _  if 
1[0, / 4 25 / 2)t a    
 3( ) 0ra ma   if 1 2{ , }m m m   
3
3( )rm t ma   if 
1 1[ / 4 25 / 2, / 4 45 / 2)t a a     
 23( ) / 4 5 / 2ra m ta     if 3m m   
1
3( )rm t na   if 1[ / 4 45 / 2,130]t a    3( ) 70ra ma   if 1m n   
   
 Strategy Sender period 4r a     Strategy Receiver period 4r a    
 1 24( ) { , }rm t U m ma _  if 
2[0, / 8 5 / 4)t t    
 n 4( ) 0ra m   if 1 2 3{ , , }m m m m   
3
4( )rm t ma   if 
2 2[ / 8 5 / 4, / 8 135 / 4)t t t     
 14( ) / 8 225 / 4ra m aa     if 1m n   
14( )rm t na    if 
2[ / 8 135 / 4,130]t t 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Hence, starting at period ,r a  we can characterize 4f  by 
1 1
1 / 8 225 / 4p pa a   , 1pt , 1 1pt    2 / 8 5 / 4pt   and 2 21 1135 / 4 / 8p pt t    (as 
long as 1 20 50p pt tb    and 150 70pa  ).  
1 2450 / 7,p pa t  270 / 7  and 1pt  25 / 7  is a steady state and attractor to 
which the dynamic converges monotonically. Hence, if in some period the strate-
gy proﬁle meets the conditions in r a , then f  converges to the 4-cycle character-
ized by above values.  
We proceed to give the ﬁrst periods of the neologism dynamic for the bab-
bling and naive initial conditions. We end as soon as the dynamic meets the 
suﬃcient conditions for their respective attractors speciﬁed above.  
If we start with a babbling proﬁle in period 1, the neologism dynamic pro-
ceeds as follows:  
 
 Strategy Sender period 1  (Babbling)   Strategy Receiver period 1  (Babbling)  
 1( ) [0,130]m t U_   if [0,130]t     1( ) 45a m  for all [0,130]m    
 
Strategy Sender period 2 (Babbling)   Strategy Receiver period 2 (Babbling)  
 12( )m t n  if [0,45 / 2)t     2( ) 0a m  if 1m n   
 2( ) [0,130]m t U_   if [45 / 2,115 / 2]t    2( ) 45a m  if [0,130]m    
 22( )m t n  if (115 /2,130]t     2( ) 70a m   if 2m n   
where 1 0,[0,45 / 2)n   and 2 70,(115 / 2,130] .n    
 
Strategy Sender period 3 (Babbling)   Strategy Receiver period 3 (Babbling)  
 13( )m t n  if [0,45 / 2)t     3( ) 0a m  if 1[0,130] { }m n    
 3( ) [0,130]m t U_   if [45 /2,115 /2)t    3( ) 70a m  if 2m n   
 23( )m t n  if [115 / 2,130]t     
    
Strategy Sender period 4  (Babbling)   Strategy Receiver period 4  (Babbling)  
 14( ) [0,130]m t U n_    if [0,35)t     4( ) 0a m  if 1[0,130]m n    
 24( )m t n  if [35,130]t     4( ) 70a m   if 2m n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Strategy Sender period 5 (Babbling)   Strategy Receiver period 5 (Babbling)  
 15( ) [0,130]m t U n_    if [0,35)t     5( ) 0a m  if 1[0,130]m cupn   
 25( )m t n  if [35,130]t     5( ) 125 / 2a m   if 2m n   
   
 Strategy Sender period 6 (Babbling)   Strategy Receiver period 6 (Babbling)  
 16( ) [0,130] { }m t U n_    if 
[0,125 / 4)t    
 6( ) 0a m  if 1[0,130] { }m n    
 26( )m t n  if (125 / 4,265 / 4]t     6( ) 125 / 2a m   if 2m n   
 36( )m t n  if (265 / 4,130]t     6( ) 70a m   if 3m n   
where 3 70,(265 / 4,130]n  .   
 
 Strategy Sender period 7  (Babbling)   Strategy Receiver period 7  (Babbling)  
 17( ) [0,130] { }m t U n_  if 
[0,125 / 4)t    
 7( ) 0a m  if 1[0,130] { }m n    
 27( )m t n  if [125 / 4,265 / 4)t     7( ) 25 / 4a m  if 2m n   
 37( )m t n  if [265 / 4,130]t     7( ) 70a m   if 3m n   
    
Strategy Sender period 8 (Babbling)   Strategy Receiver period 8 (Babbling)  
 18( ) [0,130] { }m t U n_  if [0,25 /8 )t    8( ) 0a m  if 1 2[0,130] { , }m n n    
 28( )m t n  if [25 /8,305 /8)t     8( ) 25 / 4a m   if 2m n   
 38( )m t n  if [305 / 8,130]t     8( ) 70a m   if 3m n   
 
Strategy Sender period 9 (Babbling)   Strategy Receiver period 9 (Babbling)  
 1 29( ) [0,130] { , }m t U n n_  if 
[0,25 /8 )t    
 9( ) 0a m  if 1 2[0,130] { , }m n n    
 29( )m t n  if [25 /8,585 /16]t     9( ) 1025 /16a m   if 3m n   
 39( )m t n  if [585 /16,130]t     
   
 Strategy Sender period 10 (Babbling) Strategy Receiver period 10 (Babbling) 
1 2
10( ) [0,130] { , }m t U n n_  if 
[0,1025 /32)t    
 10( ) 0a m  if 1 2[0,130] { , }m n n    
 310( )m t n  if [1025 / 32,2145 / 32]t     10( ) 125 / 2a m   if 3m n   
 410( )m t n  if (2145 /32,130]t     10( ) 70a m   if 4m n   
where 4 70,(2145 / 32,130] .n 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Strategy Sender period 11 (Babbling) Strategy Receiver period 11 (Babbling) 
 1 211( ) [0,130] { , }m t U n n_   if 
[0,125 / 4)t    
 11( ) 0a m  if 1 2[0,130] { , }m n n    
 311( )m t n  if [125 / 4,265 / 4)t     11( ) 225 / 32a m   if 3m n   
 411( )m t n  if [265 / 4,130]t     11( ) 70a m   if 4m n   
   
 Strategy Sender period 12 (Babbling) Strategy Receiver period 12 (Babbling) 
 1 212( ) [0,130] { , }m t U n n_    if 
[0,225 /64)t    
 12( ) 0a m  if 1 2[0,130] { , }m n n    
 312( )m t n  if [225 / 64,2465 / 64)t     12( ) 25 / 4a m   if 3m n   
 412( )m t n  if [2465 /64,130]t     12( ) 70a m   if 4m n   
   
 Strategy Sender period 13 (Babbling) Strategy Receiver period 13 (Babbling) 
 1 213( ) [0,130] { , }m t U n n_    if 
[0,25 / 8)t    
 13( ) 0a m  if 1 2 3[0,130] { , , }m n n n    
 313( )m t n  if [25 /8,305 /8)t     13( ) 8225 / 128a m   if 4m n   
 413( )m t n  if [305 / 8,130]t     
   
Now, 1 213 1325 / 8 305 / 8 50t t     and 11350 8225 / 128 70.a    Hence, 
period 13 meets the requirements of round r a  and the dynamic converges to the 
attracting four-cycle.  
If we start with a naive proﬁle in period 1, the neologism dynamic proceeds 
as follows:  
 
 Strategy Sender period 1  (Naive)   Strategy Receiver period 1  (Naive)  
 1( )m t t   if [0,130]t     1( ) 0a m   if [0,60]m    
   1( ) 60a m m   if [60,130]m    
    
Strategy Sender period 2 (Naive)   Strategy Receiver period 2 (Naive)  
 2( ) [0,60]m t U_   if 0t     1( ) 0a m   if [0,60]m    
 2( ) 60m t t   if (0,70)t     1( ) 60a m m   if [60,130]m    
 2( ) 130m t   if [70,130]t     
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Strategy Sender period 3 (Naive)   Strategy Receiver period 3 (Naive)  
 3( ) [0,60]m t U_   if 0t     3( ) 0a m   if [0,120)m    
 3( ) 60m t t   if [0,70)t     3( ) 120a m m   if [120,130)m    
 3( ) 120m t   if [70,130]t     3( ) 70a m   if 130m    
    
 Strategy Sender period 4  (Naive)   Strategy Receiver period 4  (Naive)  
 4( ) [0,120]m t U_   if 0t     4( ) 0a m   if [0,120)m    
 4( ) 120m t t   if [0,10)t     4( ) 120a m m   if [120,130)m    
 4( ) 130m t     if [10,40)t     4( ) 70a m   if 130m    
 4( ) 130m t   if [40,130]t     
    
 Strategy Sender period 5 (Naive)   Strategy Receiver period 5 (Naive)  
 5( ) [0,120]m t U_   if 0t     5( ) 0a m   if [0,130)m    
 5( ) 120m t t   if [0,10)t     5( ) 65a m   if 130m    
 5( ) 130m t     if [10,40)t     
 5( ) 130m t   if [40,130]t     
    
 Strategy Sender period 6 (Naive)   Strategy Receiver period 6 (Naive)  
 6( ) [0,130)m t U_  if [0,65 / 2)t     6( ) 0a m   if [0,130)m    
 6( ) 130m t   if [65 / 2,135 / 2]t     6( ) 65a m   if 130m    
 6 1( )m t n  if (135 /2,130]t     6( ) 70a m   if 1m n   
where 1 70,(135 / 2,130]n  .  
    
 Strategy Sender period 7  (Naive)   Strategy Receiver period 7  (Naive)  
 7( ) [0,130)m t U_  if [0,65 / 2)t     7( ) 0a m   if [0,130)m    
 7( ) 130m t   if [65 / 2,135 / 2]t     7( ) 15 / 2a m   if 130m    
 7 1( )m t n  if (135 /2,130]t     7( ) 70a m   if 1m n   
   
 Strategy Sender period 8 (Naive)   Strategy Receiver period 8 (Naive)  
 8( ) [0,130)m t U_  if [0,15 / 4)t     8( ) 0a m   if [0,130)m    
 8( ) 130m t   if [15 / 4,155 / 4]t     8( ) 15 / 2a m   if 130m    
 8 1( )m t n  if (155 / 4,130]t     8( ) 70a m   if 1m n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Strategy Sender period 9 (Naive)   Strategy Receiver period 9 (Naive)  
9( ) [0,130)m t U_  if [0,15 / 4)t  }   9( ) 0a m   if [0,130]m    
9( ) 130m t   if [15 / 4,155 / 4]t  }   9( ) 515 / 8a m   if 1m n   
9 1( )m t n  if (155 / 4,130]t  }   
    
Now, 1 29 915 / 4 155 / 4 50t t     and 1950 515 / 8 70.a    Hence, peri-
od 9 meets the requirements of round r a  and the dynamic converges to the 
attracting four-cycle.  
Finally, we turn to the prediction errors for the attracting four-cycle. First 
the pooling equilibrium. In the same way as above, it can be straightforwardly 
calculated that prediction error of the pooling equilibrium in periods ,r a  1,r a    
2r a   and 3r a   is respectively equal to 17145 2585 304 2640, ,  and .637 91 91 91  Hence, 
the average prediction error of the pooling equilibrium over the four cycle is 
18750
29.4.
637
  The prediction error of the separating equilibrium in periods ,r a  
1,r a    2r a   and 3r a   is respectively equal to 4440 635 1825 7625, ,  and .637 91 91 91  
Hence, the average prediction error of the separating equilibrium over the four 
cycle is 
29285
11.5
2548
 .  
G(210) 
We continue with G(210). Consider the following state r a :  
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 Strategy Sender period r a    Strategy Receiver period r a   
 1( )rm t ma   if 1[0, )t t    ( ) 0ra ma   if 1 2{ , }m m m   
 2( )rm t ma   if 1 2[ , )t t t    1( )ra m aa   if 3m m   
 3( )rm t ma   if 2 3[ , )t t t    2( )ra m aa   if 4m m   
 4( )rm t ma   if 3 4[ , )t t t    3( )ra m aa   if 5m m   
 5( )rm t ma   if 4 5[ , ]t t t    4( )ra m aa   if 1m n   
 1( )rm t na   if 5( ,210]t t    
where 1 2 3 4 5t t t t t     with 10 15,t   3 60t   and 5 90;t   
1 2 3 40 a a a a     with 2 30a   and 4 90a   and 1 4 5,[ ,210] .n a t   
 
Then, by straightforwardly applying the neologism dynamic, we get for round 1r a  :  
 
 Strategy Sender period 1r a     Strategy Receiver period 1r a    
 11( )rm t ma   if 1[0, / 2)t a    1( ) 0ra ma   if 1 2 3{ , , }m m m m   
 31( )rm t ma   if 
1 1 2[ / 2,( ) / 2)t a a a    
 41( ) 60ra m ta    if  4m m   
 41( )rm t ma   if 
1 2 2 3[( ) / 2,( ) / 2)t a a a a     
 51( ) 60ra m ta   if 5m m   
 51( )rm t ma   if 
2 3 3 4[( ) / 2,( ) / 2)t a a a a     
 51( ) 45 / 2ra m ta     if 1m n   
 11( )rm t na   if 
3 4 42[( ) / 2, (45 )]
3
t a a a     
 41( ) 60 / 3ra m aa   if 2m n   
 21( )rm t na   if 42( (45 ),210]3t a    
 
where 2 4 4
2
60 / 3,( (45 ),210] .
3
n a a     
 
Hence, for period r r ap we can describe f  by 4 41 60 / 3,r ra a    
5 4
1
2
(45 / 3),
3r r
t a    3 51 45 / 2,r ra t   4 3 41 1 ( ),2r r rt a a  
2 5
1 60,r ra t    
3 2 3
1
1
( ),
2r r r
t a a    1 41 60,r ra t   2 1 21 1 ( )2r r rt a a   and 
1 1
1
1
2r r
t a   (as long as 
1 5,...,r ra a  and 
1 5,...,r rt t  meet the above conditions).  
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Since 4 41 60 / 3,r ra a    4ra  converges monotonically to 90. Consequently, it 
follows that  
4 590,  90,r ra t   3ra  90,  4 90,rt   2ra  30,  3 160,  r rt a  30,   2 30rt   and 
1 15rt   is an attractor for this dynamic to which converges. (It is not a steady 
state, as if 4 90ra  , then no neologism could be made. Nonetheless, the proﬁle is 
never reached and all points in its neighborhood converge to it.)  
We now proceed to give the ﬁrst periods of the neologism dynamic for the 
babbling and naive initial conditions.  
If we start with a babbling proﬁle in period 1, the neologism dynamic pro-
ceeds as follows:  
    
 Strategy Sender period 1  (Babbling)   Strategy Receiver period 1  (Babbling)  
 1( ) [0,210]m t U_   if [0,210]t     1( ) 45a m  for all [0,210]m    
    
Strategy Sender period 2 (Babbling)   Strategy Receiver period 2 (Babbling)  
 12( )m t n  if [0,45 / 2)t     2( ) 0a m  if 1m n   
 2( ) [0,210]m t U_   if [45 / 2,60]t     2( ) 45a m  if [0,210]m    
 22( )m t n  if (60,210]t     2( ) 75a m   if 2m n   
where 1 0,[0,45 / 2)n   and 2 75,(60,210] .n    
    
 Strategy Sender period 3 (Babbling)   Strategy Receiver period 3 (Babbling)  
 13( )m t n  if [0,45 / 2)t     3( ) 0a m  if 1[0,210] { }m n    
 3( ) [0,210]m t U_  if [45 / 2,60)t     3( ) 75a m  if 2m n   
 23( )m t n  if [60,80]t     3( ) 85a m   if 3m n   
 33( )m t n  if (80,210]t     
where 3 85,(80,210] .n 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 Strategy Sender period 4  (Babbling)   Strategy Receiver period 4  (Babbling)  
 14( ) [0,210] { }m t U n_   if 
[0,75 / 2)t    
 4( ) 0a m  if 1[0,210] { }m n    
 24( )m t n  if [75 / 2,80)t     4( ) 20a m   if 2m n   
 34( )m t n  if [80,260 / 3]t     4( ) 85a m   if 3m n   
 44( )m t n  if (260 /3,210]t     4( ) 265 / 3a m   if 4m n   
where 4 265 / 3,(260 / 3,210] .n     
   
 Strategy Sender period 5 (Babbling)   Strategy Receiver period 5 (Babbling)  
 15( ) [0,210] { }m t U n_   if [0,10)t     5( ) 0a m  if 1[0,210] { }m n    
 25( )m t n  if [10,105 / 2)t     5( ) 20a m   if 2m n   
 35( )m t n  if [105 / 2,260 / 3)t     5( ) 80 / 3a m   if 3m n   
 45( )m t n  if [260 / 3,800 / 9]t     5( ) 265 / 3a m   if 4m n   
 55( )m t n  if (800 /9,210]t     5( ) 805 / 9a m   if 5m n   
where 5 805 / 9,(800 / 9,210] .n     
   
 Strategy Sender period 6 (Babbling)   Strategy Receiver period 6 (Babbling)  
 16( ) [0,210] { }m t U n_   if [0,10)t     6( ) 0a m  if 1 2[0,210] { , }m n n    
 26( )m t n  if [10,70 / 3)t     6( ) 80 / 3a m   if 3m n   
 36( )m t n  if [70 /3,115 /2)t     6( ) 260 / 9a m   if 4m n   
 46( )m t n  if [115 / 2,800 / 9)t     6( ) 805 / 9a m   if 5m n   
 56( )m t n  if [800 /9,2420 /5]t     6( ) 2425 / 27a m  if 6m n   
 66( )m t n  if (2420 / 27,210]t     
where 6 2425 / 27,(2420 / 27,210] .n    
  
Now, 160 10 15,t   36 115 / 2 60,t   56 2420 / 27 90,t   26 260 / 9 30a    
and 46 2425 / 27 90a    Hence, period 6 meets the requirements of round r a  
and the dynamic converges to the attractor.  
 If we start with a naive proﬁle in period 1, the neologism dynamic proceeds 
as follows:  
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Strategy Sender period 1  (Naive)   Strategy Receiver period 1  (Naive)  
 1( )m t t   if [0,210]t     1( ) 0a m   if [0,60]m    
   1( ) 60a m m   if [60,210]m    
    
 Strategy Sender period 2 (Naive)   Strategy Receiver period 2 (Naive)  
 2( ) [0,60]m t U_  if 0t     2( ) 0a m   for all [0,60]m    
 2( ) 60m t t   if (0,150)t     2( ) 60a m m   for all [60,210]m    
 2( ) 210m t   if [150,210]t     
    
Strategy Sender period 3 (Naive)   Strategy Receiver period 3 (Naive)  
 3( ) [0,60]m t U_  if 0t     3( ) 0a m   if [0,120)m    
 3( ) 60m t t   if (0,150)t     3( ) 120a m m   if [120,210)m    
 3( ) 210m t   if [150,210]t     3( ) 120a m   if 210m    
    
 Strategy Sender period 4  (Naive)   Strategy Receiver period 4  (Naive)  
 4( ) [0,120]m t U_  if 0t     4( ) 0a m   if [0,120)m    
 4( ) 120m t t   if (0,90)t     4( ) 120a m m   if [120,210)m    
 4( ) 210m t     if [90,105)t     4( ) 120a m   if 210m    
 4( ) 210m t   if [105,210]t     
    
Strategy Sender period 5 (Naive)   Strategy Receiver period 5 (Naive)  
 5( ) [0,120]m t U_  if 0t     5( ) 0a m   if [0,180)m    
 5( ) 120m t t   if (0,90)t     5( ) 180a m m   if [180,210 )m     
 5( ) 210m t     if [90,105)t     5( ) 45a m   if 210m      
 5( ) 210m t   if [105,210]t     5( ) 195 / 2a m   if 210m    
   
 Strategy Sender period 6 (Naive)   Strategy Receiver period 6 (Naive)  
 6( ) [0,180]m t U_  if 0t     6( ) 0a m   if [0,180)m    
 6( ) 180m t t   if (0,30)t     6( ) 180a m m   if [180,210 )m     
 6( ) 210 2m t     if [30,75 / 2)t     6( ) 45a m   if 210m      
 6( ) 210m t     if [75 /2,285 / 4)t     6( ) 195 / 2a m   if 210m    
 6( ) 210m t   if [285 / 4,210]t     
    
ESSAYS ON BARGAINING AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION  
120 
 
Strategy Sender period 7  (Naive)   Strategy Receiver period 7  (Naive)  
 6( ) [0,180]m t U_  if 0t     7( ) 0a m   if [0,210 2 )m      
 7( ) 180m t t   if (0,30)t     7( ) 45 / 4a m   if 210m      
 7( ) 210 2m t     if [30,75 / 2)t     7( ) 645 / 8a m   if 210m    
 7( ) 210m t     if [75 /2,285 / 4)t     
 7( ) 210m t   if [285 / 4,210]t     
   
 Strategy Sender period 8 (Naive)   Strategy Receiver period 8 (Naive)  
 8( ) [0,210 2 )m t U_    if [0,45 / 8)t     8( ) 0a m   if [180,210 2 )m      
 8( ) 210m t     if [45 / 8,735 /16)t    8( ) 45 / 4a m   if 210m      
 8( ) 210m t   if [735 /16,335 / 4)t     8( ) 645 / 8a m   if 210m    
 18( )m t n  if [335 / 4,210]t     8( ) 695 / 8a m   if 1m n   
where 1 695 / 8,(335 / 4,210] .n     
   
Strategy Sender period 9 (Naive)   Strategy Receiver period 9 (Naive)  
 9( ) [0,210 2 )m t U_    if [0,45 / 8)t     9( ) 0a m   if [0,210 )m     
 9( ) 210m t     if [45 / 8,735 /16)t    9( ) 95 / 4a m   if 210m    
 9( ) 210m t   if [735 /16,335 / 4)t     9( ) 695 / 8a m   if f 1m n   
 19( )m t n  if [335 / 4,1055 /12]t     9( ) 2135 / 24a m   if 2m n   
 29( )m t n  if (1055 /12,210]t     
where 2 2135 / 24,(1055 / 12,210] .n     
   
 Strategy Sender period 10 (Naive) Strategy Receiver period 10 (Naive)  
 10( ) [0,210 )m t U_    if [0,95 / 8)t     10( ) 0a m   if [0,210 )m     
 10( ) 210m t   if [95 / 8,885 /16)t     10( ) 95 / 4a m   if 210m    
 110( )m t n  if [885 /16,1055 /12)t     10( ) 335 / 12a m   if 1m n   
 210( )m t n if [1055 /12,3215 / 36]t     10( ) 2135 / 24a m   if 2m n   
 310( )m t n if (3215 / 36,210]t     10( ) 6455 / 72a m  if 3m n   
where 3 6455 / 72,(3215 / 36,210] .n 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 Strategy Sender period 11 (Naive) Strategy Receiver period 11 (Naive)  
 11( ) [0,210 )m t U_    if [0,95 / 8)t     11( ) 0a m   if [0,210]m    
 11( ) 210m t   if [95 /8,155 /6)t     11( ) 335 / 12a m   if 1m n   
 111( )m t n  if [155 /6,935 /16)t     11( ) 1055 / 36a m   if 2m n   
 211( )m t n if [935 /16,3215 /36)t     11( ) 6455 / 72a m   if 3m n   
 311( )m t n if [3215 / 36,9695 /108]t    11( ) 19415 / 216a m   if 4m n   
 411( )m t n if (9695 /108,210]t     
 where 4 19415 / 216,(9695 / 108,210] .n     
 
Now, 111 95 / 8 15,t   311 935 / 16 60,t   511 9695 / 108 90,t    
2
11 1055 / 36 30a    and 411 19415 / 216 90.a    Hence, period 11 meets the 
requirements of round r a  and the dynamic converges to the attractor.  
Finally, we turn to the prediction errors for of the equilibria with respect to 
the attractor. The average prediction error of the pooling equilibrium is equal to 
285
40.7.
7
  The average prediction error of the separating equilibrium is equal 
to 
195
27.9.
7
   
4.9.4 Experimental Instructions 
We include the experimental instructions (including check questions) of the 
G(120) treatment for both the “Chooser” (Sender) and “Proposer” (Receiver) 
roles. The instructions of the G(130) and G(210) treatments are very similar. 
Instructions Chooser 
INSTRUCTIONS          
Welcome to this decision-making experiment. Please read these instructions carefully. We will 
first provide you with an outline of the instructions and then we will proceed with a detailed 
description of the instructions. 
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OUTLINE 
Experiment 
x At the start of the experiment you will receive a starting capital of 100 points. In addition, 
you can earn points with your decisions.  
x At the end of the experiment, you receive 1,5 (one-and-a-half) euro for each 100 points 
earned.
x The experiment consists of around 50 periods. 
x Your role in the whole experiment is: CHOOSER.
x In each period, you will be randomly paired with a different participant who performs the 
role of Proposer.  
Sequence of events 
x In each period, you and the Proposer will bargain over an outcome, which can be any 
number between 0 and 120. 
x Your preferred outcome is a number between 0 and 120. Any number between 0 and 120 is 
equally likely. The Proposer’s preferred outcome is always 0. 
x  Each period you will receive a new (random) preferred outcome. You are the only one who 
is informed about your preferred outcome.  
x After learning your preferred outcome, you will send a SUGGESTION for a proposal 
(between 0 and 120) to the Proposer.  
x The Proposer is informed of your suggestion and makes a PROPOSAL (between 0 and 
120) for the outcome. 
x After you have been informed of the proposal, you accept or reject it. 
x At the end of a period, you are informed of the points you earned (your payoff). 
Payoffs 
x When you accept a proposal, your payoff is 60 minus the distance between your preferred 
outcome and the proposal. 
x  The Proposer’s payoff is 60 minus 0.4 times the proposal in this case.  
x When you reject a proposal, you receive 0 points and the Proposer receives 0 points. 
History Overview 
When making a decision, you may use the History Overview, which provides an overview of 
the results of the other Chooser/Proposer pairs (including your own pair) in the 15 most recent 
periods. The left part of the overview is a Table with four columns SUGGESTION, PRO-
POSAL, ACCEPTANCE and PREFERRED OUTCOME. In a row, you will find a particular 
pair’s suggestion, the corresponding proposal, whether the Chooser accepted or rejected the 
proposal and the preferred outcome of that Chooser. On the right, you find a Graph where the 
most recent results are represented by blue squares. On the horizontal axis you can read the 
value of the suggestion and on the vertical axis the value of the corresponding proposal 
DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS 
Now we will describe the experiment in detail. At the start of the experiment you will receive a 
starting capital of 100 points. During the experiment you will be asked to make a number of 
decisions. Your decisions and the decisions of the participants you will be paired with will 
determine how much money you earn. The experiment consists of around 50 periods. In each 
period, your earnings will be denoted in points. Your final earnings in the experiment will be 
equal to the starting capital plus the sum of your earnings in all periods. At the end of the 
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experiment, your earnings in points will be transferred to money. For each 100 points you earn, 
you will receive 1,5 (one-and-a-half) euro. Your earnings will be privately paid to you in cash.  
In each period, all participants are paired in couples. One participant within a pair has the role of 
CHOOSER, the other participant performs the role of PROPOSER. In all periods you keep the 
same role.
Your role is: CHOOSER.  
MATCHING PROCEDURE  
For the duration of the experiment, you will be in a fixed matching group of five Proposers and 
five Choosers (hence 10 participants in total, including yourself). In each period you are 
randomly matched to another participant in this matching group with the role of Proposer. You 
will never learn with whom you are matched.  
BARGAINING AND PREFERRED OUTCOMES 
In each period, you and the Proposer with whom you are coupled will bargain over an outcome. 
The Proposer’s preferred outcome is always 0. Your preferred outcome is a number between 
(and including) 0 and 120. Any number between 0 and 120 is equally likely. Each period you 
will receive a new preferred outcome that does not depend on your preferred outcome of any 
previous period. You are the only one who is informed about your preferred outcome. The 
Proposer only knows that your preferred outcome is a number between 0 and 120 (and that each 
such number is equally likely).  
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IN A PERIOD  
After you have learned your preferred outcome in a period, you will send a SUGGESTION for a 
proposal to the Proposer. You may send any suggestion between (and including) 0 and 120. It is 
up to you to decide whether and how you let your suggestion depend on your preferred out-
come. Then, the Proposer with whom you are coupled is informed of your suggestion (but not of 
your preferred outcome). Subsequently, the Proposer makes a PROPOSAL for the outcome. A 
proposal is any number between (and including) 0 and 120. Finally, you will choose to accept or 
reject the proposal. 
At the end of a period, you are informed of the payoff (points you earned) that you made. This 
payoff is automatically added to your total earnings (or in case that you make a loss, it is 
subtracted from your total earnings). The Proposer is informed of the outcome, your preferred 
outcome and her or his own payoff. 
Please note that the experiment will only continue from one phase to another after everybody
has pressed OK/PROCEED. For this reason, please press OK/PROCEED as soon as you have 
made your decision. 
PAYOFFS WHEN YOU ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL 
When you accept the proposal, you will receive a payoff of 60 minus the distance between your 
preferred outcome and the proposal: 
Your payoff = 60 – distance(your preferred outcome and proposal).  
When you accept the proposal, the Proposer’s payoff is 60 minus 0.4 times the proposal: 
Payoff Proposer = 60 – 0.4 * proposal. 
It is possible to reject a proposal. 
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PAYOFFS WHEN YOU REJECT THE PROPOSAL 
When you reject a proposal, then the outcome is the status quo. In this case, you will receive 0 
points and the Proposer will receive 0 points.  
Notice that accepting an offer gives you a higher payoff than rejecting it if and only if the 
distance between the proposal and your preferred outcome is smaller than 60. The Proposer’s 
payoff is higher when you accept than when you reject in all cases. 
EXAMPLE 1. Suppose your preferred outcome is 80 and you receive a proposal of 100. Then, 
the distance between your preferred outcome and proposal is 100 - 80 = 20.  
If you accept, your payoff is 60 - 20 = 40. The Proposer’s payoff in this case is 60 – 0.4*100 = 
20.  
If you reject, your payoff is 0 and the Proposer’s payoff is 0.  
EXAMPLE 2. Suppose your preferred outcome is 80 and you receive a proposal of 10. Then, 
the distance between your preferred outcome and the proposal is 80 - 10 = 70. 
If you accept, your payoff is 60 - 70 = -10. The Proposer’s payoff in this case is 60 – 0.4*10 
= 56. 
If you reject, your payoff is 0 and the Proposer’s payoff is 0. 
HISTORY OVERVIEW  
When making a decision, you may use the History Overview, which fills the lower part of the 
screen. The History Overview summarizes the results of the most recent 15 periods. (If less than 
15 periods have been completed, this history overview contains results of all completed peri-
ods.)  
Apart from your own results in the previous periods, the History Overview also contains the 
results of the other Chooser/Proposer pairs in your matching group. In total you are thus 
informed about the past results of the same matching group of five Chooser/Proposer pairs. All 
other Choosers and Proposers in your matching group will have the same information. The 
presentation of information for Proposers is different than for Choosers. 
TABLE 
Below you see an example of the history overview. THE NUMBERS IN THE HISTORY 
OVERVIEW DO NOT INDICATE WHAT YOU SHOULD DO IN THE EXPERIMENT. The 
left part of the history overview is a Table with four columns. The first column labelled SUG-
GESTION contains the suggestions made by the Choosers in the recent previous periods. The 
second column labelled PROPOSAL gives the proposal that was made by the Proposer as a 
response to the suggestion in the same row. The third column labelled ACCEPTANCE shows 
whether the Chooser accepted or rejected the proposal. The fourth column labelled PRE-
FERRED OUTCOME shows the preferred outcome of the Chooser. 
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The results shown in the history overview will be sorted on the basis of suggestion in ascending 
order. (The lower the suggestion, the higher the place in the table.) When the suggestion is the 
same for two or more different results, these observations will be sorted on the basis of pro-
posal, again in ascending order. In the example above, this applies to the third and the fourth 
row, where two Choosers chose the same suggestion but the corresponding Proposers chose 
different proposals. More generally, observations have been sorted first on suggestion, then on 
proposal, then on acceptance or rejection and finally on preferred outcome. 
GRAPH 
On the right of the history overview, the most recent results are represented in a graph. The 
horizontal axis presents the suggestion and the vertical axis presents the proposal. Each previous 
observation is represented by a blue square. On the horizontal axis you can read the value of the 
suggestion for a particular result and on the vertical axis you can read the value of the corre-
sponding proposal. (Proposers will see preferred outcomes on the vertical axis, rather than 
proposals.)
EXAMPLE. Consider the square that is displayed in the lower left corner of the Graph shown 
above. Here, the Chooser made a suggestion of 30. The Proposer responded with a proposal of 
10. 
You have now reached the end of the instructions. The next page contains some questions 
concerning the experiment. When all participants have answered all questions correctly, we will 
proceed with the experiment. 
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QUESTIONS 
Please answer the following questions. THE VALUES USED IN SOME QUESTIONS DO 
NOT INDICATE WHAT YOU SHOULD DO IN THE EXPERIMENT. RATHER, THEY 
HAVE BEEN CHOSEN TO FACILITATE CALCULATIONS. 
1. Is the following statement correct? ‘In each period I am coupled with the same Proposer.’ 
2. Is the following statement correct? ‘My preferred position will be observed by the Proposer 
before (s)he makes her or his proposal.’ 
3. 
(A) What is the highest value your preferred outcome can take on? 
(B) What is the highest value a suggestion of yours can take on? 
(C) What is the highest value a proposal can take on? 
4. Consider a period in which your preferred outcome is 50. You chose to send a suggestion of 
40. The Proposer made a proposal of 20, which was accepted by you. 
(A) What are your own earnings in this period? 
(B) How much does the Proposer to whom you are paired earn? 
5. Consider a period in which your preferred outcome is 90. You chose to send a suggestion of 
100. The Proposer made a proposal of 0, which was accepted by you. 
(A) What are your own earnings in this period? 
(B) How much does the Proposer to whom you are paired earn? 
6. Consider a period in which your preferred outcome is 30. You chose to send a suggestion of 
40. The Proposer made a proposal of 10, which was rejected by you. 
(A) What are your own earnings in this period? 
(B) How much does the Proposer to whom you are paired earn? 
When you are ready answering the questions, please raise your hand.  
Instructions Proposer 
INSTRUCTIONS           
Welcome to this decision-making experiment. Please read these instructions carefully. We will 
first provide you with an outline of the instructions and then we will proceed with a detailed 
description of the instructions. 
OUTLINE 
Experiment 
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x At the start of the experiment you will receive a starting capital of 100 points. In addition, 
you can earn points with your decisions.  
x At the end of the experiment, you receive 1,5 (one-and-a-half) euro for each 100 points 
earned.
x The experiment consists of around 50 periods. 
x Your role in the whole experiment is: PROPOSER.
x In each period, you will be randomly paired with a different participant who performs the 
role of Chooser.  
Sequence of events 
x In each period, you and the Chooser will bargain over an outcome, which can be any 
number between 0 and 120. 
x Your preferred outcome is always 0.  
x The Chooser’s preferred outcome is a number between 0 and 120. Any number between 0 
and 120 is equally likely.  
x Each period, each Chooser will receive a new (random) preferred outcome. The Chooser 
is the only one who is informed about her or his preferred outcome.  
x After learning her or his preferred outcome, the Chooser with whom you are matched will 
send a SUGGESTION for a proposal (between 0 and 120) to you.  
x You are informed of the Chooser’s suggestion and make a PROPOSAL (between 0 and 
120) for the outcome. 
x After the Chooser has been informed of the proposal, she or he accepts or rejects it. 
x At the end of a period, you are informed of the points you earned (your payoff). 
Payoffs 
x When the Chooser accepts your proposal, your payoff is 60 minus 0.4 times the proposal.  
x The Chooser’s payoff is in this case 60 minus the distance between her or his preferred 
outcome and the proposal. 
x When the Chooser rejects your proposal, you receive 0 points and the Chooser 0 points. 
History Overview 
When making a decision, you may use the History Overview, which provides an overview of 
the results of five Chooser/Proposer pairs (including your own pair) in the 15 most recent 
periods. The left part of the overview is a Table with four columns SUGGESTION, PRE-
FERRED OUTCOME, PROPOSAL and ACCEPTANCE. In a row, you will find a particular 
pair’s suggestion, the preferred outcome of the Chooser, the proposal made by the Proposer and 
whether the Chooser accepted or rejected the proposal. On the right, you find a Graph where the 
most recent results are represented by blue squares. On the horizontal axis you can read the 
value of the suggestion and on the vertical axis the value of the corresponding preferred out-
come of the Chooser. 
DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS 
Now we will describe the experiment in detail. At the start of the experiment you will receive a 
starting capital of 100 points. During the experiment you will be asked to make a number of 
decisions. Your decisions and the decisions of the participants you will be paired with will 
determine how much money you earn. The experiment consists of around 50 periods. In each 
period, your earnings will be denoted in points. Your final earnings in the experiment will be 
equal to the starting capital plus the sum of your earnings in all periods. At the end of the 
experiment, your earnings in points will be transferred to money. For each 100 points you earn, 
you will receive 1,5 (one-and-a-half) euro. Your earnings will be privately paid to you in cash.  
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In each period, all participants are paired in couples. One participant within a pair has the role of 
CHOOSER, the other participant performs the role of PROPOSER. In all periods you keep the 
same role. 
Your role is: PROPOSER.  
MATCHING PROCEDURE  
For the duration of the experiment, you will be in a fixed matching group of five Proposers and 
five Choosers (hence 10 participants in total, including yourself). In each period you are 
randomly matched to another participant with the role of Chooser. You will never learn with 
whom you are matched.  
BARGAINING AND PREFERRED OUTCOMES 
In each period, you and the Chooser with whom you are coupled will bargain over an outcome. 
Your preferred outcome is always 0. The Chooser’s preferred outcome is a number between 
(and including) 0 and 120. Any number between 0 and 120 is equally likely. Each period, each 
Chooser will receive a new preferred outcome that does not depend on a preferred outcome of 
any previous period. The Chooser is the only one who is informed about her or his preferred 
outcome. You only know that the Chooser’s preferred outcome is a number between 0 and 120 
(and that each such number is equally likely). 
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IN A PERIOD  
After the Chooser with whom you are matched has learned her or his preferred outcome in a 
period, she or he will send a SUGGESTION for a proposal to you. The Chooser may send any 
suggestion between (and including) 0 and 120. It is up to the Chooser to decide whether and 
how she or he lets her or his suggestion depend on her or his preferred outcome. Then, you are 
informed of the Chooser’s suggestion (but not of her or his preferred outcome). Subsequently, 
you make a PROPOSAL for the outcome. A proposal is any number between (and including) 0 
and 120. Finally, the Chooser will choose to accept or reject the proposal. 
At the end of a period, you are informed of the outcome of the period and the preferred outcome 
of the Chooser you were paired with. Finally, you are informed of the payoff (points you 
earned) that you made. This payoff is automatically added to your total earnings (or in case that 
you make a loss, it is subtracted from your total earnings).  
Please note that the experiment will only continue from one phase to another after everybody 
has pressed OK/PROCEED. For this reason, please press OK/PROCEED as soon as you have 
made your decision. 
PAYOFFS WHEN THE CHOOSER ACCEPTS THE PROPOSAL 
When the Chooser accepts your proposal, your payoff is 60  minus 0.4 times the proposal: 
Your payoff = 60 – 0.4 * proposal. 
When the Chooser accepts your proposal, the Chooser will receive a payoff of 60 minus the 
distance between her or his preferred outcome and the proposal: 
Payoff Chooser = 60 – distance(her or his preferred outcome and proposal).  
It is possible for a Chooser to reject a proposal. 
PAYOFFS WHEN THE CHOOSER REJECTS THE PROPOSAL 
When the Chooser rejects a proposal, then the outcome is the status quo. In this case, you will 
receive 0 points and the Chooser will receive 0 points.  
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Notice that accepting an offer gives the Chooser a higher payoff than rejecting it if and only if 
the distance between the proposal and her preferred outcome is smaller than 60. Your payoff is 
higher when the Chooser accepts than when she or he rejects in all cases. 
EXAMPLE 1. Suppose the Chooser’s preferred outcome turns out to be 80 (which you can-
not know) and you make a proposal of 100. Then, the distance between her preferred outcome 
and your proposal is 100 - 80 = 20.  
If the Chooser accepts, your payoff is 60 – 0.4*100 = 20. The Chooser’s payoff in this case is 60 
- 20 = 40.  
If the Chooser rejects, your payoff is 0 and the Chooser’s payoff is 0.  
EXAMPLE 2. Suppose the Chooser’s preferred outcome turns out to be 80 and you make a 
proposal of 10. Then, the distance between her preferred outcome and your proposal is 80 - 10 = 
70. 
If the Chooser accepts, your payoff is 60 – 0.4*10 = 56. The Chooser’s payoff in this case is 60 
- 70 = -10.  
If the Chooser rejects, your payoff is 0 and the Chooser’s payoff is 0.  
HISTORY OVERVIEW  
When making a decision, you may use the History Overview, which fills the lower part of the 
screen. The History Overview summarizes the results of the most recent 15 periods. (If less than 
15 periods have been completed, this history overview contains results of all completed peri-
ods.)  
Apart from your own results in the previous periods, the history overview also contains the 
results of the other Chooser/Proposer pairs in your matching group. In total you are thus 
informed about the past results of the same group of five Chooser/Proposer pairs. All Choosers 
and Proposers in your matching group will have the same information. The presentation of 
information is different for Choosers than for Proposers.  
TABLE 
Below you see an example of the history overview. THE NUMBERS IN THE HISTORY 
OVERVIEW DO NOT INDICATE WHAT YOU SHOULD DO IN THE EXPERIMENT. The 
left part of the history overview is a Table with four columns. The first column labelled SUG-
GESTION contains the suggestions made by the Choosers in the recent previous periods. The 
second column labelled PREFERRED OUTCOME shows the preferred outcome of the Choos-
er. The third column labelled PROPOSAL gives the proposal that was made by the Proposer as 
a response to the suggestion in the same row. The fourth column labelled ACCEPTANCE shows 
whether the Chooser accepted or rejected the proposal.  
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The results shown in the history overview will be sorted on the basis of suggestion in ascending 
order. (The lower the suggestion, the higher the place in the table.) When the suggestion is the 
same for two or more different results, these observations will be sorted on the basis of pre-
ferred outcome, again in ascending order. In the example above, this applies to the third and the 
fourth row, where two Choosers chose the same suggestion but had different preferred out-
comes. More generally, observations have been sorted first on suggestion, then on preferred 
outcome, then on proposal and finally on acceptance or rejection. 
GRAPH 
On the right of the history overview, the most recent results are represented in a graph. The 
horizontal axis presents the suggestion and the vertical axis presents the proposal. Each previous 
observation is represented by a square. On the horizontal axis you can read the value of the 
suggestion for a particular result and on the vertical axis you can read the value of the corre-
sponding proposal. If the square is green, the particular proposal was accepted and if the square 
is red with white inside, the particular proposal was rejected. (Choosers will see proposals on 
the vertical axis.) 
EXAMPLE 1. Consider the square that is displayed in the lower left corner of the Graph 
shown above. Here, the Chooser made a suggestion of 20. This Chooser’s preferred outcome 
was 30. 
You have now reached the end of the instructions. The next page contains some questions 
concerning the experiment. When all participants have answered all questions correctly, we will 
proceed with the experiment. 
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QUESTIONS 
Please answer the following questions. THE VALUES USED IN SOME QUESTIONS DO 
NOT INDICATE WHAT YOU SHOULD DO IN THE EXPERIMENT. RATHER, THEY 
HAVE BEEN CHOSEN TO FACILITATE CALCULATIONS. 
1. Is the following statement correct? ‘In each period I am coupled with the same Chooser.’ 
2. Is the following statement correct? ‘I will observe the Chooser’s preferred position before I 
make my proposal.’ 
3. 
(A) What is the highest value the preferred outcome of a Chooser can take on? 
(B) What is the highest value a suggestion of a Chooser can take on? 
(C) What is the highest value a proposal of yours can take on? 
4. Consider a period in which the Chooser’s preferred outcome is 50. The Chooser chose to send 
a suggestion of 40. You made a proposal of 20, which was accepted by the Chooser. 
(A) What are your own earnings in this period? 
(B) How much does the Chooser to whom you are paired earn? 
5. Consider a period in which the Chooser’s preferred outcome is 90. The Chooser chose to send 
a suggestion of 100. You made a proposal of 0, which was accepted by the Chooser. 
(A) What are your own earnings in this period? 
(B) How much does the Chooser to whom you are paired earn? 
6. Consider a period in which the Chooser’s preferred outcome is 30. The Chooser chose to send 
a suggestion of 40. You made a proposal of 10, which was rejected by the Chooser. 
(A) What are your own earnings in this period? 
(B) How much does the Chooser to whom you are paired earn? 
When you are ready answering the questions, please raise your hand. 
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Chapter 5 Formal versus Informal Legislative 
Bargaining65 
5.1 Introduction  
The outcome of a legislative bargaining process is usually a result of both 
formal and informal bargaining. When parliament is in session, parliamentary 
procedures strictly govern what members can do at what time; hence, bargain-
ing is highly formalized. After oﬃcial sessions have been adjourned, however, 
bargaining often continues informally in oﬃces, corridors and backrooms, where 
formal rules barely exist. That bargaining occurs at diﬀerent levels of formality 
likely has historical and functional reasons: informal bargaining is arguably 
faster, whereas formal bargaining provides transparency and legitimacy to the 
democratic process. The question we address in this chapter is whether the 
formality of bargaining also systematically aﬀects the bargaining outcome. This 
is important for understanding institutional choice and parliamentary proce-
dures.  
That the bargaining procedure can drastically aﬀect the outcome has been 
recognized at least since the research boom on spatial voting in the late 1970s. If 
the procedure favors speciﬁc negotiators (e.g., through the order of voting, 
agenda-setting power, or proposal and voting rights), the outcome may crucially 
depend on it (e.g., McKelvey (1976; 1979), Schoﬁeld (1978), McCarty (2000)). 
The eﬀect of formality seems diﬀerent on at least two accounts, however. First, 
the diﬀerence between formal and informal bargaining cannot be captured in 
terms of changing the agenda or proposal or voting rights. Second, moving from 
a formal to informal bargaining or vice versa does not prima facie favor speciﬁc 
negotiators in any obvious way. The diﬀerence between the two is that informal 
bargaining provides much more ﬂexibility to the bargaining parties. It does not 
give more ﬂexibility to some parties than to others, however.  
                                     
65 This chapter is based on De Groot Ruiz, Ramer & Schram (2011). 
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Intuitively, the choice of how much weight to put on formal versus informal 
procedures may be determined by strategic considerations (Elster (1998), 
Stasavage (2004)). For instance, parties with a strong bargaining position may 
prefer backrooms and wish to reserve formal voting for well negotiated deals. On 
the other hand, parties with more extreme positions might prefer to avoid 
backrooms and follow the more formal procedures in order to allow their pro-
posals to have a chance of success. This study intends to help us better under-
stand such preferences.  
More speciﬁcally, we compare two bargaining procedures, which we believe 
are representative for formal and informal bargaining in the ﬁeld. To obtain a 
clean comparison, in both cases the bargaining procedure is ‘fair’ in the sense 
that it does not prima facie favor any negotiator. In this important way, our 
study diﬀers from the legislative bargaining literature of the 1970s discussed 
above. The main question we address is whether the increased ﬂexibility of the 
informal compared to the formal procedure aﬀects the legislative outcome. In 
addition, if it does, does it do so for purely strategic reasons or do psychological 
eﬀects play a role? To provide an answer to these questions we analyze legisla-
tive bargaining both theoretically and in a controlled laboratory experiment.  
In the informal procedure, players can freely make and accept proposals at 
any time.66 We did not choose for a completely unstructured face-to-face setting, 
but instead opted for a computerized setting where players can make and accept 
proposals in continuous time. This allows us to analyze the procedure as a non-
cooperative game and to collect data on the bargaining process. We believe that 
the procedure is suﬃciently unrestricted to be representative for informal bar-
gaining like that which takes place in parliamentary backrooms. As we will see, 
the procedure is also not restrictive in the sense that it imposes no strategic 
constraints on the players. In the formal procedure, proposals and voting are 
regulated by a ﬁnite, closed-rule Baron-Ferejohn (1987) alternating oﬀers 
                                     
66 In the 1970s, several experiments used informal bargaining procedures to compare the 
many cooperative solution concepts that had been proposed. Amongst the ﬁrst were Fiorina & 
Plott (1978). The procedures used tend to be rather diﬀerent from ours, however. More im-
portantly, these studies do not compare their informal procedure to a formal procedure, nor do 
they model it as a non-cooperative game. 
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scheme.67 Though there are potentially very many fair formal procedures, the 
Baron Ferejohn framework is widely taken to be a suitable model for studying 
formal legislative bargaining.68 Our procedure is an elementary Baron-Ferejohn 
scheme. 
We study the eﬀects of formality in the context of a three-player legislative 
bargaining setting. The game is a straightforward extension of the standard one-
dimensional median voter setting (Black, 1948; 1958) and has the following 
motivation. In the standard setting, the median player’s ideal point is the 
unique (strong) core outcome irrespective of the location of others’ ideal points 
(as long as they are on the same dimension). However, intuitively one may 
expect that the outcome of a legislative bargaining process or the coalition 
supporting this outcome is less stable if preferences are far apart −i.e., if polari-
zation is strong−, even if the policy space seems unidimensional. One explana-
tion is that the disagreement point may well lie outside of the line on which all 
policy proposals are deﬁned. This is a point, we believe, that has hardly been 
appreciated in the literature.69 Such a situation may occur for various reasons. 
First, a decision often involves a new type of policy or project so that the status 
quo may not fall in the space under consideration. Second, if the disagreement 
point consists in the termination of a project or a coalition, then it may involve 
signiﬁcant transaction costs (e.g., involving new elections). If so, the disagree-
ment point will be of a qualitatively diﬀerent nature than the issue under 
negotiation. 
                                     
67 Baron & Ferejohn (1987) compare open and closed amendment rules and ﬁnd distinct 
equilibria. Note that both settings constitute formal bargaining procedures.  
68 See, in addition to the work by Baron and Ferejohn, amongst many others, Banks & Aus-
ten Smith (1988), Merlo & Wilson (1995), McCarty (2000), Diermeier, Eraslan & Merlo (2003), 
Battaglini & Coate (2008) and Banks & Duggan (2000; 2006). These models tend to reach 
similar conclusions about agenda setting power. The ﬁrst proposal is typically always accepted 
in equilibrium, since players know which proposals would subsequently be accepted or rejected. 
This gives a great advantage to the player chosen to make the ﬁrst proposal (Palfrey 2006). 
Experiments, however, only partly corroborate these theoretical ﬁndings (McKelvey (1991), 
Diermeier & Morton (2005), Frechette, Morelli & Kagel (2005)). The ﬁrst proposer does indeed 
have an advantage, but this is not as large as theoretically predicted and, in fact, the ﬁrst 
proposal is often rejected, leading to ‘delay.’ 
69 The only exception we are aware of is Romer & Rosenthal (1978), who make a similar 
observation when they compare competitive majority rule to a controlled agenda setting 
mechanism. They do not consider polarization. 
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An example serves to illustrate the environments we are thinking of. Imagine 
a legislature that consists of three factions (doves, moderates and hawks) and is 
deciding on the renewal of a budget for an ongoing war. No single faction holds 
a majority and any coalition of two does. Doves prefer a reduction of the current 
war budget, moderates want no change and hawks would like an increase. 
Preferences are single-peaked with respect to budget revisions. The option to 
end the war (‘retreat’) serves as a disagreement point, which cannot simply be 
represented as a budget revision. (Retreating is qualitatively distinct from a 
reduction of the budget to zero and, furthermore, spending 5 billion on retreat-
ing is quite diﬀerent from spending this amount on war eﬀorts.) Preferences are 
such that all parties prefer some revisions to retreating. Polarization is then 
deﬁned as the distance between the ideal revisions of the factions (relative to 
the attractiveness of retreating70) and captures the extent of divergence of 
interests. Polarization will most likely drive the stability of the outcome. If 
polarization is weak, then the factions’ preferences lie close together and retreat-
ing is a relatively unattractive agreement. Hence, all coalitions will prefer the 
median ideal to retreating. In this case, we can use Black’s Median Voter Theo-
rem (1948, 1958) to predict that the moderates’ ideal point will prevail. If the 
ideal revisions are very far apart, then polarization is strong. In this case re-
treating is relatively attractive and there are no revisions that any coalition 
prefers to retreating. With moderate polarization, we get a cyclical pattern. 
Both doves and hawks prefer retreating to the unaltered budget; however, 
moderates and doves prefer some negative revisions to retreating; and moderates 
and hawks prefer the unaltered budget to negative revisions. In this case, it is 
not clear what the legislature may decide. Intuitively, one may expect the 
moderates to have the highest bargaining power, as doves and hawks can only 
coordinate on retreating.  
Our model and experimental design take the same basic form as this exam-
ple. The point of departure is a bargaining problem in a median voter setting 
that is modiﬁed to have an exterior disagreement point. Then, we introduce the 
formal bargaining procedure to obtain the formal bargaining game and the 
                                     
70 In particular, relative to the distance between a player’s ideal budget and the budget(s) 
she ﬁnds equally attractive as retreating. 
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informal bargaining procedure to obtain the informal bargaining game. We 
analyze cooperative solutions for the bargaining problem and for both games we 
derive non-cooperative equilibrium predictions.  
The bargaining outcome will typically depend on speciﬁc characteristics of 
the bargaining problem (i.c., the extent of polarization). As a consequence, the 
eﬀect of the procedure may also depend on these characteristics. More speciﬁcal-
ly, the relevance of formality may arguably be dependent on whether or not the 
bargaining problem has a core.71 Our setup allows us to obtain distinct out-
comes with respect to the core by varying the level of polarization. When 
polarization is weak, the core consists of the median ideal and with strong 
polarization the core is the disagreement point. With moderate polarization, the 
core is empty.  
The non-cooperative predictions depend on the procedure.72 For the formal 
game, we derive a unique (reﬁned) subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) that 
converges (with the number of bargaining rounds) to the core element when this 
exists. It typically does not converge at all when the core is empty. In the 
informal game the disagreement point and all points between the players’ ideal 
points can be supported as an SPE-outcome, irrespective of the extent of polari-
zation. In addition, the equilibrium set cannot be reﬁned in any standard way. 
                                     
71 When the core is empty, all outcomes can be supported by some agenda-setting institution 
(McKelvey (1976; 1979), Schoﬁeld (1978)). This is important, because the core will be empty 
unless extreme symmetry conditions are satisﬁed (Gillies (1953), Plott (1967), Riker (1980), Le 
Breton (1987), Saari (1997)). If the core is non-empty, the (non-cooperative) equilibrium 
outcome for many procedures tends to lie in it (Perry & Reny (1993; 1994), Baron (1996), Banks 
& Duggan (2000)). There is indeed experimental evidence on the stability of core-outcomes 
(Fiorina & Plott (1978), McKelvey & Ordeshook (1984), Palfrey (2006)). On the other hand, the 
outcome is sometimes sensitive to fairness considerations (Isaac & Plott (1978), Eavey & Miller 
(1984)). Structure may matter even if there is a core, for instance, if some procedures are 
considered fairer than others (Bolton, Brandts, & Ockenfels, 2005). 
72 Two theoretical breakthroughs have allowed us to overcome challenges in studying the 
eﬀects of formality. First, for a long time many cooperative solution concepts have been ad-
vanced for situations in which the core is empty but none found broad theoretical and empirical 
support. Miller’s (1980) uncovered set as a generalization of the core drew theoretical support 
(Shepsle & Weingast (1984), Banks (1985), Cox (1987), Feld, Grofman, Hartley, Kilgour & 
Miller (1987)). However, systematic empirical tests were problematic, as it was impossible to 
compute the uncovered set in most cases.  By developing an algorithm to ﬁnd the uncovered set, 
Bianco, Lynch, Miller & Sened (2006; 2008) managed to ﬁnd solid empirical support using data 
from many old and new experiments. Second, continuous time bargaining has made the non-
cooperative analysis of low-structure settings possible (Simon & Stinchcombe (1989), Perry & 
Reny (1993; 1994)).  
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Our interpretation is that informality oﬀers so much strategic ﬂexibility that 
strategic considerations alone cannot identify an outcome.  
From our experiments, we have two main ﬁndings: polarization matters and 
formality matters. Polarization has a strong impact on the outcome. In accord-
ance with theory, the median player is signiﬁcantly worse oﬀ with moderate 
than with weak polarization. However, we ﬁnd that increased polarization hurts 
the median player and does so even at weak levels when her most preferred 
outcome remains the unique core element. Our experimental ﬁndings suggests 
this is due to intra-coalitional fairness considerations. Such considerations 
become less important as negotiators gain more experience, however. After 
players have repeatedly played the game (in ever-changing groups), competition 
between coalitions is strengthened and the position of the median player also 
becomes stronger. 
Our second result is that the formality of the bargaining procedure matters. 
The median player is signiﬁcantly better oﬀ with the informal than with the 
formal procedure. One plausible cause seems to be that ﬂexibility in making 
proposals at any time increases her ability to exploit her superior bargaining 
position, as observed by Drouvelis, Montero & Sefton (2010) in a diﬀerent 
setting. This points to the more general idea that parties in a superior bargain-
ing position will prefer institutions that impose less structure on the bargaining 
procedure.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 models the 
bargaining problem as a cooperative game and derives solutions for it. Section 
5.3 describes and solves the non-cooperative games for the formal and informal 
bargaining procedures. Our experimental design is presented in section 5.4 and 
the experimental results are presented in section 5.5. Section 5.6 concludes. 
5.2 The Bargaining Problem and Cooperative Solu-
tions 
Formally, the bargaining problem is represented by * = *(N, Z,ui,W) and 
consists of a ﬁnite set N of players, thought of as factions in a legislature; a 
CHAPTER 5.  FORMAL VERSUS INFORMAL LEGISLATIVE BARGAINING 
139 
 
collection W of subsets of N, thought of as winning coalitions; a set Z of alterna-
tives; and utility functions ui, one for each player i N  representing i’s prefer-
ences over Z. Note that although winning coalitions have been speciﬁed, nothing 
as yet has been said about the decision making process itself. Procedures gov-
erning this process will be described and formalized in the next section.  
In the bargaining problems studied here, three players (N = {1,2,3}) bargain 
over the set of alternatives represented by ,Z Ew \  with \  denoting the set 
of real numbers and E  the disagreement point. Each player i N  has an ideal 
point iz  \ . Without loss of generality we normalize by setting z1 = a < 0, z2 
= 0, and z3 = b > 0, with b ≥ a. Hence, the ideal point of player 2, the median 
player, is z = 0. For players 1 and 3, the wing players, z1 is normalized to lie 
closer to 0 than z3. The distance, a, between the closer wing player and the 
median player will be interpreted as a measure of the polarization of players’ 
preferences. We shall distinguish three cases of respectively, weak (a ≤ 1), 
moderate (1 < a < 2), and strong polarization (a ≥ 2). 
Preferences of all players are single-peaked on \  and represented by piece-
wise linear von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions 	 
 1 .i iu z z z    We 
further assume that the utility attributed to the disagreement point is normal-
ized at 0, that is, ui(δ) = 0, for all i N . Hence, each player has an open 
interval of outcomes with strictly positive values; to wit, ( a – 1, a + 1 ) for 
player 1, ( –1, 1 ) for player 2, and ( b – 1, b + 1 ) for player 3. Note that the 
endpoints of these intervals yield utility of 0, while the outcomes outside of 
these intervals are strictly worse for the respective players than the disagreement 
point δ. Figure 5.1 depicts this payoﬀ structure. 
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Figure 5.1 
The ﬁgure shows the payoﬀ structure of *. 
 
As for winning coalitions W, we assume that any majority of two players can 
implement any z  Z as the outcome. This can be achieved in various ways, 
determined by the structure of the bargaining process (see section 5.3). 
* can be regarded as a cooperative game and more precisely as a coalitional 
game without transferable payoﬀ.73 We start by deﬁning the dominating and 
covering relations for any given *(N, Z, ui, W). 
 
Deﬁnition 5.1 Let , .z z Za   We say that 
(i)  z a dominates z, and write z za ; , if there is a winning coalition M W  
such that all members in M strictly prefer z’ to z;  
(ii)  z a covers z, and write z Cza  if z za ; and z z z zaa a aaº; ; , for all .z Zaa   
 
The assumption that the disagreement point E  does not coincide with a point 
on the line \  is important. If E  did lie in \ , then we would have a standard 
median voter setting and the median ideal 0 would dominate all other possible 
outcomes. 
The counter-positive equivalent of Deﬁnition 5.1 reads as follows. 
 
                                     
73 Note that individual players cannot achieve any outcome by themselves and hence the 
payoﬀs available to singleton coalitions are not independent of the actions of the complementary 
coalition. Hence, under some deﬁnitions it would fall outside of the class of coalitional games 
with non-transferable utility. 
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Deﬁnition 5.2 For an alternative z Z  we say that 
(i)  z is undominated if for every z a  the set of players who strictly prefer z a  
over z is not a winning coalition; 
(ii)  z is uncovered if for every z a  which dominates z there is z aa  which domi-
nates z a  and does not dominate z. 
 
To obtain a solution we look at the core and, when the core is empty, at the 
uncovered set, which is a generalization of the core. These are deﬁned by: 
 
Deﬁnition 5.3  
(i) The core C(*) of * is the set of all points in Z that are undominated;  
(ii) The uncovered set U(*) of * is the set of all points in Z that are uncovered. 
  
Intuitively, the uncovered set is a ‘two step core.’ If an outcome z is uncov-
ered, there might be an outcome z a  that dominates it, but this outcome z a  will 
itself be dominated by an outcome z aa  that does not dominate z. This means for 
instance, that forward-looking negotiators might be hesitant to move away from 
a point in the uncovered set. The uncovered set has several appealing theoretical 
properties. It is never empty, is equal to the core if the latter is nonempty and 
strict (Miller, 1980), contains all Von Neumann Morgenstern sets (McKelvey, 
1986) and it subsumes the Banks set (Banks, 1985).74 McKelvey argued that the 
uncovered set could be seen as a “useful generalization of the core when the core 
does not exist” (1986). Recently, this concept has also attracted signiﬁcant 
empirical support (Bianco, Lynch, Miller & Sened 2006; 2008).  
Whereas the uncovered set is typically large and diﬃcult to calculate, in our 
bargaining problem it is small and simple.75 Table 5.1 gives the core and uncov-
ered set for our bargaining problems.  
                                     
74 These diﬀerent papers prove these relations under slightly diﬀering conditions. 
75 In addition, in our game the uncovered set is reﬁned in a nice way by the von Neumann 
Morgenstern set and the bargaining set, both of which are unique. More details are given in 
Appendix 5.7.1. 
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TABLE 5.1 
COOPERATIVE SOLUTIONS 
Polarization C(*) U(*) 
weak: a ≤ 1 0 0 
moderate: 
1<a<2 
a < b  {–a + 1, 0, δ} 
a = b {–a + 1, 0, b – 1, δ} 
strong: a ≥ 2 δ δ 
Notes: For *=* (N, Z, ui,W), the table gives the elements in the core 
(C(*))and uncovered set (U(*)) for the levels of polarization distinguished in 
the ﬁrst column. 
 
When polarization is weak or strong, the core is nonempty and coincides with 
the uncovered set. It always holds that players 1 and 2 prefer the median ideal 
to all points right of it, whereas players 2 and 3 prefer the median ideal to all 
points left of it. In addition, when polarization is weak, players 1 and 2 also 
prefer the median ideal to the disagreement point. Hence it dominates all points, 
and, as a consequence, also covers them all. Thus, if polarization is weak, the 
median ideal is the singleton core and uncovered set. When polarization is 
strong, no point on the line exists that two players prefer to the median ideal. 
Hence, the disagreement point dominates all points on the line and constitutes 
the core and uncovered set. From a behavioral perspective, this case seems less 
interesting, as no alternative outcome to the disagreement point seems viable. 
When polarization is moderate, we get a circular dominance pattern and the 
core is empty: The median ideal dominates all other points on the line, but is 
dominated by the disagreement point. The disagreement point itself is in turn 
dominated by some points on the line (which are dominated by the median ideal 
etc.). This also means that the median ideal and the disagreement point do not 
cover each other; they are uncovered. Furthermore, the point closest to the 
median player that is not dominated by the disagreement point, –a + 1, is 
uncovered as well. (The same holds for a – 1 if a = b). Consequently, in this case 
the uncovered set consists of three or four elements: the median ideal, the 
disagreement point, –a + 1 and, if a = b, a – 1. 
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For technical details on the dominance relations and the cooperative solu-
tions, see Appendix 5.7.1. 
5.3 Formal and Informal Procedure 
We now impose procedures on the bargaining problem described in section 
5.2 and analyze the resulting non-cooperative games. One may think of this as 
the legislature selecting exactly one element of the set of feasible alternatives Z 
by means of a procedure established (or agreed upon) in advance. Formally, 
such a procedure can be regarded as an extensive game. We shall present and 
discuss two such games, exemplary for two important frameworks for legislative 
bargaining, voting and open bargaining. We do so by introducing a ‘formal’ and 
an ‘informal’ bargaining procedure to * = *(N, Z,ui,W). 
5.3.1 Formal procedure 
We begin with a formal procedure for the selection of an outcome in Z, repre-
sented by a sequential voting game FT( . The game − similar to that in Baron & 
Ferejohn (1989) − consists of multiple rounds, with a predetermined maximum 
of T rounds. Each round comprises of three stages.  
At stage 1, one player is randomly selected with equal probability across 
players. At stage 2, the selected player i submits her proposal. At stage 3, 
players vote independently on this proposal. It becomes the ﬁnal choice if it is 
accepted by at least two players. Because the player who submitted it supports 
her own proposal (by assumption), support by one other player suﬃces to pass 
the proposal and end the game. Whenever the proposal is voted down by the 
two other players, it is oﬀ the table and the game proceeds to round t + 1, 
where a player is selected to submit a new proposal, and so on. If the game 
reaches round T and the ﬁnal proposal is also rejected, the game ends and the 
disagreement point E  is implemented. 
For any given T and bargaining problem *, the game FT(  is an extensive form 
game of ﬁnite length with random moves by nature at the ﬁrst stage and simul-
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taneous moves by all three players at the third stage of each round.76 Actions 
played at any stage are observed before the next stage or round begins. In 
general, players’ best responses will not be unique so one can expect multiple 
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPE), possibly with distinct outcomes. In 
order to select a single best response at each stage, and ultimately to select 
consistently a single SPE for every given T, we assume players vote as if they 
are pivotal and shall adopt a number of tie-breaking rules known from the 
literature on voting games (Baron & Ferejohn (1989), Baron (1996), Banks & 
Duggan (2006)):  
(i) A player accepts a proposal submitted in round t if it provides to her a 
payoﬀ equal to her expected equilibrium payoﬀ in the subgame beginning 
at stage 1 of round t + 1. 
(ii) Whenever a player has two best proposals, one that will be accepted and 
one that will be rejected, she submits the proposal that will be accepted. 
(iii) Whenever –c and c are both best proposals for player 2 she submits each 
of them with an equal probability. 
(iv) Whenever E  and c  \  are both best proposals for a player she submits 
E . 
The ﬁrst assumption guarantees that an SPE exists, the remaining assump-
tions imply that it is unique.77 From now on, we will refer to this equilibrium 
simply as ‘the equilibrium’ of .FT(  Note that equilibrium strategies in a round 
depend neither on what happened in previous rounds nor on the total number of 
rounds (T), but only on the number of rounds left before the game ends. 
The equilibrium outcome of FT(  can be characterized by the probability dis-
tribution of the equilibrium outcomes : [0,1]T ZN l .78 If all equilibrium pro-
posals are accepted in the ﬁrst round, TN  simply allots equal probability to each 
of the players’ equilibrium proposals in the ﬁrst round. There is, however, the 
                                     
76 Though the player that made a proposal has an action set consisting of one element (‘ac-
cept’) at the 3rd stage.  
77 Assumption 4 is particular to our game (as E  \ ) and is a convenient tie breaking rule 
for the case a = 2. For other parameter values it is not essential which rule one assumes for 
these ties. 
78 TN is a probability mass function. As we show in Appendix 5.7.2, 
TN  has countable sup-
port. 
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possibility of delay. Though for some values of parameters a, b and T, all three 
equilibrium proposals are immediately accepted, for other values an equilibrium 
proposal, in particular that of player 3, will be rejected. The equilibrium out-
come of FT(  may depend in complicated ways on the number of bargaining 
rounds, T.79 Hence, our approach is to look at whether the equilibrium outcome 
converges as T increases. We say that for given values of a and b the equilibrium 
outcome converges if there exists a probability distribution *,a bN  on Z such that 
*
,lim
T
a bT
N N
ld
  in the sense of weak convergence of probability measures 
(Billingsley, 1999). If no such limit exists, then we say that the outcome does 
not converge. The equilibrium outcome converges to some single ,z Z  if *,a bN is 
concentrated at ,z Z  i.e. *, ( ) 1a b zN  . This allows us to summarize the SPE of 
F
T( in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 5.1 
(i) If 0 ≤ a < 1 or a = b = 1, the equilibrium outcome converges to 0. For T 
suﬃciently large, the ﬁrst round proposals are accepted without delay. 
(ii) If 1 ≤ a ≤ b < 2 and b > 1, the equilibrium outcome does not converge 
except for some patches of the values of a and b, and never to a single out-
come in Z. 
(iii) If a ≥ 2, the equilibrium outcome is δ for suﬃciently large T. 
 
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix 5.7.2. It is a terse and long exercise in 
backward induction, since the non-convexity of the outcome set precludes the 
use of standard techniques and results. 
 
                                     
79 Numerically, the equilibrium outcome can be calculated for each value of a, b and T. Simu-
lations show that it always appears to converge to a cycle in T, the length of which depends in 
erratic ways on a and b. To illustrate, Appendix 5.7.2 provides simulation results that show how 
the period of the cycles depends on a and b.  
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Comparing Proposition 5.1 to Table 5.1, we conclude that the equilibrium 
outcome converges to the single element of the core for a < 1 and a > 2, and 
that it does not converge to a single outcome if the core is empty.80  
Proposition 5.1 speciﬁes the parameter conﬁgurations for which we have ro-
bust predictions. Note that legislative bargaining in the ﬁeld can go through a 
substantial number of rounds, but that the number is often ﬁnite (due to time 
constraints, for example). If the outcome converges as the number of rounds 
increases, this allows for a stable prediction for such cases. If there is a suﬃcient 
number of rounds, the prediction will not depend signiﬁcantly on the exact 
number, on who gets to propose ﬁrst or on the precise values of a and b. If the 
outcome does not converge, however, then the outcome will depend on all these 
parameters, and typically in a very sensitive and non-linear way.81 For instance, 
in our experiment we will use T = 10. For this case, we can derive a unique 
prediction, whether the core is empty or not (See Table 5.3 below). When the 
core is nonempty, it does not matter much whether T is 9, 10, 11, 20 or 100 or 
whether a=.4 or a=.41 or whether player 1 or player 3 starts.82,83 When the core 
is empty, however, then the outcome depends crucially on all these parameters. 
Though we have predictions for the speciﬁc parameters of our experiment, they 
will be strongly aﬀected by small changes. This makes the outcome hard to 
predict in practice. In addition, this arguably makes it more diﬃcult for players 
to coordinate on the equilibrium. Hence, Proposition 5.1 helps us understand 
when speciﬁc predictions for ﬁnite T are robust (i.c., this is the case for (i) and 
(iii)). 
5.3.2 Informal Procedure 
Now, we turn to the informal bargaining procedure where all players can 
make and accept proposals in continuous time, which we denote by IT( . The 
                                     
80 In the non-generic case of a = 1 and b > 1 the core consists of 0 but the equilibrium out-
comes do not converge as T goes to inﬁnity. 
81 See footnote 79.   
82 In addition, in the ﬁeld (as in our experiment) the outcome set will not be exactly continu-
ous but discrete and very ﬁne-mazed. In this case, the outcome even converges in a ﬁnite 
number of rounds if the core is non-empty. 
83 Parameter values exist (especially those close to values where the core is empty), where 
more than 10 rounds are required to see converging behavior.  
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basic tenet of IT( is a triple of proposals 	 
1 2 3, ,t t tp p p  on the table at all times 
< >0,t T  until one of the proposals is accepted lest the game ends with the 
disagreement point δ at time T. It has by now been well established that such a 
game with continuous time cannot be solved without further assumptions, 
however (Simon & Stinchcombe (1989), Perry & Reny (1993; 1994)). Drawing 
on Perry & Reny’s game (1993), we introduce a reaction and waiting time. Our 
game requires diﬀerent rules than those used by Perry & Reny (1993; 1994), 
nonetheless, as it concerns a more complex bargaining problem. In contrast to 
Perry & Reny (1993), * is not a two-player game; * is diﬀerent from the bar-
gaining problems Perry & Reny (1994) consider in that * can have an empty 
core and does not have transferable payoﬀs. 
The rules of the game are as follows. Player i can either be silent (7 ), tip 7 ,  
have a proposal on the table, ,tip z z Z  , or accept the proposal of another 
player j, ti jp a . For each player i, tip  as a function of time is assumed to be 
piecewise constant and to be right-continuous. We say that a player moves at 
time t when lim
i
t t s
i i s tp p p

³v w . It is natural to only allow only such discrete 
changes in proposals, since actual negotiations (face-to-face or computerized) 
consist of discrete actions (‘I propose x’, ‘I accept’, ‘I withdraw y’) in a continu-
ous time. 
Players start with no proposal on the table: 0
i
p 7 w . We introduce a uniform 
reaction and waiting time, S . In particular, if some player moves at time t, no 
player can move at ( , )t s s S  .84 This models the fact that players cannot 
react (or act again) immediately after a player has moved and that the time it 
takes to process information, make a decision and execute it is roughly the same 
for all players at all times. Essential is that we allow S  to be arbitrarily small.85  
                                     
84 We also allow a player to resubmit her old proposal and induce the reaction time U. Intui-
tively, this is the strategic move “I still propose z.” Technically, if tip z
  , then we deﬁne the 
move that resubmits the same proposal as *tip z . (We set  **z zw , such that if *tip z  , then 
resubmitting z is tip z .) If accepted, *z  just induces z as outcome. 
85  In our model the waiting time is exactly equal to the reaction time, unlike in Perry and 
Reny (1993). What is important is that we exclude the possibility of making a proposal and 
then withdrawing it before it can be accepted. For this purpose, any reaction time smaller than 
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Player i accepts j’s proposal by setting ti jp a . In order to ensure that a 
player knows which proposal she accepts, if player i plays ti jp a  she accepts 
.tjp
  To ensure a unique, well-deﬁned outcome a player i can only accept a 
proposal at time t if she is silent herself ( )
i
tp 7  .86 In addition, one can (natu-
rally) not accept a proposal from a player who is silent. As soon as a proposal 
has been accepted, the accepted proposal is the outcome of the game. If no 
proposal has been accepted before or at t = T, then the outcome is the disa-
greement point δ. After a proposal has been accepted or when t>T, no player 
can move anymore. Formally, we always let the game end at t T S  .87  
To deﬁne strategies and derive equilibria, we need to introduce some further 
deﬁnitions. 
 
Deﬁnition 5.4 
(i) A history, h, consists of a speciﬁcation of 1 2 3{ , , }
t t tp p p  for [0, ( ))t hU , 
where ( ) [0, ]h TU S   is the history’s end. 
(ii) ( ) sup{ : ( ) ( )}t ti it h t p h p hU w  v  is the last moment before ( )hU  that 
any player moved (if no player has moved, we conveniently set 
( )t h Sw  ).  
(iii) A proposal function is right-continuous and piecewise linear if for all 
TU   and each i, there is an 0F   such that 
( ) ( ) [ , )s ti ip h p h s t t F    . As discussed above, we will only consider 
such proposals. 
(iv) History h is an active history if  ( ) ( )t h h TS U b b  and no proposal 
has been accepted. 
                                                                                                           
the waiting time would suﬃce; since there is no time-discounting, this would make the analysis 
unnecessarily more complex. 
86 If a player were not required to be silent when accepting a proposal, her proposal could be 
accepted while she were accepting another. Essentially, we are requiring that a player removes 
her own proposal before accepting another. Given that U can be arbitrarily small, this assump-
tion is not behaviorally restrictive. 
87 This is because at time t, it is not yet known what happens at t itself. Any time after T 
would do. 
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(v) The set of admissible proposals at each history for player i is called 
( )iZ h , with ˆ( )iZ h ZU  , where \ ^1 2 3ˆ , , ,Z Z a a a7  .88 ( )iZ h  is subject 
to the following restrictions: 
 a.  ( ) { }  if  is not an active historyti iZ h p hU U
  
 b.  *{ , ( ) } ( )i iZ p h Z h
U
U U7   if  is an active historyhU  
c. ( ) if  j ia Z h hU U is an active history ,  ( )ji j p hU U 7v v and
( )ip h
U
U 7   
(vi) The outcome of a history h  is ( )z h : 
The unique element of { ( ): ( )  for some ( )} if it exists
( )  if { ( ): ( )  for some ( )}  and ( )
 if { ( ): ( )  for some ( )}  and ( )
t t
j i j
t t
j i j
t t
j i j
p h p h a t h
z h p h p h a t h h T
p h p h a t h h T
U
U U
E U U



£¦  ¦¦¦w      b¤¦¦¦     ¦¦¥
 (vii) LetH  be the set of histories in which all proposals are right-continuous 
and piecewise linear and admissible and have ( )h TU S  . Call any 
h H  a resolved history.  
(viii) Let H be the set of histories in which all proposals are right-
continuous, piecewise linear and admissible, and that have no outcome 
( ( ) ).z hU    Any h HU   is called an unresolved history.  
(ix) h  is a subhistory of ha , or 'h h , if ( ) ( ')h hU Ub  and ( ) ( ) t ti ip h p h a
for each i and for all [0, ( ))t hU  Furthermore, h is a ‘proper subhistory’ 
of ha , or 'h h , if h ha  and ( ) ( ')h hU U . 
(x) ( )sh h  is the unique history such that ( ( ))sh h sU  , ( )sh h h  and no 
player moves in [ ( ), )h sU . 
(xi) { : ( ) }H h H hU U Ua aw    is the set of histories ending at U a .  
(xii) { : ( ) ( ) }H h H h t hU Sw  p    is the set of active histories in H.  
 
                                     
88  Because we allow players to repeat their previous proposal, we actually have 
\ ^* * 1 2 3ˆ , , , ,Z Z Z a a a7 7   , where Z* includes all asterisked outcomes (cf. fn 84). 
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A strategy of player i is a mapping from the set of unresolved histories to the 
set of admissible proposals, ˆ:i H ZT l . It meets the following two conditions: 
(S1) For all ,h HU   ( ) ( )i ih Z hU UT    
(S2) For all ,h HU   a time 0F  exists such that ( ) ( )i ih h hUU UT Ta a   with 
( )h h h hU U F UU a   . 
 
(S1) ensures moves are in the set of admissible proposals. (S2) ensures that the 
strategies result in well-deﬁned histories with piecewise constant, right-
continuous paths. By 4  we denote the set of all proﬁles that meet (S1) and 
(S2). 
Proposition 5.2 shows that T  4  induces from any well-deﬁned unresolved 
history h HU  a unique well-deﬁned resolved history h H :   
 
Proposition 5.2 The game LT(  is a well-deﬁned mapping : .IT TH H S( q4l  
Proof: See Appendix 5.7.3. 
 
The intuition underlying the proof is that for a given strategy proﬁle and un-
resolved history hU , either no player would do anything after hU  until the game 
ends or one can ﬁnd a well-deﬁned ﬁrst action at or after U . This action yields a 
new history, which is either a resolved history or an unresolved history. Hence, 
one can repeat this procedure of searching for the ﬁrst action until it yields a 
resolved history. 
We can now deﬁne subgames and equilibria of .IT(  A subgame 
\ : { : } ,
I
T h Th H h h HU U(   q4l  represents the game that starts at hτ. Let 
( ; | )i i iU hUT T  Ł \( ( ( , )))Ii T hu z hU U T(  be the payoﬀ player i receives from the 
outcome that T  induces on hU  and let 0( ; ) ( ; | ).i i i i i iU U hT T T T w  A Nash 
Equilibrium of \
L
T hU
(  is a strategy proﬁle T  such that 
( ; | ) ( ; | )i i i i i iU h U hU UT T T T ap  for each i and all i iTa  4 . T  is a Subgame Perfect 
Equilibrium (SPE) of IT(  if it is a Nash Equilibrium in all of its subgames: 
( ; | ) ( ; | )i i i i i iU h U hU UT T T T ap  for each i and all i iTa  4  and in all .h HU    
CHAPTER 5.  FORMAL VERSUS INFORMAL LEGISLATIVE BARGAINING 
151 
 
Finally, we are able to show by an explicit construction that every point of 
the interval [ , ]a b R   and the disagreement point E  itself can be an outcome 
of a subgame-perfect equilibrium of IT( . This yields Proposition 5.3. 
 
Proposition 5.3 The set of SPE outcomes contains [ , ] { }a b E   for every 
continuous game IT(  with T S . 
Proof: See Appendix 5.7.3. 
 
Many of the SPEs in Proposition 5.3 may seem unintuitive. For instance, the 
at ﬁrst sight unlikely outcome b (which is the ideal point of the wing player 
furthest from the median player) can be supported by an equilibrium in which 
players 1 and 2 always propose b. Player 3 will accept b as soon as she can, 
while players 1 and 2 cannot individually proﬁtably deviate, as the other player 
will anyhow propose b, which will be readily accepted by player 3.  
This large set of SPE cannot be reﬁned in any standard way. A simple set of 
standard tie-breaking rules, such as those used for FT( , would be much too weak 
to have any eﬀect. Stationarity only has a very small bite (b and δ can, for 
instance, be sustained by stationary strategies for any a and b). A procedure of 
iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies, as proposed by Moulin 
(1979), and used by Baron & Ferejohn (1989), is of little avail in our case, due 
to the fact that typically in many subgames of IT(  multiple actions per player 
will survive, so that hardly any strategy will eventually be eliminated in the 
complete game. In addition, a reﬁnement based on trembling-hand perfection 
(Selten, 1975), if it can be adapted to continuous time and space, will not 
eliminate these unintuitive equilibrium-outcomes either. For instance, the reason 
that player 1 does not propose 0 instead of b in the equilibrium discussed above, 
could be that she is afraid that player 2 might tremble and play b F  instead of 
b. Hence, there are few strategic restrictions on the equilibrium strategies in the 
informal game.  
Nonetheless, there are some points in the outcome set that strike us as more 
‘likely’ than others (for instance points in the uncovered set). Their plausibility 
might be the result of their focal nature due to the constellation of preferences 
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and winning coalitions (which is captured by the cooperative solution concepts 
of the bargaining problem).  
5.3.3 Overview of Theoretical Results 
In Table 5.2 we summarize the main results obtained for the outcomes of the 
equilibria of the two strategic games analyzed in this section, FT(  and IT( , 
together with the solutions of the cooperative game *. 
 
TABLE 5.2
THEORETICAL RESULTS MAIN CASES
 Polarization 
  Weak: 
a<1 
Moderate: 
1<a<2 
Strong: 
a > 2 
Cooperative 
Game 
* (N, X, ui, W) 
Core 0  E  
Uncovered Set 0 {1a, 0, a1*,E } E  
Formal (convergence), FT(  0 No convergence** E  
Informal (for T ≥ ρ), 
I
T(  [-a , b]{E } *** 
Notes: Cells give the solution concepts for the two games as derived above for the three 
generic cases of polarization (a<1, 1<a<2, a>2). Solution concepts used are described in the 
previous subsections.  
*a−1 is only included if a = b; ** There are some exceptions, in which case the outcome 
may converge but never to a single outcome in Z. ***Outcomes can also lie in the interval 
[max{b−1, −b}, a] if max{b−1, −b} < −a. 
5.4 Experimental Procedures and Design 
The experiment was run at the Center for Research in Experimental Econom-
ics and political Decision making (CREED) of the University of Amsterdam. It 
was computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). An English translation of 
the Dutch experimental instructions is provided in Appendix 5.7.4. Subjects had 
to correctly answer a quiz before proceeding to the experiment. In total, 102 
subjects were recruited from CREED’s subject pool.89 They earned a €5 show-
                                     
89 The subject pool consists of around 2000 individuals who have voluntarily registered. Al-
most all of these are undergraduate students at the University of Amsterdam, of which approxi-
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up fee plus on average €11.65 in 90-120 minutes. In the experiment, payoﬀs are 
in ‘francs’. The cumulative earnings in francs are exchanged for euros at the end 
of the session at a rate of 1 euro per 10 francs.  
We ran six sessions. Each session consists of 24 periods. In each period sub-
jects are rematched in groups of three. We use matching groups of 6 or 9 sub-
jects.90 After groups have been formed, subjects are randomly appointed the role 
of player ‘A’, ‘B’, or ‘C’. To avoid focality, players do not play the normalized 
game described above (e.g. B’s position is not set equal to 0 and it is not neces-
sarily the case that A’s ideal value is closer to B’s value than C’s is). For analy-
sis, the bargaining problem subjects face can easily be normalized to correspond 
to the model of section 5.2.  
Each player is appointed an ‘ideal value’, which is an integer between 0 and 
100 (inclusive).91 Player A’s ideal value is always the smallest and player C’s the 
largest. Players know all ideal values. Each group has to choose an integer 
between 0 and 100 (inclusive). If the group chooses a player’s ideal value, this 
player receives 20 francs. For every unit further from her ideal point, one franc 
is subtracted from her earnings. Hence, earnings are negative for a player if the 
group chooses a number that is more than 20 larger or smaller than her ideal 
value. To avoid negative total earnings at the end of the experiment, each 
subject starts with a positive balance of 100 francs.92  
The procedure was varied in a between subjects design, which consisted of a 
formal and an informal treatment. We ran three sessions per treatment, so that 
we have six matching groups per treatment. In both treatments, proposals are 
                                                                                                           
mately 40% major in Economics or Business. When the experiment was announced, all received 
an invitation to sign up and participation was on a ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-serve basis. 
90 Subjects are told that they are in a session with 15 or 18 participants and will be re-
matched in every round. 
91 The restriction to natural numbers is done for practical purposes. It is suﬃciently ﬁne-
mazed to avoid aﬀecting the equilibria described in the previous section in any relevant way. 
One diﬀerence is that if the outcome converges in T to 0, it converges in ﬁnite time and, for our 
parameter values, in fact it already converges for T < 10. In Table 5.3, we report the equilibria 
of the high structure game with a discretized line and 10 rounds (which we calculated numerical-
ly). 
92 Still, ﬁve subjects ended their session with negative earnings. They were sent oﬀ with no 
pay other than the €5 show-up fee. Data which involved these individuals were deleted from the 
sample due to possible incentive problems. Including these individuals makes little diﬀerence, 
except that statistical results become somewhat less conclusive due to the extreme behavior of 
one subject who would have earned –14.70 euros and showed erratic behavior after his earnings 
became negative. 
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made consisting of any integer between 0 and 100 (inclusive) or δ (called “end”). 
If the disagreement point is the outcome, each player receives a payoﬀ of zero.93 
In the formal treatment, subjects play the game FT(  of section 5.3.1 with T = 
10; i.e., negotiations were held for a maximum of 10 rounds per period. We use 
the strategy method (for proposals) where in every round every player is asked 
to make a proposal. One proposal is randomly selected and put to the other two 
group members to vote on. If at least one of the two accepts this proposal, it 
becomes the group choice and the game ends. If the proposal is rejected by both 
players, a new round begins, unless 10 rounds have been ﬁnished. In the latter 
case, the outcome is the disagreement point. 
In the informal treatment, subjects are given two-and-a-half minutes to reach 
an agreement. At any time, any group member can make a proposal, change a 
previous own proposal or accept one made by another member. They do so by 
typing a number (proposal) and clicking on an ok-button, respectively selecting 
another member’s proposal and clicking on an accept-button. As soon as a 
proposal has been accepted, this becomes the group choice for the period and 
negotiations are ﬁnished. If no proposal is accepted within the time-span, the 
disagreement point is the outcome. This treatment follows our informal model 
closely. We do not impose a reaction or waiting times. In the model, these times 
do not represent procedural restrictions but rather cognitive and physical 
restrictions, which are allowed to be arbitrarily small. Nor do we require that 
players need to retract their own proposal before they can accept a proposal.94 
Otherwise, the rules are identical as in .LT(  
To help a subject in determining her choices during the negotiations for a 
group decision, her screen always shows a history of previous rounds,95 current 
                                     
93 In both treatments, a round of bilateral messages precedes group negotiations: each player 
may send a private message (consisting of a number between 0 and 100 or δ) to either or both 
other player(s). This is meant to reﬂect pre-negotiation lobbying. This cheap-talk does not aﬀect 
the theoretical analysis presented in section 5.3.  
94 In the model, we need this requirement to guarantee a well-deﬁned outcome. In the exper-
iment, we do not require this, as the probability that a player accepts a proposal at the exact 
same time her own proposal is accepted is zero. Implementing the additional restriction would 
not make a big behavioral diﬀerence (it would take two mouse clicks instead of one to accept a 
proposal), but would make the interface unnecessarily more cumbersome. 
95 The history showed for each previous round what happened in the group the player partic-
ipated in. In particular, it speciﬁed (i) the ideal point for each role,(ii) the role the player herself 
had, (iii) the outcome and (iv) the earnings for all three roles. 
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earnings, a scrollable help-box with instructions, a history of oﬀers in the cur-
rent round and a device to calculate payoﬀs for any hypothetical proposal. 
Polarization is varied in a within-subjects design by using 12 sets of ideal 
values. Each set was used once in the ﬁrst half (ﬁrst 12 periods) and once in the 
second half (last 12 periods) of a session. The sets were chosen such that for the 
normalized parameters there were six with a<1 and six with 1<a<2 (cf. Table 
5.3, below). We chose not to use parameters with a≥2 in the experiment be-
cause it seems obvious that participants will always agree on the disagreement 
point of no earnings if there is no outcome where at least two players have 
positive earnings.  
Table 5.3 gives the (normalized) parameters used, the periods in which they 
were used and the theoretical predictions for each set. We can conclude a few 
things from this table about the predictions of the cooperative solutions and the 
equilibrium of the formal game. First, as long as a<1 (weak polarization) the 
median’s payoﬀ does not depend on the level of polarization. Second, when a>1 
the median’s payoﬀ can be expected to decrease with polarization. Third, when 
the core is empty, there are many instances where the SPE-outcomes of the 
formal game are not in the uncovered set.  
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TABLE 5.3
PARAMETERS AND PREDICTIONS
Parameters Periods Cooperative1 Formal game2 Informal game
a b 1 
starts 
2
starts 
3 
starts 
 
0.2 1.4 5, 23 0 0 0 0 [-0.2, 1.4]∪{δ}
0.5 1.1 3, 21 0 0 0 0 [-0.5, 1.1]∪{δ}
0.5 1.7 11, 13 0 0 0 0 [-0.5, 1.7]∪{δ}
0.8 0.8 1, 19 0 0 0 0 [-0.8, 0.8]∪{δ}
0.8 1.4 9, 15 0 0 0 0 [-0.8, 1.4]∪{δ}
0.8 2 8, 24 0 0 0 0 [-0.8, 2.0]∪{δ}
1.1 1.1 7, 17 {0.1, 0, 0.1,δ} 0.3 0 0.3 [-1.1, 1.1]∪{δ}
1.1 1.7 10, 22 {0.1, 0, δ} 0.4 0.15 0.4 [-1.1, 1.7]∪{δ}
1.1 2.3 2, 14 {0.1, 0, δ} 0.45 0.15 0.45 [-1.1, 2.3]∪{δ}
1.4 1.4 12, 20 {0.4, 0, 0.4,δ} δ 0 δ [-1.4, 1.4]∪{δ}
1.4 2 4, 16 {0.4, 0, δ} 0.55 0.2 δ [-1.4, 2.0]∪{δ}
1.7 1.7 6, 18 {0.7, 0, 0.7,δ} δ {-0.5,0.5} δ [-1.7, 1.7]∪{δ}
Notes: Cells give the theoretical prediction (cf. Table 5.1) applied to the experimental parame-
ter set. The predictions for the formal procedure are for the game with a discretized outcome set 
and 10 rounds, as played in the experiment. 
1For a<1 the prediction is given by the core (=uncovered set); for a>1 it is given by the un-
covered set. 
2The column gives the (reﬁned) SPE conditional on the player chosen to make the ﬁrst oﬀer. 
Player 2 is deﬁned as the median position, 1 is the other player closest to the median. 
5.5 Experimental Results 
We focus on how formality (and its interaction with polarization) aﬀects the 
ability of the median player to reach agreements close to her ideal point. All 
tests used below are two-sided and non-parametric, using each matching group 
(of six or nine participants) as one independent data point. We use the Wilcox-
on signed rank tests for within comparisons and the Mann-Whitney test for 
between comparisons. Whenever we report statistically signiﬁcant results for 
pooled Formal/Informal data only, the results are also signiﬁcant at the 0.05 
level for the disaggregated data where Formal and Informal are tested separate-
ly. P-values that are (unrounded) smaller than 0.05 are marked by an asterisk. 
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5.5.1 Earnings 
We start with players’ earnings from negotiations. Figure 5.2 shows the pay-
oﬀs for diﬀerent levels of polarization (captured by a) and the two treatments. 
Most relevant are the payoﬀs of the median player. First consider the eﬀect of 
polarization. Theory predicts that for weak polarization (a < 1) the median 
player will be able to secure her maximum payoﬀ (of 1), whereas moderate levels 
(1<a<2) of polarization would hurt her (cf. Table 5.3). 
 
 
Figure 5.2 
    This ﬁgure shows payoﬀs.The bars show the average payoﬀs of players per period. Player 2 is 
the median player and player 1 is the other player closest to her. 
 
The experimental results show no obvious change at a = 1. Increasing polari-
zation clearly aﬀects the median player (player 2) negatively, even when a < 1. 
For example, Player 2 earns approximately 0.9 (close to the maximum of 1) 
when a=0.2 (for both Formal and Informal) but only just over 0.79 for a=0.8 in 
the informal setting. Her earnings are signiﬁcantly lower for a=0.8 than for 
a=0.2 (p=0.01*). As predicted by theory, the median’s payoﬀ is signiﬁcantly 
lower for moderate (a>1) than for weak (a<1) polarization (p<0.01*). 
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Second, formality also has a clear eﬀect. The median player is (signiﬁcantly) 
better oﬀ in the Informal treatment than in the Formal treatment (p=0.03*). 
The diﬀerence between treatments seems to increase with the extent of polariza-
tion. When polarization is very weak (a=0.2) the procedure does not aﬀect 
player 2’s earnings from negotiations. When it is relatively strong (a=1.7) the 
median earns more than twice as much in Informal than in Formal. Next, we 
further explore what drives these results.  
5.5.2 How Polarization & Formality Aﬀect The Median Player  
We start by looking at whether participants manage to reach an agreement 
before the deadline. Figure 5.3 shows the number of proposals needed to reach 
agreement. 
 
Figure 5.3 
    This ﬁgure shows the rounds or proposals before agreement. Bars show the fraction of 
agreements using the number of proposals depicted on the horizontal axis for Formal (top 
panel) and Informal (bottom panel). In Formal, a proposal in any round could only be made by 
the player selected to do so and there was a maximum of 10 rounds. In Informal, any player 
could make a proposal at any time during a period of at most 150 seconds. 
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In both treatments, agreement was reached within the limit (150 seconds or 
10 rounds, respectively) in 99% of all cases. Hence, it almost never occurred that 
the disagreement point was forced upon the negotiators for missing their limit. 
Moreover, agreement was generally reached very quickly. In Formal, agreement 
was reached in at most 3 rounds in 88% of the cases and in Informal agreement 
was reached in at most 30 seconds in 82% of the cases. Consequently, binding 
(time) limits do not appear to be of any inﬂuence (for treatment eﬀects). Play-
ers make signiﬁcantly more proposals in Informal (4) than in Formal (2) 
(p<0.01*), however. 
The outcome of the game can be characterized by three dimensions. First, 
whether it is a real number (as opposed to disagreement). If so, second, its value 
(‘location’) and, third, its distance to the median position, i.e., its absolute value 
(‘distance’). We will look at each of these in turn. Figure 5.4 shows the percent-
ages of outcomes that were a real number (‘frequency’). As long as polarization 
is weak (a<1), virtually all outcomes are real numbers and polarization is 
immaterial. 
 
Figure 5.4 
    This ﬁgure shows the frequency (of outcomes were a real number). The bars show the 
percentage of outcomes that were a real number. 
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The frequency (of real number agreements) is, however, clearly and statisti-
cally signiﬁcantly lower for moderate than for weak polarization (p<0.01*). 
Hence, a decrease in real number agreements may partly explain why moderate 
polarization is worse for the median player than weak polarization. However, it 
cannot explain why she cannot obtain her optimal payoﬀ even when polarization 
is weak. Furthermore, there is no clear treatment eﬀect. Real number outcomes 
are somewhat less likely in Formal, but the eﬀect is small and insigniﬁcant 
(p=0.33 for a<1 and p=0.22 for a>1). Hence, the percentage of real number 
outcomes cannot explain why the median player is better oﬀ in Informal. 
In search of such an explanation, we take a closer look at the real number 
outcomes players agreed upon. For completeness sake, we ﬁrst depict the loca-
tion of real number agreements in Figure 5.5 (although the location per se is not 
relevant for player 2’s payoﬀ). This clearly shows that the average agreement is 
typically between the ideal points of the median player and player 1 (the other 
player closest to the median). In fact, there are only two cases with a≠b where 
the average agreement lies between the ideal points of the median player and 
player 3. In both cases, player 1 still earns more that player 3. We will discuss 
the coalitions observed in more detail further on. 
Given that an outcome is a real number, the median player’s payoﬀ is fully 
determined by its distance to the median ideal (0). This is shown in Figure 5.6. 
This ﬁgure clearly shows that the distance increases with polarization. Distance 
is signiﬁcantly higher for moderate than for weak polarization (p<0.01*). Dis-
tance matters even within weak levels of polarization: it is signiﬁcantly higher 
for a=0.8 than for a=0.2 (p=0.01* (pooled), p=0.12(Low), p=0.05* (High)). 
 
CHAPTER 5.  FORMAL VERSUS INFORMAL LEGISLATIVE BARGAINING 
161 
 
 
Figure 5.5 
    This ﬁgure shows the location of real number outcomes. Bars show the average normalized 
location of agreements, when groups agreed on a real number. Negative (positive) numbers 
indicate an agreement in between the ideal points of players 1 (3) and 2. The median position is 
an agreement at 0. Whenever a=b, the non-median players are randomly located as players 1 
and 2, so any agreement is equally likely to be normalized to a positive or negative number. 
 
 
Figure 5.6 
    This ﬁgure shows the distance of real number outcomes. Bars show the average absolute 
distance between agreements and the median point, when groups agree on a real number. 
 
Figure 5.6 also shows a clear treatment-eﬀect. Distance is signiﬁcantly lower 
for Informal than for Formal. Hence, player 2 seems to exploit her superior 
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bargaining position better in Informal than in Formal. A possible explanation is 
that players are freer to make proposals in the Informal negotiations, so that 
they can negotiate better. Recall that players make signiﬁcantly more proposals 
in Informal (4.0) than in Formal (2.0) (p<0.01*), In addition, we ﬁnd that in 
Formal players use slightly less proposals in the last 12 periods (1.9) than in the 
ﬁrst 12 periods (2.1). In contrast, in Informal, players use signiﬁcantly more 
proposals in the last 12 periods (4.5) than in the ﬁrst 12 periods (3.5) 
(p=0.03*).  
We conclude that the main driving force underlying the higher proﬁts for the 
median player in the Informal treatment is that the more ﬂexible bargaining 
procedure allows her to secure real number agreements closer to her preference. 
5.5.3 Intra-coalitional Fairness vs. Inter-coalitional Competition 
One intriguing question that remains is why even weak polarization hurts the 
median player, while her ideal is the unique core element. To address this 
question, we consider coalitions and the way in which outcomes distribute 
payoﬀs within them. Figure 5.7 shows the distribution of real number agree-
ments divided by a. Hence, −1 represents an agreement at –a (i.e., player 1’s 
ideal point), 0 represents the median ideal 0 and 1 represents a.  
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Figure 5.7 
    This ﬁgure shows the distribution of real number outcomes and learning eﬀects. Bars show 
the fraction of real number outcomes that are within 0.05 of the outcome depicted on the 
horizontal axis. The horizontal axis gives the normalized outcome divided by a. The left panels 
shows the distribution for a<1, the right for a>1. The top panels show the distribution for the 
ﬁrst half (ﬁrst 12 periods), the bottom for the last half (last 12 periods). 
 
Strikingly, almost all real number outcomes lie between –a/2 and a/2, with –
a/2 being one of the most frequently chosen outcomes. Note that –a/2 equalizes 
payoﬀs between players 1 and 2, but is a rather unfair outcome for player 3; in 
fact worse than the median preference. From a fairness perspective it might 
seem remarkable that the players in the coalition do not seem to care much 
about the player outside of the coalition. Nonetheless, this is in line with the 
ﬁndings in the three-person ultimatum games (Güth & Van Damme (1998), 
Bolton & Ockenfels (1998)), where the third powerless person (who can neither 
propose nor reject) is given little consideration. 
It seems that players 1 and 3 in many cases demand some part of the ‘sur-
plus’ in a coalition with player 2. However, player 2 does not give more than the 
fair split to player 1. Furthermore, player 3 does not obtain a better outcome 
than a/2, since player 2 probably feels that she can certainly obtain −a/2 in a 
coalition with player 1. Such considerations of intra-coalitional fairness yield real 
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number agreements increasing in a, even for weak levels of polarization, as we 
observe. Note, however, that as a increases it becomes more costly to the medi-
an player to give her coalition partner a ‘fair share.’  
Figure 5.7 also shows that there is a strong learning eﬀect: the distribution of 
outcomes in the ﬁrst half (ﬁrst 12 periods) is very diﬀerent from that in the last 
half (last 12 periods). In the ﬁrst half, intra-coalitional fairness considerations 
seem to play an important role, certainly within coalitions of players 1 and 2. 
Furthermore, coalitions tend to consist of players 1 and 2, in particular in 
Formal (see Figure 5.8).  
 
 
Figure 5.8 
    This ﬁgure shows coalitions and learning eﬀects. Stacked bars show the distribution of 
distinct coalitions. A coalition ij is deﬁned as an outcome proposed by i and accepted by j or 
vice versa. A coalition ijk is an outcome with 2 yes votes (only possible in formal). 
 
In the course of the experiment, inter-coalitional competition becomes more 
important. In the second half, more coalitions arise of players 2 and 3 than in 
the ﬁrst half (p=0.03* (pooled), p=0.46 (Informal), p=0.05* (Formal)), resulting 
in a more even spread of positive and negative agreements. Furthermore, for 
a>1 more coalitions are formed in the second half than in the ﬁrst half between 
players 1 and 3 (p=0.03* (pooled), p=0.03* (Informal), p=0.21 (Formal)).   
Note that having the viable ‘outside option’ of a coalition with player 3 
means that the median player can oﬀer less to player 1. Median players appear 
to realize this remarkably well in the second half of the experiment. Agreements 
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tend to be closer to 0 in the last half (see Figure 5.7). In particular, the number 
of fair 1-2 compromises drops considerably (p<0.01* (pooled), p=0.04* (Infor-
mal), p=0.05 (Formal)) with an accompanying increase in the number of out-
comes at the median ideal (p=0.01* (pooled), p=0.03* (Informal), p=0.14 
(Formal)). 
 
Figure 5.9 
    This ﬁgure shows the learning eﬀects in frequency, location and distance. The left chart 
shows the percentage of outcomes that were real numbers. The middle chart shows the average 
location of real number agreements and the right chart the average distance between real 
number outcomes and the median preference. 
 
Figure 5.9 splits the data depicted in Figure 5.4-Figure 5.6 and shows the 
frequency of real number agreements, their location and distance separately for 
the ﬁrst and last half. From Figure 5.9 we learn ﬁrstly that the greater number 
of coalitions between players 1 and 3 results in a signiﬁcantly lower frequency of 
real number agreements in the second half when a>1 (p=0.04* (pooled), 
p=0.03* (Informal), p=0.25 (Formal)). Secondly. the more equal spread of 1-2 
and 2-3 coalitions also results in an average location closer to zero (p=0.04*, 
(pooled), p=0.12 (Low), p=0.18 (High). Finally, we see that the strongest learn-
ing eﬀect is that the distance of real number outcomes to the median ideal 
becomes signiﬁcantly lower (p<0.01*). Hence, it is the median player who 
beneﬁts most from the increase in inter-coalitional competition. 
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5.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have addressed the question whether the outcome of the 
legislative process is aﬀected by the formality of the bargaining procedure. We 
compared an informal bargaining procedure where players can freely make and 
accept proposals to a formal bargaining procedure where agenda-setting and 
voting is regulated by a Baron-Ferejohn alternating oﬀers scheme. We studied 
the eﬀect of formality in a legislative bargaining problem that consisted of a 
three-player median voter setting modiﬁed to have an external disagreement 
point. This allowed us to study formality both when the core exists and when it 
is empty, and to study whether an external disagreement point can explain why 
the polarization of a legislature can aﬀect the legislative outcome. We derived 
cooperative solutions for the bargaining problem, studied the equilibrium prop-
erties of the formal and informal bargaining games, and tested the two proce-
dures in the laboratory. 
Our ﬁrst result pertains to polarization. Theoretically, we ﬁnd that polariza-
tion should matter when there is an external disagreement point and in our 
experiment, we ﬁnd that this is indeed the case.96 In particular, polarization 
hurts the median player. As predicted by theory, in our experiments the median 
player is signiﬁcantly worse oﬀ at moderate than at weak levels of polarization. 
In contrast to what theory predicts, however, more polarization hurts the 
median player even when her ideal is the unique core element. This seems to be 
the result of intra-coalitional fairness considerations. Over time, inter-coalitional 
competition appears to attenuate these fairness considerations and polarization 
hurts the median player less. 
Our second and main result is that formality matters. Theoretically, it is 
diﬃcult to analyze the eﬀects of formality, as a key characteristic of informal 
bargaining is that it imposes very few strategic restrictions on the negotiators. 
We ﬁnd that in the informal game, all plausible outcomes are supported as 
subgame perfect equilibrium points. This is an important motivation to run 
experiments. The data show a clear treatment eﬀect of formality. The median 
                                     
96 Recall that polarization does not matter in the classic median voter setting (Black, 1948; 
1958).  
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player in our experiment is signiﬁcantly better oﬀ under an informal bargaining 
procedure without rules about the timing of proposal and acceptance decisions. 
Outcomes in the Informal treatment are signiﬁcantly more often the median 
ideal and signiﬁcantly less often the fair compromise between players 1 and 2. It 
appears that the informal procedure gives the median player more ﬂexibility to 
exploit its superior bargaining position. This result supports the armchair 
observation that players in a better bargaining position prefer less regulation of 
negotiations. To put this result on a stronger footing, more research is needed as 
we compare two representative but still speciﬁc procedures. Recently, this result 
has received support from Drouvelis, Montero & Sefton (2010).  
Our results are relevant for the application of game theoretic models to the 
legislative process. The fact that formality inﬂuences the payoﬀs of certain 
players and the performance of speciﬁc predictions means that ‘neutral’ simpli-
fying assumptions (i.e., assumptions that do not favor any player prima facie) 
made to obtain tractable results need not be as innocuous as is often assumed. 
For instance, a highly stylized alternating oﬀers game may not be a suitable 
model of the legislative process if a signiﬁcant part of the bargaining is informal. 
Finally, understanding the inﬂuence of formality is relevant for studying insti-
tutional choice and parliamentary procedure. In particular, legislatures have to 
decide on a bargaining procedure –either from scratch or from a set of previously 
established procedures– before they can decide on the outcome itself. Even if the 
extent of formality may seem like a neutral parameter, it can signiﬁcantly 
inﬂuence the bargaining outcome. Consequently, parties may have preferences 
for a formal or informal bargaining procedure. For instance, parties in the center 
of a political spectrum may prefer to prolong backroom discussions until agree-
ment has been reached. Our results point to the more general idea that parties 
in a superior bargaining position will prefer less formal bargaining institutions, 
as these give them more room to exploit their bargaining position. 
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5.7 Appendix 
5.7.1 Cooperative Solution Concepts 
This appendix gives an overview of the dominance relations and the coopera-
tive solutions concepts in our bargaining problem. The dominance relations (as 
shown in Table 5.4) depend mainly on the polarization parameter a and to some 
degree on b.  
 
TABLE 5.4 
DOMINANCE RELATIONS (  
 Position  Polarization 
z za;  z za   for ,z z a  \   
z E;  
z  (–1, 1)  
z  (–1, –a + 1) (b – 1, 1) 
z  (–1, –a + 1) 
a + b < 2 
b < 2 
a < 2 
zE ;  
z  (–a + 1, b – 1) 
z  (–a + 1, 1) 
z  [–1, 1] 
z (–∞, –a – 1)  (b + 1, ∞) 
a, b ≤ 2, a + b > 2   
a ≤ 2, b > 2 
a > 2 
all a, b 
Notes: The table summarize dominance relations between alternatives in the coop-
erative game.  
 
For example, the second row states that when two alternatives are real num-
bers, the one closest to the median ideal of 0 dominates the alternative further 
away. The third and fourth rows compare real numbers to the disagreement 
point. For example, row 3 shows for a<2 that any real number between –1 and –
a+1 dominates E  (because it gives players 1 and 2 strictly positive utility). On 
the other hand, if a>2, any real number between –1 and 1 gives both wing 
players negative utility, so they both prefer the disagreement point, which then 
dominates the real number (row 4). 
With these dominance relations, we can analyze the set of cooperative solu-
tion concepts for our bargaining problem. Aside from the core (C(*)) and uncov-
ered set (U(*)), this includes two reﬁnements of the uncovered set, the von 
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Neumann Morgenstern set (L (*))97 and the bargaining set (B(*))98. Both are 
unique.  
All four solutions are ﬁnite sets for all values of a and b. The size of each de-
pends on the polarization parameter a. The four solutions coincide whenever the 
core is non-empty. This is the case in both extremes, i.e., for weakly and for 
strongly polarized preferences. In the remaining case of moderately polarized 
preferences (1 < a < 2), the other three solution sets are non-empty and satisfy 
the following inclusions. 
 
 = C(*)  B(*)  L(*)  U(*) 
 
It turns out that all inclusions are strict. Under the general additional as-
sumption that a < b, the bargaining set B(*) consists of a single point, the von 
Neumann Morgenstern set L(*) consists of two points, and the uncovered set 
U(*) consists of three points. In the special case when 1 < a = b < 2 all three 
sets contain an additional solution point, due to symmetry considerations. The 
solution sets are listed in Table 5.5. 
 
TABLE 5.5 
COOPERATIVE SOLUTIONS (COMPLETE) 
Polarization C(*) B(*) L(*) U(*) 
weak: a ≤ 1 0 0 0 0 
moderate 
1<a<2 
a < b  {–a + 1} {–a + 1, δ} {–a + 1, 0, δ} 
a = b {–a + 1, b– 1} {–a + 1, 0, δ} {–a + 1, 0, b–1,δ} 
strong: b ≥ 2 δ δ δ δ 
Notes: For * = *(N, Z,ui,W), the table gives the elements in the core (C(*)), bargaining 
set B(*), vNM set (L(*)) and uncovered set (U(*)) for the levels of polarization distinguished 
in the ﬁrst column. 
 
                                     
97 Formally, a subset L of Z is a von Neumann Morgenstern set if elements of L do not domi-
nate each other and every element of Z\L is dominated by at least one element of L.  
98 The bargaining set is the set of eﬃcient points z in Z such that for any z’ which dominates 
z and player k  N who prefers z over z’ there exists z’’ which weakly dominates z’ and is for 
player k at least as good as z.  (We use Maschler’s (1992) deﬁnition of the bargaining set.) 
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The results for weak and strong polarization are straightforward. In the for-
mer case, the median ideal (0) dominates all other alternatives and the same 
holds for the disagreement point in the latter case. Here, we brieﬂy explain the 
arguments underlying the results for moderate polarization, speciﬁcally for a 
and b such that 1 < a < 2 < b.99  The results for parameters where equalities 
hold in this relationship are straightforward. 
 
(C) All z  \  unequal 0 are dominated by 0, 0 itself is dominated by δ, 
which in turn is dominated by any z between –1 and (–a +1). Hence, the 
core is empty. 
(B) The proposal –a +1 is dominated by any alternative za  closer to 0 than 
itself. Player 1 who prefers –a +1 above za  has a counter-objection 
z Eaa   which dominates za  and which gives him the same utility of 0 as 
the original proposal z.  For any other proposal z  Z an objection exists 
for which there is no counter-objection justifying the original proposal. 
Hence, (–a+1) is the unique element of the bargaining set B(*). 
(L) Player 1 is indiﬀerent between (–a + 1) and δ while players 2 and 3 have 
opposite preferences for these alternatives, hence, they do not dominate 
each other. Points on \  between (–a + 1) and (b – 1) are dominated by 
δ, those beyond these limits are dominated by (–a + 1) itself. Hence, {–a 
+ 1, δ} is a vNM set L(*). One can easily verify that in * there is no oth-
er vNM set. 
(U) (i) z = –a +1 is only dominated by za   (–a +1, 1– a), which in turn are 
dominated by z Eaa   which does not dominate z, 
(ii) z = 0 is dominated only by za= δ, which in turn is dominated by, for 
example, / 2z aaa    which does not dominate z, 
                                     
99 The properties of the core and the uncovered set known from the literature on cooperative 
games are invariably obtained under the assumption of convexity of the values of all coalitions, 
which does not hold here. The bargaining sets and the von Neumann Morgenstern sets have 
been studied mostly in the context of TU games. Hence, all results in Table 5.5  must be veriﬁed 
case by case. We do not claim validity for any of these relations beyond the scope of bargaining 
problems as described here, with a one-dimensional set of alternatives augmented with a 
disagreement point and single-peaked preferences for the trio of players. 
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(iii) z = δ is dominated by any za (–1, –a +1), all of which are domi-
nated by 0zaa   which does not dominate z, 
(iv) all z with |z| > –a +1 are covered by –a + 1, while all 
( 1,0) (0, 1]z a a      are covered by 0.  
Hence, the uncovered set U(*) consists of the triple {–a + 1, 0, δ}. 
 
5.7.2 Proof of Proposition 5.1 (Formal) 
In this appendix, we provide the proof of Proposition 5.1, which characterizes 
the equilibrium outcome of FT(  (when it converges). Since FT(  is (highly) non-
convex due to the exterior disagreement point, we cannot use standard results 
and techniques to derive equilibria; rather it involves a tour de force in backward 
induction. We also ran simulations, which illustrate (and corroborate) the 
results of the proposition. In particular, they shed some light on what happens if 
the outcome does not converge. At the end, we provide a ﬁgure that illustrates 
the cyclic dependence of the outcome on a and b for 1 < a < 2 and a < b < 3 
(as obtained by simulations).  
  
Proof  
Before we can determine the equilibrium, we need to introduce some nota-
tion. Due to backward induction and players having a unique best response at 
each information set, the equilibrium proposal and voting strategies only depend 
on how many rounds are ahead. Hence, we will count the rounds by the remain-
ing number of rounds 1r T tw   . Hence, the ﬁrst round has r = T and the 
last round r = 1.  Furthermore, this implies that the equilibrium strategy for 
round r is the same for each game FT(  with T ≥ r. Hence, it is meaningful to 
talk in general about the (sub)game Fr( . The equilibrium (behavioral) strategy 
for player i, iT , speciﬁes for each round r ≤ T  (i) for the proposal stage, a 
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probability distribution over possible proposals : [0,1], ( )r r r ri i i iZ p pQ Ql 6 ,100 
and (ii) for the voting stage, an acceptance function : {0,1}, ( )r r r ri iZ p pO Ol 6 . 
The equilibrium outcome of Fr(  can be characterized by the probability distri-
bution of the equilibrium outcomes : [0,1].r ZN l 101 The continuation value 
[ ( )]rri iEU E u zN  
supp
( ) ( )
r
r
iz u z
N
N   is the expected utility of player i of the 
(sub)game .Fr(  We can conveniently express riEU  in terms of ( )r rf N Ew ,
[ | ]rrL E z z RNw   and [ | ]rrD E z z RNw  . (Note that r rD Lp ). Deﬁne the 
indicator function ( )RI x w  [1 if , 0 if ],x R x R   the acceptance probability 
( )ri xY  1 (1 ( ))(1 ( ))r rj kp pO Ow     and the probability of delay [ ]rrP delayN w  
supp
1
1 ( ) ( )
3 r
i
r r
i i
N
x x
N
Q Y   . Then, we get: 
(5.1) 
	 

	 

	 

1 01
3
supp
1 11
3
supp \{ }
1
3
supp \{ }
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ,   0
If 0,  then 0, 0. Otherwise:
1
( ) ( ) [ ]
1
( ) ( ) [ ]
r
i
r
i
r
i
r r r r r
i i R
N
r r r
r r r r r r
i ir
N
r r r r
i ir
N
f x x I x P delay f f
f L D
L x x x P delay f L
f
D x x x P delay f
f
Q
Q E
Q E
Q Y
Q Y
Q Y

 
  w
 w w
 ¬­ ­w  ­ ­ ­ ®
w 
 
 
  1 1r rD  ¬­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ®
 
 
Since rEN [ui(z)] = Pr rN [z = δ] rEN [ui(z)| z = δ] + Pr rN [z ≠ δ] rEN [ui(z)| z ≠ δ] 
and ui(z) are linear in z for [ , ]z a b E   ,  from 	 
 1i iu z z z    we get that 
(for supp [ , ]r a bN E   ): 
 
                                     
100 supp 2riQ b  
101  rN  is a probability mass function and has countable support:
,
supp 3 max supp 6r ri ir T i Nr rN Qb b  . 
CHAPTER 5.  FORMAL VERSUS INFORMAL LEGISLATIVE BARGAINING 
173 
 
(5.2) 
1
2
3
(1 )
(1 )
(1 )
r r r
r r r
r r r
EU f a L
EU f D
EU f b L
  
 
  
 
 
A player i will accept a proposal p in round r + 1 if and only if ( ) ri iu p EUp . 
This allows us to characterize for round r + 1 (i) 
1
1
r
L

, the largest proposal 
player 1 accepts, (ii) 13
rL  , the smallest proposal player 3 accepts,  and (iii)
1
2
r
D

, 
the largest absolute value a proposal can have for player 2 to accept it: 
(5.3) 
	 
	 

	 
	 

	 

1
1
1
3
1
2
1 –  1 –
1 –  1    
1 –   
r r r r
r r r r
r r r r
L f a f L
L f b f L
D f f D



 
  
 
 
Players will only delay if they cannot make a proposal that will be accepted 
and gives them at least their continuation value. Player 1 or 2 will only delay in 
round r + 1 if 
1
1 2
r r
L D
 b , which is equivalent to (1 –  f r) (2 – a) + f r (Lr + 
Dr) < 0. This can only hold if a > 2 and f r <1. Hence, players 1 and 2 will 
never delay if a ≤ 2 and, by the same reasoning, player 3 will never delay if b ≤ 
2.  
Note that if 1 , 2rip R i
  v  is accepted in equilibrium, it must be accepted by 
player 2 in round r + 1 and, hence, 12 2( )
r r
iu p EU
 p . If a < 2, then player 2 will 
propose 1 – a (or a – 1) in round T. This means that 2 0
rEU   for all r and that 
she will never accept nor propose δ. Furthermore, if a < 1, player 1 can always 
propose 0 so that she will never propose δ. Finally, 2 0
rEU   implies Lr <1, and 
hence 3 0
rEU   if b ≥ 2. In the following Lemma, we summarize these facts and 
some conditions that are easily derived. 
 
Lemma 5.1 For a < 2, the equilibrium {σ1, σ2, σ3} is determined by: 
1.  1 ( )
r pO = 1 for [ , ]p a b   iﬀ 1rp Lb  and 1 ( )rO E = 1 iﬀ 11rEU  ≤ 0. 
2.  2 ( )
r pO = 1 for [ , ]p a b   iﬀ 2rp Db  and 2 ( )rO E = 1 iﬀ 2rEU ≤ 0. 
3.  3 ( )
r pO = 1 for [ , ]p a b   iﬀ 3( )rp L Tp  and 3 ( )rO E = 1 iﬀ 13rEU  ≤ 0. 
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4.  1 ( ) 1
rQ E   iﬀ 2 1rD a p   and 13 0rEU  b ; 1 ( ) 1r aQ    iﬀ 2rD a  ; 
21 ( ) 1
rr DQ    iﬀ 2 1ra D a b    or 2rD a p  and 13 0rEU   ; 
5.  2 (0) 1
rQ   iﬀ 1 0rL   or 3 0rL  ; 12( ) 1rr LQ   iﬀ 1 0
r
L b , 3 0rL   and 
1 3| |
r rL L ; 
2 3( ) 1
r rLQ   iﬀ  1 0rL  , 3 0rL p  and 1 3
r rL L  ; 
1
1 32 2 2( ) ( )
r rr rL LQ Q   iﬀ 1 0rL b , 3 0rL p  and 1 3| |
r rL L ; 
6. 3 (delay) 1
rQ   iﬀ 23
rrL D  and  1 0rEU    (only if 1rf   <1); 
3 ( ) 1
rQ E   iﬀ 2 1rD bb   and 11 0rEU  b ; 3 ( ) 1r bQ   iﬀ  2 1rD b  ;  
23( ) 1
rr DQ   iﬀ 21 rb D b  b  or 1 0rEU   and 2rD bb . 
 
Now we are ready to look at whether the equilibrium outcome converges. Let
* lim r
r
x x
ld
w . The probability distribution *N  is the limit of rN  if it holds that 
*lim ( ) ( )r
r
z zN N
ld
  for all z in the support of *N . As deﬁned in section 5.3.1, , we 
say that the equilibrium outcome rN  converges to *N  if * lim r
r
N N
ld
w ; if this 
limit does not exist, we say that rN does not converge.  
The equilibrium outcome converges to 0 if *(0) 1N  , which is equivalent to 
* 1f   and * 1D  . The equilibrium outcome converges to δ if *( ) 1N E  , which 
is equivalent to * 0f   and 
* *
lim sup r
r r r
D
ld b
 \ . Finally, it is straightforward that 
rN  does not converge if (i) *f  does not exist or (ii) * 0f   and *L  or *D  do 
not exist. 
 
Proposition 5.1 
(i) If 0 ≤ a < 1 or a = b = 1, then the equilibrium outcome converges to 0  
(ii) If a ≤ b < 2 and b > 1, the equilibrium outcome does not converge, un-
less 137 2a bb    or 3 5 32 4 2,b a b   or 8 13 5 43 14 7 7,b a bb     or 
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3 7
2 3bb   7 7 8 61 15 10 5 5 5 5,max{ , }b b a b     . In these latter cases the 
outcome may converge, but never to a single outcome in Z. 
(iii) If a ≥ 2, the equilibrium outcome is δ. 
Proof: 
(i.a) We show that if 0 ≤ a < 1, then  * 1f    and * 0D  . 
 
Throughout the proof, we will use the following suﬃcient condition for con-
vergence: For 0 ≤ a < 1, * 1f   and * 0D   if 
 
(SC) 
† ††
1there exists a round  such that 1 and 0
r rr f EU   
 
Let (SC) hold for r†. 
†
1 0
rEU   ( † 1rL a   ) implies that player 1 will not 
accept nor propose δ in round r† + 1. 
†rf = 1 implies that player 3 will not delay 
and that either player 1 or 3 accept 0 in round r† + 1. Consequently,
† 1
2 0
rp   , 
†
† *11
21
rr rp D D
      and 
†
† †11
23
rr rp D D
   . Hence, † 1rf  = 1, † 1rL  = 
† †
1
3 ( 0 )
r rD D   = 0 < 1 - a and † † † †1 1 23 3( 0 )r r r rD D D D     . Thus, (SC) 
holds for r† + 1 and by induction for all r ≥ r†. As a result, * 1f   and *D  
*lim limr m
m m
D 
ld ld
 	 
 *23 0m rD  . A suﬃcient condition for (SC) to hold is that: 
 
(SC’)  ' ' '' ''
2 1 13 33
there is a round '  such that 
( )  and 1  and  ( )  or 3(1 )
r r rr rr
r
i L D a L a ii L L L ab b   p    
 
' ''
2 13  and 1
r rrL D a L ab b    imply that '' 21
rrp D  and '' 23
rrp D . Hence, 
'rf = 1 and ' '1 23 [ ]
r rL E p . If '' '13 3or 3(1 )
rr rL L L ap   , then '2[ ] 3(1 )rE p a   
and ' (1 )rL a  . Hence (SC) holds for r’. In the remainder of the proof we 
divide the (a, b) parameter-set into regions and show that (SC) holds for each 
region.  
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We start by looking at the last four rounds. In the ﬁnal round, 11p  = –a and 
1
2p  = 0. If  b < 2, then 
1
3p = min{b,1},  
1f = 1 and 1 13 (1 )L a  , such that round 
1 satisﬁes (SC). So, let b ≥ 2. Then 13p  = δ and 
1f  = 23 , D
1
  = –L1 = 12 a. Hence, 
2
1
1 3 (1 2 )L a  < 1 – a, 
2
1
2 3 (1 )D a   and 2 13 3 ( 1)L b a   . Since 11 0EU  , 23p  
= delay  iﬀ 
2 2
2 3D L  iﬀ b > 2 (a + 1). Let us ﬁrst consider b ≤ 2 (a + 1) and a 
≤ ½. Then 21p  = a ,  22p  =  0  and 
22
23p D , so that 2f  = 1 and 
2 1
9 (1 2 )L a   < 1 – a. Hence, round 2 meets (SC).  
Let us now consider b ≤ 2 (a + 1) and a > ½. In this case, 
22
23L D ab b , so 
that round 2 satisﬁes (SC’) if 
2 2
1 3L L b  or 23 3(1 )L a  . So let 3(1 – a) 
22
13L Lb  . This means that 10 – 8a ≤ b < 3a and 1011a  . Furthermore,
22
21p D , 22 32p L  and 
22
23p D , so that 2f  = 1, 2 21 23 1L p a    and 2 19D 
(1 + a + b) ≤ a. Hence,
33 2
21p D D  ,  32 0p   and 33p E , so that  3f  = 
2
3 , D
3
 = -L3 = 12 D
2. From this, 
4
1
1 27 (8 10 )L a b   ,  
4
1
2 27 (10 )D a b     and 
4 1
3 27 (8 10 )L b a   ). 2 < b ≤ 2 (a + 1) and a > ½ imply 
4
2D ab  and 
4
1 (1 )L a  . 10 – 8a ≤ b < 3a implies 4 441 23L L D   . Hence, round 4 satisﬁes 
(SC). Thus (SC) holds if 
 
(A) 2( 1)b ab   
 
Let b > 2 (a + 1) from now on. 3 0
rEU   for all r and player 3 can now de-
lay consecutive rounds and alternatingly delay and not delay. This requires a 
careful characterization of the dynamic before we proceed. We will call a set of 
consecutive rounds in which player 3 delays a delaying sequence. We index these 
sequences by s (again backwards), with s = 1 the ﬁnal delaying sequence, s = 2 
the pre-ﬁnal delaying sequence etc. Let R(s) be the set of rounds in the s-th 
delaying sequence and deﬁne ( ) max ( )r s R sw  and ( ) min ( )r s R sw . Finally, let 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1m s r s r s    be the number of delaying rounds in R(s). 
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Let us look at ( )r s -1.  ( )3
r sp delay  implies ( ) 11 0r sEU    and ( ) 1 23r sf   . As 
player 1 accepts δ in ( )r s  - 1, she also accepts 0 and ( ) 12 0
r sp   . Since 
( ) 1 ( ) 1
1 2
r s r sp D   , this means that ( ) 1( ) 1 ( ) 1 1 22
r sr s r sD L D
   . We proceed to 
rounds r   R(s).  Since player 3 delays, ( )( ) 23 r sr sL D  and 
( ) ( )
2 1min{0, } 0
r s r sp L b . As ( ) ( )r s r sD L  and ( ) 1 23r sf   , by (5.1) and Lemma 
5.1 it must be that 1f < 1, 0r rL D   and 1 0rEU   for all ( )r R s . Fur-
thermore: 
(5.4) 
	 
	 

	 

	 

	 
	 

1 11
2 1
1 11
2 1
1 11
2 3
111
23
If ,  then:
1 –  2 –  
1 –  2
 1 –  
1 –  – 2 – 2  
r r
r rr r
r rr r r r
r rr r
rrr r r r
D L
D L f a
D L f a f D
D L f b
L D f b f D
B
B
H
H
 

 

 



 
w  
w   
w  
w  
 
 
In particular, r rD L  holds for r = ( ) 1,.., ( )r s r s . 
Moreover, as player 3 delays in rounds ( )r R s and ( ) 1 23r sf   : 
 
(5.5) 12 13 3 ( )
r rf f r R s     
(5.6) 
2
( )
2
3 1
for 1,0,1,.., ( ) 1
3
m
r s m
mf m m s



    
 
From (5.4) we get ( )r sB = ( ) 11 43 3 r sa D   and it turns out that 
( ) ( )r r s sB B B   w  for ( ) ( ) 1r s r r sb b  . For s = 1 it is simple. Suppose rB= a 
and Dr = -Lr = 12 a . Then immediately
1rB  = a. Furthermore, due to the sym-
metry Dr+1 = -Lr+1 = 12 a . Since 
(1) 1rD   D1 = –L1 = 12 a  and (1) 1 1r aB B   , 
by induction it follows that r aB   for (1) (1) 1r r rb b  .  For s > 1, we need 
to assume that 
( )
1
r s
L ≤ 0 and 
( )
2
r s
D ab  and justify it later. Suppose 1rL  ≤ 0, 2rD  
≤ a and 3 .
rp delay  Hence, 1 2r r rp p B    and, using (5.1), we get Dr = 
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1 12 1 1
1 23 2 3( )
r r r r
r
p p f D
f
 ¸     = 
1 1 1(1 ) 3
3
r r r
r
f a f D
f
    . Substituting this term and 
using (5.5), we get that 1r rB B    = a ( rf  – 1rf  ) + 2 1rf  Dr-1 – 2 rf Dr  = 0. 
Hence, 1 .r rB B  Furthermore, using the same substitutions, we get 
1 11
2 2 3 (2 )(1 )
r r rD D a f
      < 0 and 12 2 .r rD D a  b  Finally, 
11 1
21
rr rL D B    
1
2 2 1 0.
r r rr rD D LB B      b Hence, as 3rp delay  for all 
( ),r R s  ( )r r sB B   for ( ) ( ) 1r s r r sb b  .  
Using (5.4) and (5.6), we get the following results for m = 0, 1, ..., m(s): 
 
(5.7) 
1( ) ( ) ( ) 21 1
1 2 21
1( ) ( ) ( ) 21 1
2 2 21
1( )( ) ( ) 2 1
23 21
( )( ) ( )
2 1
1
( ) ( )
3
1
( ) ( )
3
1
( )
3
2
2 ( )
3
r s m r s m r s m
m
r s m r s m r s m
m
r s mr s m r s m
m
r s mr s m r s m
m
a
L s
a
D s
a b
L D s
a b
D s
B B B
B B B
H B
H H B
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
  
   
   
    
    
 
 
Since player 3 only delays in round r iﬀ 11 0
rEU    and rH> 0, from (5.7) we 
get that m(s) = ( )min{ : 0}r s mm R H  b  = ceiling ln( 2) ln(3 ( ))ln(3)
a b sB  ¯  ¡ °¡ °¢ ±
. 
Equivalently, since ( ) ( ) 1 0r s m sH     and ( ) ( ) 0r s m sH  b , we get: 
 
(5.8) ( ) ( ) 12 3 ( ) 2 3 ( )m s m sa s b a s sB B    b     
 
In round ( ) 1 ( ) ( )r s r s m s    player 3 will not delay. Since ( )1 0r sEU   and 
(1) 1( ) 1
23
rr sL D
 b  ( )2r sD a b , 
 
(5.9) 	 
 ( ) 13( ) 1 satisfies SC’  if 3(1 )r sr s L a    
 
(1) 1 (1) 1(1) 1 1
2 23 9 (1 4 )
r rrL D D a
  b b   . Hence, by (5.9) (1)r + 1 satisﬁes (SC’) if 
CHAPTER 5.  FORMAL VERSUS INFORMAL LEGISLATIVE BARGAINING 
179 
 
 
(B) 2631a   
 
Let 2631a  .It turns out that if ( ) 1r s   does not satisfy (SC), then 
( ) 3 ( 1)r s r s   . Let ( )r s  + 1 not satisfy (SC). In this case ( ) 11 0r sEU  b  and 
( ) 1 ( ) 1
2 3
r s r sp L  . Consequently, ( ) 22 0r sp   , ( ) 23r sp E   and ( ) 21r sp    
( ) 2 ( ) 1
2
r s r sD D
      ( ) 1 ( ) 11 2 33 (2 )
r s r sD L
    ( ) 11 2 2 ( )6 3m s
a b
sB
 ¬  ­   ­ ­ ®  (using 
(5.7). Thus, ( ) 2 23
r sf   , ( ) 21 0r sEU    and ( ) 2 ( ) 2 ( ) 21 12r s r s r sD L p      . Using 
(5.4) , we get ( ) 3r sH    ( ) 1
1 2 2
3 6 ( )
9 3m s
a b
b sB 
 ¬  ­    ­ ­ ® . Furthermore, since 
( ) 1 ( ) 11 1
12 2
r s r sD p a   b , ( )sB  = ( ) 11 43 3 r sa D   ab  and, by (5.8), 
( ) 1
( )1
3 2m s
s
a b
B
 b   . Hence, 
( ) 3r sH  p  
1 2 2
3 6 1
9 2
a b
b a
a b
 ¬ ¬  ­ ­   ­­  ­­ ­ ®  ®. Since b > 2 
(a + 1) and 2631a p , ( ) 3r sH   	 
2 2 19 a  > 0. Thus, 
( ) 3
3
r sp delay   and 
( ) 3 ( 1).r s r s    As a consequence,  ( 1)sB   = ( 1) 11 43 3 r sa D    = 
( ) 21 4
3 3
r sa D  : 
 
(5.10) ( ) 3
1 1 2 2
( 1) ( )
3 9 3m s
a b
s a sB B  
      
 
We conclude our characterization of the delaying sequences by showing we 
can indeed assume 
( )
1
r s
L ≤ 0 and
( )
2
r s
D ab  for s > 1. Since ( )s aB b  and  
26
31a p ,  
( )
1 1 1
2 3 2 2(1 ) ( )
r s
D a s aB    . Showing ( )1r sL ≤ 0 requires some work.  
Let 
( )
1
r s
L ≤ 0 or s = 1. Using (5.3), 
( 1) ( ) 3
1 1
r s r s
L L
    
( ) 1
1 2 2
( ) 6( 1)
18 3m s
a b
s aB
 ¬  ­    ­ ­ ® . Since ( ) 1r s   does not satisfy (SC’),  
( ) 1
3
r sL   
≥ 3(1 – a) and, using (5.7), this implies ( ) 1
6 6 ( )1
3 2 2m s
a s
a b
B

 p    . Furthermore, 
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(5.10) implies that 13( )s aB p  for s > 1.  Hence,
( 1)
1
r s
L
 b  
22(18 9 ( 27))
27(2 2)
a a b
b a
     < 0 (as b > 2(a + 1)). Since in particular
(2)
1 0
r
L b , by 
induction it follows that 
( )
1 0
r s
L b  for all s > 1. 
We proceed by dividing the parameter-plane not covered by (A) and (B) ac-
cording to m(1) ≥ 1, the number of rounds player 3 delays in the ﬁrst delaying 
cycle, and proof that (SC) holds for some ( ) 1r s  . By (1)B  = a and (5.8)  
 
(5.11) (1) (1) 12 3 2 3m ma a b a a   b    
 
By (5.9), (1) 1r  satisﬁes (SC’) if 1(1) 1 2 13 2(1) 1 13
r
m
a b
L a 
    < 3 (1 - a) if  
 
(C) (1) 2 (1) 1121 3 (1 5 3 )
m mb a     ¸  
 
Now, let (1) 1r   not satisfy (SC) and (A) - (C) not hold. Using (1)B  = a 
and (5.10), we get (2)B  = 49(1) 32 23m
a b
a
   . Hence, by (5.7), (2) (1)r mH  
4
9(1) 3
10 7 20
3m
a b
a
   . This is positive iﬀ: 
 
(D) (1) 127 (10 5 2 3 )
mb a a   ¸  
 
This means that if (D) holds m(2) > m(1) and (2) 1 (2) (1) 13 3
r r mL L  b . Using 
(5.7) and the upper bound for b in (5.11), we get (2) (1) 13
r mL     29 (1) 1
2
3m
a b
a
 ¬  ­  ­ ­ ®  
0 3(1 )ab   . Hence, if (D) is met (2) 1r   satisﬁes (SC’). 
Finally, let (2) 1r   not satisfy (SC) and (A) - (D) not hold. As long as m(s) = 
m(1), from (5.10) we get  
 
(5.12) (1) 3
1 1 2 2
( 1) ( )
3 9 3m
a b
s a sB B  
 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The unique steady state of this diﬀerence equation is 
(1) 1
1 2 2
3
8 3m
a b
aB 
 ¬  ­  ­ ­ ® , which is a global attractor with a monotonic dynamic 
since 
( 1)
0 1
( )
d s
d s
B
B


  . Using the upper bound for b in (5.11), m(1) ≥ 1 and 
26
31 ,a p  we get that 112 (1 7 )aB b   (0).a Bb   Hence, ( )sB  decreases mono-
tonically to B . Suppose m(s) = m(1) for all delaying sequences. Using the 
right-hand side of (C) as lower bound for b and 0 ≤ a < 1, we get  
(1) 13m
b B  p  (1) 1
1 2
9(1 ) 0
4 3m
a
a 
 ¬ ­   ­ ­ ® . Hence, if m(s) = m(1) for all s, there 
exists an sˆ  such that 
ˆ( ) 1ˆ( ) 1
13
r sr sL L
    (1) 1 ˆ( ) 03m
b
sB     and sˆ  meets (SC’). 
m(s) is increasing in s, because ( )sB  is decreasing in s and, by (5.8), m(s) is 
decreasing in ( )sB . This means that if m(s) is not equal to m(1) for all s, there 
exists an s’ such that m(s’) > m(s’–1) = m(1). Furthermore, 
1
3 (1) 3
2 2
( )
3m
a b
s aB 
    (for s > 1). Using (5.7), this implies that 
( ') 1
3 (1) 3
2( ) 4 1
3 6
r s
m
a b
L a 
 ¬  ­b  ­ ­ ® . As a consequence, 
( ') 1
3 0
r sL  b   and ( ') 1r s   
satisﬁes (SC) if 
 
(E) (1) 2
1
(8 4 3 )
4
mb a ab    
 
Hence, if (E) holds, either m(s) = m(1) for all s or not, both of which imply 
that (SC) holds for some ( ) 1r s  . Furthermore, the right-hand side of (E) 
minus the right-hand side of (D) is 	 
	 
1328 4 5 3 8m a ¸   and this is positive if 
26
31a p  and m(1) ≥ 1. Hence, since (A) – (D) do not hold, (E) must hold.  
In conclusion, for each ( , ) [0,1) [ , )a b a q d  there exists some round r  `  
that satisﬁes (SC) and, hence, the outcome converges to 0 as r increases.  
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(i.b) We show that if a = b = 1, then  lim 1r
r
f
ld
  and lim 0r
r
D
ld
 . 
In round 1, 11 1p   ,  12 0p   and 13 1p  . In round r > 1, 21
rrp D , 2 0rp   
and 23
rrp D , with 1rf   and 12 223 3 .
rr rD D D    Consequently, lim 1r
r
f
ld
  
and lim 0r
r
D
ld
 . 
 
(ii) We show that if 1 ≤ a < 2 and b > 1, then * 0f v  and *f , *L  or *D  does 
not exist, except if 137 2a bb    or 3 5 32 4 2,b a b   or 8 13 5 43 14 7 7,b a bb      
or 3 72 3bb   7 7 8 61 15 10 8 5 5 5,max{ , }b b a b     . In these latter case, the out-
come may converge but never to a single outcome in Z. 
  
Let 1 ≤  a  <  2 and b > 1. First, we show that if the outcome converges 
there exists an r† such that 3
rp delayv  for all r > r†. Since 2 0rEU  and 
1 2
r r
L D  , 1 1rL   and 2rp  \  for all r ≥ r†.  Suppose there exists an r’ such 
that 3
rp delay  for all r ≥ r’.  This implies that 1 0rEU  , 12 0
rrp L   and 
21
rrp D a   for all r ≥ r’ and hence by (5.1) that *f  = 1. Furthermore, 
using (5.3), (5.4), and the logic behind (5.7), we get that ' 0r rB B    and, 
hence,  Dr = 12 1 11 23 2 3( )
r r rp p D     '1 11 23 3( )r r rp p Bp      for all r ≥ r’. Now, 
3
rp delay only if 2 3
r rD L , which implies by (5.4) that (1 – rf )(b – 2) – 2 rf
Dr > 0 for all r ≥ r’. However, this is not possible, since *f = 1 and 
'1
3 0 '
r rD r rBp   p . Hence, there does not exist an r’ such that 3rp delay  
for all r ≥ r’. Convergence (of 23
rrL D ) implies the opposite holds: 
 
(5.13) † †3there exists an  such that  for all 
rr p delay r rv p  
 
Second, there can be no convergence to δ as 2
rp  \  for all r.  
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Third, there can be no convergence to 0. lim 1r
r
f
ld
  and (5.13) would imply 
that there exists an r’ such that 1rf   for r  ≥  r’. This means that 
21
rrp D , 2 0rp   and 23
rrp D  for all r ≥ r’ + 1. Consequently, Lr = 0 and, 
hence, 1 0
rEU b  and 3rEU  < 0 for r ≥ r’ + 1. However, if this is the case
1
3
rp E  , contradicting 1rf   for r ≥ r’ + 1. 
Finally, we show there can be no convergence to anything else then 0 or δ, 
save for four exceptions. Suppose that *f , *L  and *D  exist, but *0 1f b  and 
* 0D  . Now,  *f = 1 23 3,   or 1. We have seen above that *f  = 1 is not possible. 
Let *f = 13 . This means that there exists a round r’ such that 
rf = 13 , 2
r
D  ≤ a – 
1 and, thus, Dr ≤ 3a – 5 for r ≥ r’. Suppose 12 min{0, }
rrp L  for r ≥ r’.  This 
implies that Lr-1 = –Dr-1 and Lr–1 <0, such that 1 0
r
L  . Furthermore, 
12 1
1 3 3( 1)
rr rD L a D     . Convergence implies that 1lim 0r r
r
D D 
ld
   and 
solving for 1r rD D    yields *D  = – *L  = a – 1. However, since a < 2,  *D  = a 
– 1 > 3a – 5 and Dr ≤ 3a – 5 cannot hold for all r ≥ r’ . Hence, 
12 min{ ,0}
rrp Lv  and a similar reasoning (with a – 1 ≤ b – 1 < 3a – 5) shows 
that 32 max{0, }
rrp Lv . Thus, let 132 1 2 2( ) ( )rr r rL LQ Q   for r ≥ r’. This means that 
Lr = 0, 1 3
r rL L   and, hence, a = b for r ≥ r’. Furthermore, 1 132 ( )
rrrD L L   
	 
23 1a  . Hence, *L  = 0 and *L  	 
23 1a  .  Dr ≤ 3a – 5 requires 
13
7 2a bb   .   
Let, ultimately, *f = 23 . This means that there exists a round r’ such that 
rf
= 23 , 1 - a ≤ 1
r
L ,  a – 1 < 2
r
D ≤ b – 1, 21
rrp D , and 3rp E  for r ≥ r’. In 
particular, this implies 
 
(5.14) 3 32 2   1 –   and 2 2   ’
r rL a a D b r rp   b   p  
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To begin, suppose 2 0
rp  . Now,  Lr = –Dr and Dr = 11 1 122 6 3
r rD D    for 
r > r’. Solving for 1r rD D    yields *D  = – *L  = 14 . As * 14L  , *1 0rL   and 
2 0
rp   requires *3 0rL b . Together with (5.14), this implies that 32b   and 
5 3
4 2ab  . Suppose now that 12 0
rrp L   for r ≥ r’. Hence, Lr = –Dr and Dr 
= 1 2 12 ( )
r r
D L  11 26 3 ra D   . Solving for 1r rD D    gives *D  = 12 a = – *L . 
However, this is not possible due to (5.14), since Lr ≥ 1 – a > 12 a . To contin-
ue, suppose 11 32 2 2( ) ( )
r rr rL LQ Q   for r ≥ r’. 11 13 rrL L    = 13 (4 ) 0rL b a    
implies 14 ( )
rL a b   for r≥r’. Furthermore, Dr 
	 
11 1 1 12 132 4 4 12 4r rr rD L L a b D        and Lr 1 1 12 132 4 4r rrD L L    
	 
1 1112 2 4 4r rb a D L      . Solving for Lr = Lr-1 and Dr = Dr-1 and using 
1
4 ( )
rL a b  , we get that  *L  = 14 ( )a b  and *D  = 18 ( )a b . (5.14) implies 
that 8 133 14bb   and 5 47 7a b  . 
The last possibility is 32 0
rrp L  . Thus, 13 rrL L  < 0 and 14 ( )rL a b  for r 
≥ r’. Furthermore, Dr = 	 
1 232 rrL D  	 
	 
1 116 2 r rb D L    , Lr = 	 
1 232 rrL D  
	 
	 
1 116 2 1r rb L D     . Solving for Lr = Lr-1 and Dr = Dr-1, we get *L  = 
1 2
10 5b  and *D  = 3 110 5b . (5.14) and 14 ( )rL a b   imply that 3 72 3bb   and 
7 7 8 61 1
5 10 5 5 5 5max{ , }b b a b     . 
In conclusion, if 1 ≤ a < 2 and b > 1, then a necessary condition for conver-
gence is that either of the following holds: 
  
* * *13 1 2
7 3 3
* * *3 5 3 2 1
2 4 2 3 4
* * *8 13 5 4 2 1 1
3 14 7 7 3 4 8
3 7 7 7 8 61 1
2 3 5 10 5 5 5 5
* *2 1
3 10
( ) 2 with , 0, ( 1)
( ) ,  with ,
( ) ,  with , ( ), ( );
( ) ,max{ , }  
     with  ,
i a b f L D a
ii b a f D L
iii b a b f L a b D a b
iv b b b a b
f L b
b      
 b    
b        
b      
   * 32 15 10 5, .D b 
 
(Note that these four regions covers a very small part of the parameter 
plane.)  
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(iii) If a ≥ 2, then * 0f   and 
* *
lim sup r
r r r
D
ld b
 \  
It is immediate that rip E  for all r and i. Hence, rf = 0 and Dr = 0 for all 
r.  
Q.E.D. 
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Cycles 
To illustrate the cyclic dependence of the equilibrium outcome on T when the 
core is empty, we provide below the simulation results for 1 < a < 2 and a < b 
< 3. The color of the area indicates the period of the cycle. White regions 
indicate that there is a steady state. The darker the color of the area, the higher 
the period of the cycle. The darkest color indicates the period is equal or higher 
than 10. 
 
Figure 5.10 
  Cycles 
 
 
 
1 1.5 2
1
1.5 
2
2.5 
3
b
a
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5.7.3 Proofs of Proposition 5.2 and Proposition 5.3 (Informal) 
Proof of Proposition 5.2 
To prove that IT(  is well-deﬁned, we need to show how the game proceeds 
given some proﬁle T  4  and some history hτ. We ﬁrst deﬁne the ﬁrst moment 
of movement: 
 
Deﬁnition 5.5 Given T  4  and h HU   and let ( | )i iR hUT { {τ ≤ t ≤ T: 
( ( )) ( ( ))i t i th h h hU UT T v }. (i) ( | )i ir hUT  is the ﬁrst moment of movement of player 
i. If ( | ) ,i iR hUT   then ( | )i ir h TUT Sw   and player i would not move at any 
( ) ( ).t Th h h hU U  If ( | ) ,i iR hUT v  then ( | ) min ( | ).i i i ir h R hU UT T  (ii) We deﬁne 
the ﬁrst moment of movement ( | ) min { ( | )}.i N i ir h r hU UT Tw  
 
If ,iR v  min iR  must exist, because otherwise (S2) would not hold for 
inf ( ).iRh hU   
Now we can deﬁne a function γ that returns a history ha  as a function of any 
unresolved history hs. The function determines whether the (absence of a) ﬁrst 
moment of action directly leads to a resolved history. If this is not the case, it 
returns another unresolved history with ( ) ( ) .h hU U Sa p   
 
Deﬁnition 5.6 Deﬁne : H H HH q4l  ,( , )h hU T al , as follows: 
- ( ) 'rh h hU  , with ( | )r r hUT .  
- If r T , then ( )Th h h HS Ua   . 
- If r Tb ,  then ( ) ( ( ))ti i rp h h hUTa  
,  , ( )i j t r hU  a   ¢  
- 'h H  if T r TS  b  or ( )i jh aUT   for some i,j 
- 'h H and ( ')h rU S   if r T Sb   and ( ) ,i jh a i jUT v    
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Now, it is straightforward to show that that IT(  is well-deﬁned. 
 
Proposition 5.2 The game IT(  is a well-deﬁned mapping 
	 
 : ,( , )LT TG H H h hS U T( q4 l l   
Proof: Consider T  4  and h HU  . IT(  applies γ iteratively. It starts with 
0( )h hU UH  . If ( )k h HUH  , then 1( ) ( ( ))k kh hU UH H H  . If ( )k h HUH  , then the 
procedure stops and ( )kh hUH . Because  ( ( )) ( )h hU UU H U Sp   and /T S  is 
ﬁnite, this procedure will always return a resolved history. Q.E.D.  
Proof of Proposition 5.3 
By p we denote the vector 1 2 3( , , )p p p and by p-i we denote the vector ( , )j kp p .  
For convenience, we set ( )iu 7 wd . 
 
Deﬁnition 5.7 By ˆ ˆ/p z  we denote the strategy proﬁle such that the following 
1-3 hold. 
1. For each active history Th HU    with τ > T –  ρ  
(i) ( )i jh aUT   iﬀ (a) ( ( )) ( )i j iu p h uU U E p  and ( ( )) ( ( ))i j i ku p h u p hU UU U  
or  (b) ˆ( )jp h z
U
U
  , ˆ( ) ( )i iu z u Ep  and ˆ( ( )) ( )i k iu p h u zU U b , or (c) 
ˆ( )jp h z
U
U
 v  and ( ( )) ( ( )) ( )i j i k iu p h u p h uU UU U E  p   and either 
( ) ( )j kp h p h
U U
U U
    or ( )jp hU U E  .  
(ii) ( )i hUT E  iﬀ \ ^1 2 3( ) , ,i h a a aUT   
2. For each active history Th HU    with T – ρ < τ ≤ T – ρ 
(i) ( )i jh aUT   iﬀ (a) ˆ( ( )) ( )i j iu p h u zU U p  and ( ( )) ( ( ))i j i ku p h u p hU UU U    
or (b) ˆ( )jp h z
U
U
   and ˆ( ( )) ( )i k iu p h u zU U b  or (c) ˆ( )jp h zU U v  and 
ˆ( ( )) ( ( )) ( )i j i k iu p h u p h u z
U U
U U
  p   and either ( ) ( )j kp h p hU UU U    or 
( )jp h
U
U E  .  
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(iii) ˆ( )i ih pUT   iﬀ \ ^1 2 3( ) , ,i h a a aUT   
3. 	 
	 
ˆ ˆ ˆ/Ihz p z zU(   if ˆ( )p h pU U   and τ ≤ T – ρ.  
 
Such proﬁles have a special property: 
 
Lemma 5.2 If ˆ ˆ/p zT   is a SPE of some subgame *\IT h(  with * ,Th H S   
then it is a SPE for any subgame ˆ\ .
I
T h
(   
Proof: Let ˆ ˆ/p zT   be a SPE of *\IT h(  and let ˆ\IT hU( be a subgame of IT( . 
For all hˆ with ˆ( )hU  > T – ρ, it is immediate from the deﬁnition of ˆ ˆ/p z  that T  
is a SPE of ˆ\ .
L
T h
(   
Hence, consider some hˆ  with ˆ( )hU ≤ T – ρ and let us look at whether there 
exists some iT  such that ˆ( ; | )i i iU hT T  ˆ( ; | )i i iU hT T . If players j and k adhere 
to iT , then ' ˆ( )i ip h pU    for all ˆh hU . At hˆU  each player i accepts according 
to T  any proposal yielding a higher payoﬀ than ˆ( )iu z . Hence, a necessary 
condition for a proﬁtable deviation is that one of the following holds: 
(i)  a subhistory ˆh hUa   exists such that player i does not accept un-
der iT  the most attractive proposal yielding her a higher payoﬀ 
than ˆ( )iu z  (i.e. :j k v ( ) ,i jh aUT a v ( ) ,ip hU U 7 a   ˆ( ( )) ( )i j iu p h u zU U a   
and ( ( )) ( ( ))i j i ku p h u p h
U U
U U
 a ap .) 
(ii) a subhistory ˆh hUa   exists where she can make a deviating pro-
posal with a higher payoﬀ than zˆ  that will be accepted in the next 
active history h hU S U a . (i.e. for some active history hUa , :z
( )i h zUT a v , ˆ( ) ( )i iu z u z  and for some j, ( )j ih aU ST     for 
h hU S U a ,  ( )ip h zU S U S  a  and ˆ( )i ip h pU S U S   a  .) 
(iii) ˆ( ) ( )i iu u zE   and a subhistory ˆh hUa   exists where she can deviate 
by moving to be silent such that at the next active history no pro-
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posal is accepted. (i.e. 1 2 3( ), ( ) ( , , )j kh h a a aU S U ST T    for h hU S U a  
with ( )ip h q
U S
U S
 
a  and ˆ( )i ip h pU S U S   a  .) 
From the deﬁnition of ˆ ˆ/p z  it follows that *( )  iff ( )  i j i T jh a h aUT T    
* * *for  with ( ) ( )TT Th h p h p h
U
U
     . Hence, if either of aforementioned (i)-(iii) 
would hold, then player i could also proﬁtably deviate at either *Th  or *h  and T  
would not be a SPE of *\
I
T h
( .  
Hence, no player i can proﬁtably deviate from ,iT  and T  is a SPE of ˆ\IT h( . 
Q.E.D. 
 
We are now ready to characterize the equilibrium outcomes of .IT(   
 
Proposition 5.3 The set of SPE outcomes is equal to [ , ]c b E for any IT(  
with T ≥ ρ, where min{ ,max{ , 1}}c a b b    . 
Proof: We ﬁrst show by construction that [ , ]c b E  are SPE outcomes of IT(  
if T ≥ ρ. For 0z  , we simply need to observe that (0, ,0)/ 07  is an SPE of any 
\ T
I
T h S
(   and hence IT( . For [ ,0)z a   consider the following proﬁle: σ is equal to 
ˆ ˆ/ (0, ,0)/ 0p z 7 , except that 0( ) ( , , )h z zT 7  and ( ) ( )h hS ST Ta aa   ( , , )a a7    
with  ( ) ( , , )p h zS S 7 E a   and ( ) ( , , )p h zS S 7 E aa  . Now, (0, ,0)/ 07  is an SPE of any 
subgame and 0h  is the only active subhistory of and h hS Sa aa . Hence, it only 
remains to be shown that no player can proﬁtably change strategies at 
0,  and h h hS Sa aa  . At hSa , player 1 will obtain her maximal payoﬀ. Furthermore, at 
 hSa  player 2 nor 3 can proﬁtably deviate: neither of them can accept the other’s 
proposal and, whatever they propose at hSa , player 1 will accept –a at 2 ( ) h hS Sa  
given that the other proposes –a. By the same reasoning, at hSaa  no player can 
proﬁtably deviate. Finally, no player can proﬁtably deviate at 0h . If player 1 
moves away from 7 , the outcome will be 0, which is worse for her than z. 
Players 2 and 3 cannot do better by proposing anything else; in particular, even 
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if 1 - a < z < 1 proposing δ at t=0 is not attractive for them, because that will 
trigger the subgame in which –a is the outcome (rather than player 1 accepting 
δ). Hence, ˆ ˆ/p z  is an SPE  of IT( .  
In a similar way, SPE of IT(  can be constructed that support z(0, b] as an 
outcome. An SPE of IT(  that supports δ is ˆ ˆ/ ( , , ) /p z E E E E , which is obviously 
an SPE of any 
\
.
T
I
T h S
(   Finally, an SPE that supports [max{ , 1}, )z b b a     (if 
–b < b – 1 < -a) is the following proﬁle: σ is equal to ˆ ˆ/ ( , , ) /p z E E E E , except 
that 0( ) ( , , )h z zT 7  and ( )hST a  ( , , )b b 7  for all hSa  with 1 ( )p h zS S a v  or 
2 ( )p h z
S
S
 a v . It is easily veriﬁed that no player can proﬁtably deviate from σ at 
any hSa  or 0h . 
Second, we show that all points in \  outside of [ , ]c b  cannot be equilibrium 
outcomes. Suppose Ta  is an SPE with outcome ˆ \ [ , ]z c b\ . In this case, player 
2 can in equilibrium never accept x ≠ 0 at a history hU , because then either 
player 1 or 3 could proﬁtably deviate by proposing 0 at ( )t hU . If 0 is proposed, 
namely, then in equilibrium either player 2 will accept this, or it will trigger a 
subgame in which 0 is the outcome under Ta . 
Player 1 will in equilibrium never accept x with |x| > a, because then player 2 
could proﬁtably deviate by proposing –a at ( )t t hU   by the same reasoning. 
Similarly, player 3 will never accept an x with |x| > b in equilibrium. This 
immediately rules out the possibility that ( , ) ( , )z b b d  d . If zˆ  [–b, min{–
a, max{–b, b–1}), then it must be accepted by player 3. However, player 3 could 
then proﬁtably deviate by at no history accepting zˆ . Since players 1 and 2 will 
never accept a proposal outside [-a, a] in equilibrium, the outcome would always 
be better than zˆ for player 3. Q.E.D. 
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5.7.4 Experimental Instructions 
We present the English translation of the original instructions in Dutch for 
both treatments. 
Instructions Informal Treatment 
INSTRUCTIONS
You will initially have fifteen minutes to go through these instructions. When time is up, 
we will ask whether there is anyone who would like some more time. In case you need 
more time, please raise your hand and we will simply give you the extra time you need.  
Introduction
In a moment you will participate in a decision making experiment. The instructions are 
simple. If you follow them carefully, you can earn a considerable amount of money. 
Your earnings will be paid to you individually at the end of the session and separately 
from the other participants. 
You have already received five euros for showing up. In addition, you can earn more 
money during the experiment. In the experiment the currency is  ‘francs.’ At the end of 
the session, francs will be changed into euros. The exchange rate is 1 euro for each 
10 francs.
In this experiment you can also lose money. To prevent that your earnings become 
negative, you will receive at the beginning of the experiment 75 francs extra. In the 
unlikely situation that your final earnings will be negative, your earnings will be zero  
(but you keep the five euros for showing up.) 
Your decisions will remain anonymous. They will not be linked in any way to your 
name. Other participants cannot possibly figure out which decisions you have made.  
You are not allowed to talk to other participants or communicate with them in any other 
way. If you have a question, please raise your hand. 
Periods and Groups 
The experiment consists of 24 periods, each of which will be carried out in groups of 
three players.
At the beginning of each period, participants will again be randomly divided into 
groups of three. The chances that you will be with any other participant in the same 
group for two consecutive periods are therefore very small. 
CHAPTER 5.  FORMAL VERSUS INFORMAL LEGISLATIVE BARGAINING 
193 
 
Choices and Earnings 
In each period, your group of three participants negotiates about choosing a number.
The chosen number determines the earnings of each of the three participants for that 
period. The group can choose any integer between 0 and 100. The group can also 
choose not to determine any number (the “no number” option).   
Hence, the number chosen by the group determines the earnings for each member of 
the group. These earnings are different per member nevertheless. How much a player 
earns depends, in addition of the chosen number, also on her ‘ideal value.’ Each 
player in a group receives an ideal and unique value between 0 and 100. The earnings 
for a player increase as the outcome lies closer to this ideal value. 
If the outcome is exactly equal to the ideal value of a player, then this player receives 
the maximum earnings of 20 francs. The difference between the ideal value and 
outcome (if any) decreases the earnings by the same amount in francs. For instance, 
suppose your ideal value in a certain round is 54. Then you receive 20 francs if the 
outcome of the period is 54, 19 if the outcome is 53 or 55, 18 if the outcome is 52 or 56 
etc. Your earnings may also be negative. If the group, for instance, chooses the num-
ber 20, then with an ideal value of 54, your earnings will be equal to -14. 
The outcome of a period can also be that the group reaches no agreement. Hence, 
one chooses “no number.” In this case each member of the group receives 0 francs.
During a round, players are identified by a letter: A, B and C. These are based on 
their ideal value: the player with the lowest ideal value is A and the player with the 
highest ideal value is C. For instance, suppose the ideal values of the three players are 
16, 54 and 86. Then the player with ideal value 16 is player A, the player with ideal 
value 54 is player B and, finally, the player with ideal value 56 is player C. 
The negotiations 
The group negotiations on how to choose a number consist of several steps.  First, we 
give an overview. Afterwards, we discuss the separate steps one at a time.  
1. Before the negotiations start, each player can send a private message to 
each other member of the group. A message is a suggestion for the number to 
choose. Each message from one player to another remains secret for the third 
player.
2. Then, there will be 2.5 minutes during which participants can make and accept 
proposals. A proposal is a number between 0 and 100 or a proposal to end 
the negotiations.
3. As soon as a proposal is accepted by a player other than the proposer, the
negotiations end. The accepted proposal is the group’s choice for that peri-
od.
4. The period also ends if after two and half minutes no proposal has been 
accepted. The outcome is then “no number” and all players earn 0 francs. 
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Information screen 
The first screen that you will see in a period, will show which player you are (A, B or C) 
and the ideal values of you 
and your group members. 
Your own letter is marked 
in red. 
If you are ready to proceed, 
before the time has 
elapsed, you can press the 
OK-button.
Sending and receiving 
messages
Subsequently, you will be 
able to send a message to each of your two group members and they will be able to 
send a message to you. 
A message is either an 
integer between 0 and 100 
or the word “end.” A num-
ber is a suggestion for the 
group choice. With “end” 
you tell the two players that 
you do not want to negoti-
ate (and therefore have 
earnings 0). You can also 
choose to send no mes-
sage by not filling out 
anything or typing the 
space bar. To send a message, you fill out a number or “end” in one or both cells and 
you press OK.
Attention: suggestions you send as a message are not put to a vote and will only be 
seen by the player who receives the message. 
You receive 30 seconds to send messages. If you do not fill out anything and press
OK within this time, then no message will be sent. The other players will only see a 
space at their cell in this case. 
After the 30 seconds have elapsed, you will see the messages that the other players 
sent to you. You will NOT see what the other players sent to each other.
Making and accepting proposals 
You are then ready to make and accept proposals. In this phase you will see in the top-
left corner of your screen all the necessary information (your identity, the messages, 
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the ideal values). At the end of these instructions, we will show you the entire screen 
lay out. 
As a group you will 
have two and a half 
minutes (150 
seconds) to accept a 
proposal (or not 
accept one). A 
proposal can once 
again be any 
integer between 0 
and 100 or the 
word “end.”
During this phase, 
you can do three 
things: make your 
own proposal, revise 
your own proposal or 
accept a proposal by 
another player. 
To make a pro-
posal, you fill out the 
number or word you 
want to propose and 
press on the “OK” 
button. This proposal 
will become immedi-
ately visible to the 
other players in the list “outstanding proposals.” Each of the other two players can 
accept a proposal you make.
To revise your proposal, you simply make another proposal. This must be different 
from the previous proposal. The old proposal disappears from the list “Outstanding 
Proposals” (but, as we shall see later, it will remain in the list “Made proposals” on the 
left of your screen). The new proposal replaces the old one in the list “Outstanding 
Proposals” 
If one of the other layers has made a proposal, then you can accept a proposal. You 
do this by clicking on the proposal you want to accept in the list “Open Proposals” and 
press the button “Accept this Proposal.”  
As soon as a proposal has been accepted by a player, the period ends. The choice 
of the group for this period is then the accepted proposal. If no proposal is accepted 
within the two and a half minutes, then the group chooses “no number” and all players 
receive 0 points. 
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Results
At the end of each period, you will get to see the outcome and the corresponding 
earnings. 
Screens
There is a lot of information you can use while you are making your choices. You can 
find:  
- the player you are 
- the ideal values of each player 
- the messages you sent and received 
- the proposals that have been rejected 
- the outcomes of previous periods 
At “Previous Periods,” you can 
find the outcomes of previous 
periods, together with the ideal 
values of the player and, be-
tween brackets their earnings. 
The word “You” before the value 
and payment indicates which 
player you were. 
At the far-left corner below you see in red the total amount of points (Earnings) that you 
have made across rounds. Because you received 75 francs at beginning, the counter 
starts at 75. Divide the final score by 10 to determine your earnings in euros. All 
information about previous periods is shown together on the left side of the screen. On 
the right side of the screen you will find new information and/or what action you have to 
take. On top, the ideal values of all players are displayed. Finally, you can find in the 
far-left corner below a help box with short description of what you have to do. 
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Instructions Formal Treatment 
INSTRUCTIONS
You will initially have fifteen minutes to go through these instructions. When time is up, 
we will ask whether there is anyone who would like some more time. In case you need 
more time, please raise your hand and we will simply give you the extra time you need.  
Introduction
In a moment you will participate in a decision making experiment. The instructions are 
simple. If you follow them carefully, you can earn a considerable amount of money. 
Your earnings will be paid to you individually at the end of the session and separately 
from the other participants. 
You have already received five euros for showing up. In addition, you can earn more 
money during the experiment. In the experiment the currency is  ‘francs.’ At the end of 
the session, francs will be changed into euros. The exchange rate is 1 euro for each 
10 francs.
In this experiment you can also lose money. To prevent that your earnings become 
negative, you will receive at the beginning of the experiment 75 francs extra. In the 
unlikely situation that your final earnings will be negative, your earnings will be zero  
(but you keep the five euros for showing up.) 
Your decisions will remain anonymous. They will not be linked in any way to your 
name. Other participants cannot possibly figure out which decisions you have made.  
You are not allowed to talk to other participants or communicate with them in any other 
way. If you have a question, please raise your hand. 
Periods and Groups 
The experiment consists of 24 periods, each of which will be carried out in groups of 
three players.
At the beginning of each period, participants will again be randomly divided into 
groups of three. The chances that you will be with any other participant in the same 
group for two consecutive periods are therefore very small. 
Choices and Earnings 
In each period, your group of three participants negotiates about choosing a number.
The chosen number determines the earnings of each of the three participants for that 
period. The group can choose any integer between 0 and 100. The group can also 
choose not to determine any number (the “no number” option).   
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Hence, the number chosen by the group determines the earnings for each member of 
the group. These earnings are different per member nevertheless. How much a player 
earns depends, in addition of the chosen number, also on her ‘ideal value.’ Each 
player in a group receives an ideal and unique value between 0 and 100. The earnings 
for a player increase as the outcome lies closer to this ideal value. 
If the outcome is exactly equal to the ideal value of a player, then this player receives 
the maximum earnings of 20 francs. The difference between the ideal value and 
outcome (if any) decreases the earnings by the same amount in francs. For instance, 
suppose your ideal value in a certain round is 54. Then you receive 20 francs if the 
outcome of the period is 54, 19 if the outcome is 53 or 55, 18 if the outcome is 52 or 56 
etc. Your earnings may also be negative. If the group, for instance, chooses the num-
ber 20, then with an ideal value of 54, your earnings will be equal to -14. 
The outcome of a period can also be that the group reaches no agreement. Hence, 
one chooses “no number.” In this case each member of the group receives 0 francs.
During a round, players are identified by a letter: A, B and C. These are based on 
their ideal value: the player with the lowest ideal value is A and the player with the 
highest ideal value is C. For instance, suppose the ideal values of the three players are 
16, 54 and 86. Then the player with ideal value 16 is player A, the player with ideal 
value 54 is player B and, finally, the player with ideal value 56 is player C. 
The negotiations 
The group negotiations to choose a number consist of several steps. First, we give an 
overview. Afterwards, we will discuss the separate steps one at a time.  
1. Before the negotiations start, each player can send a separate message to 
each other member of the group. A message is a suggestion for the number 
the group can choose. Each message from one player to another remains se-
cret for the third player.
2. Next, at most 10 rounds follow with making proposals and voting. 
3. During each round, each of the three participants makes a proposals. This 
proposal can be any number between 0 and 100 or a proposal to end the nego-
tiations. Subsequently, one of the three proposals is randomly chosen to be 
put to a vote. The other two participants can then vote “For” or “Against” the 
chosen proposal (the player who made the chosen proposal automatically votes 
in favor). 
4. If one of these two participants votes “For,” then the proposal is accepted and 
the period ends. If both participants vote “Against,” then the proposal is rejected 
and there will be a next round of making proposals and voting. This can contin-
ue until nine proposals have been rejected; if also the tenth proposal is re-
jected, then the period ends and the outcome is ‘no number.’ 
5. If a proposal to end the negotiations is accepted, then the outcome is “no
number” and, consequently, all players receive 0 francs. If a proposed number 
is accepted, then this number is the choice of the group for that period. 
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Information screen 
The first screen that you will see in a period, will show which player you are (A, B or C) 
and the ideal values 
of you and your 
group members. 
Your own letter is 
marked in red. 
If you are ready to 
proceed, before the 
time has elapsed, 
you can press the 
OK-button.
Sending and receiving messages 
Subsequently, you will be able to send a message to each of your two group members 
and they will be able to send a message to you. 
A message is either 
an integer between 0 
and 100 or the word 
“end.” A number is a 
suggestion for the 
group choice. With 
“end” you tell the two 
players that you do 
not want to negotiate 
(and therefore have 
earnings 0). You can 
also choose to send 
no message by not 
filling out anything or typing the space bar. To send a message, you fill out a 
number or “end” in one or both cells and you press OK.  
Attention: suggestions you send as a message are not put to a vote and will only be 
seen by the player who receives the message. 
You receive 30 seconds to send messages. If you do not fill out anything and press
OK within this time, then no message will be sent. The other players will only see a 
space at their cell in this case. 
After the 30 seconds have elapsed, you will see the messages that the other players 
sent to you. You will NOT see what the other players sent to each other.
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Making a proposal 
You are then ready to make 
and accept proposals. In this 
phase you will see in the top-
left corner of your screen all 
the necessary information 
(your identity, the messages, 
the ideal values). At the end of 
these instructions, we will show 
you the entire screen lay out. 
A proposal can once again be 
any integer between 0 or 100 
or the word “end.”To make a 
proposal, you fill out this 
number or word and press 
“OK.”
To help you calculate quickly 
which payments belong to 
which proposal, you also have 
a earnings-calculator at your 
disposal. If you fill out any 
number and press “Calculate” 
then the earnings will appear 
that all members would receive 
should that proposal be accepted. This device is only meant to help you. Nothing that 
you type there, will be seen by the other players. 
ATTENTION: In each rounds, everybody fills out a proposal. However, only one of 
these proposals is (randomly) chosen. This proposal will be revealed to the others and 
be put to a vote. 
You will receive 40 seconds to make your proposal. If you do not type in anything within 
this time, then ‘0’ will be your proposal. 
Voting 
After everybody has made a proposal, it will be revealed whose proposal has been 
chosen. Moreover, the payments everyone would receive if this proposal would be 
accepted are also shown. 
Next, the proposal will be put to a vote. The player who made the proposal, automati-
cally votes “For” and does not press any button.
CHAPTER 5.  FORMAL VERSUS INFORMAL LEGISLATIVE BARGAINING 
201 
 
The other members can vote by simply pressing “For” or “Against.” 
If at least one of the two votes is “For”, then the proposal is accepted and it will be 
the outcome of that period. The group has then made a decision and the period ends.
If both vote “Against,”
then the proposal is 
rejected and you will 
proceed to a next round 
of proposing and voting. 
This can continue until 
nine proposals have 
been rejected. If the 
tenth proposal is also 
rejected, then the group 
was not able to reach a 
decision and the period 
ends. In this case, the 
outcome is “no num-
ber.”
Results
At the end of each 
round, you will see how 
each player voted, 
whether the proposal 
has been accepted and 
whether or not you will 
go to a next round. 
At the end of each 
period, you will see the outcome and your corresponding earnings. 
Screens
There is a lot of information you can use while you are making your choices, You can 
find:  
- the player you are 
- the ideal values of each player 
- the messages you sent and received 
- the proposals that have been rejected 
- the outcomes of previous periods 
At “Previous Periods,” you can find the outcomes of previous periods, together with the 
ideal values of the player and, between brackets their earnings. The word “You” before 
the value and payment indicates which player you were. 
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At the far-left corner below you see in red the total amount of points (Earnings) that you 
have made across rounds. Because you received 75 francs at beginning, the counter 
starts at 75. Divide the final score by 10 to determine your earnings in euros. 
All information about 
previous periods is shown 
together on the left side of 
the screen. On the right 
side of the screen you will 
find new information and/or 
what action you have to 
take. On top, the ideal values of all players are displayed.  
Finally, you can find in the far-left corner below a help box with short description of 
what you have to do. 
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Samenvatting (Dutch Summary) 
‘Essays over Onderhandelen en  
Strategische Communicatie’ 
 
 
Dit proefschrift omvat een reeks van vier essays over onderhandelen en 
communicatie vanuit een gedragseconomisch perspectief. Onderhandelen en 
communiceren zijn kenmerkende en nauw verweven onderdelen van sociale 
interactie. Zodoende kan onderzoek hierover licht werpen op intermenselijke 
verbanden, ons wellicht helpen om eﬀectiever met elkaar te onderhandelen en 
misschien zelfs wegen duiden naar beter ingerichte sociale instituties. 
De gedragseconomische aanpak van dit proefschrift verschilt van de 
benadering die gebruikelijk is in ‘standaard’ economisch onderzoek. De 
standaard economie gaat uit van rationele, egoïstische homines economici die in 
perfect evenwicht interacteren en exact weten wat zij zelf en anderen denken en 
doen. De gedragseconomie daarentegen probeert theorieën te ontwikkelen die 
wortelen in psychologisch realistische aannames om zodoende gedrag goed te 
kunnen voorspellen. Er zit wel overlap tussen beide aanpakken, aangezien 
gedragseconomische modellen regelmatig een aanpassing betreﬀen van de 
standaard modellen. Gedragseconomen vinden het daarnaast belangrijk om hun 
theorieën te toetsen aan de hand van laboratorium- en veldexperimenten. De 
vier essays in dit proefschrift (hoofdstukken 2 tot 5) beogen een bijdrage te zijn 
aan deze groeiende tak van wetenschap.  
Dit proefschrift behoort tot het speciﬁeke onderzoeksveld van de 
gedragsmatige speltheorie, de tak van de gedragseconomie die zich bezig houdt 
met strategische interacties. Een rode draad door dit werk is dat alle essays over 
situaties gaan waarin de standaard speltheoretische aanname dat gedrag 
rationeel en in evenwicht is niet tot een eenduidige voorspelling leidt. Door 
minder beperkende aannames te maken en experimenten uit te voeren, kunnen 
de onderzoeken in dit proefschrift toch tot gerede voorspellingen komen.  
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Hoofdstukken 3 en 4 bevatten methodologische bijdrages aan de literatuur: 
hoofdstuk 3 introduceert een nieuwe methode om voorspellingen te maken in 
speciﬁeke spelsituaties en hoofdstuk 4 stelt deze methode experimenteel op de 
proef. Hoofdstukken 2 en 5 zijn, daarentegen, toegepaste bijdragen die 
gedragseconomische methodes gebruiken om openstaande vraagstukken over de 
economie en politiek op te lossen. 
Hoofdstukken 2, 3 en 4 bestuderen cheap talk situaties. Cheap talk is de 
speltheoretische benaming voor communicatie door middel van ‘kosteloze’ 
boodschappen. Daar bedoelen economen niet alleen Skype mee.. Alle talige 
uitingen, zoals wat mensen zeggen in een gesprek of toespraak en schrijven in 
een email of chat, zijn vormen van cheap talk. ‘Cheap,’ omdat het bijvoorbeeld 
niets kost om te zeggen dat je van iemand houdt of te schrijven dat je een 
uitermate capabele werknemer zult zijn. (Economen onderscheiden dergelijke 
kosteloze boodschappen van kostbare signalen, zoals het geven van een bijzonder 
cadeau om je genegenheid te tonen of het volgen van een moeilijke studie om te 
laten zien dat je intelligent bent.) Hoofdstukken 2, 3 en 4 kijken speciﬁek naar 
elementaire cheap talk situaties waarin een zender met bepaalde informatie een 
boodschap stuurt aan een ontvanger. De informatie waarover de zender beschikt 
kan feiten of voorkeuren betreﬀen en is voor beiden van belang. Het wordt dan 
interessant wanneer zender en ontvanger deels tegengestelde en deels 
overeenkomende belangen hebben. We kunnen hierbij denken aan het advies dat 
een IT-bedrijf aan een klant geeft over de noodzaak van een lucratief IT-project 
of aan een onderhandeling tussen scheidende ouders wanneer de moeder niet 
weet hoe vaak de vader de kinderen zou willen zien. 
Hoofdstuk 2 geeft een speltheoretische analyse van de invloed van macht op 
de helderheid van communicatie. Hoewel de relatie tussen macht en 
communicatie in andere disciplines reeds lang onderkend wordt, is dit een 
grotendeels onontgonnen gebied in de economie. We richten ons op de observatie 
dat er aanwijzingen zijn dat personen die behoren tot een machtigere sociale, 
economische of politieke groep hun wensen duidelijker communiceren. Zo zal een 
leidinggevende eerder aangeven dat hij of zij een voorstel van een werknemer 
niet ziet zitten dan omgekeerd. Ook zijn er aanwijzingen dat in patriarchale 
samenlevingen vrouwen minder helder kunnen zijn in het uiten van hun wensen 
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dan mannen. In een speltheoretisch model kunnen we een precieze invulling 
geven aan de begrippen ‘macht’ en ‘helderheid.’ Dit stelt ons in staat om 
theoretische resultaten te verkrijgen over hoe macht de helderheid van 
communicatie beïnvloedt. Onze belangrijkste conclusie is dat als een persoon (of 
instantie) weinig macht heeft, hij vaag moet zijn, omdat de informatie die hij 
prijsgeeft (ook) tegen hem gebruikt kan worden. Dit betekent tegelijkertijd dat 
macht een geïnformeerd persoon in staat stelt om duidelijker te zijn, omdat 
macht hem minder kwetsbaar maakt voor ‘misbruik’ van de informatie die hij 
verstrekt. Ons model voorspelt bijvoorbeeld dat een vader tijdens 
onderhandelingen over bezoekregelingen vaag zal zijn als hij juridisch zwak staat 
of weinig geld heeft voor advocaten. Helderheid is dus een privilege van de 
machtigen. 
Hoofdstuk 3 pakt het probleem van evenwichtselectie op. Speltheorie neemt 
aan dat gedrag in strategische situaties uiteindelijk in een evenwicht zal geraken. 
Gedrag wordt in evenwicht beschouwd als niemand er baat bij heeft om zijn of 
haar gedrag te wijzigen als alle anderen vasthouden aan hun handelwijze. Deze 
benadering biedt voordelen omdat er in de praktijk maar een aantal evenwichten 
zijn. Met behulp van zogenoemde selectiecriteria kunnen speltheoretici 
vervolgens bepalen welk van deze evenwichten het meest plausibel is en een 
eenduidige voorspelling doen. Voorgaande pogingen om tot algemeen geldende 
criteria te komen in cheap talk spellen zijn echter niet bijzonder succesvol 
gebleken. Onze inschatting is dat dit komt omdat er werd uitgegaan van perfect 
rationele actoren die in een of ander stabiel evenwicht moeten verkeren. Het 
probleem is dat doorgaans alle cheap talk evenwichten instabiel zijn, omdat ze 
zogeheten geloofwaardige afwijkingen toelaten. Wij zien een uitweg uit dit 
probleem in de observatie dat gedrag in de praktijk toch nooit geheel in of uit 
evenwicht is. Dit betekent wellicht dat de stabiliteit van een evenwicht niet een 
zwart-wit gegeven is en dat we de mate van (in)stabiliteit moeten meten.  Dit 
idee werken we uit tot het ‘Average Credible Deviation Criterion’ (ACDC). 
Volgens dit criterium wordt een evenwicht waarschijnlijker naarmate het minder 
en kleinere geloofwaardige afwijkingen toestaat. ACDC blijkt gedrag minstens 
zo goed te kunnen voorspellen als reeds bestaande selectiecriteria in eerder 
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uitgevoerde experimenten. Daarnaast kan ACDC ook voorspellingen doen in 
situaties waar andere criteria dat niet kunnen. 
Hoofdstuk 4 beschrijft een nieuw laboratorium experiment dat we uitvoeren 
om ACDC te toetsen. In een economisch laboratorium experiment moeten 
proefpersonen in een abstracte situatie anoniem keuzes maken, waarin hun 
beslissingen bepalen hoeveel (cash) geld ze aan het eind mee naar huis kunnen 
nemen. Het voordeel van dit soort experimenten is dat we veel controle kunnen 
houden op de omgeving, wat ons in staat stelt onze theoretische modellen 
nauwkeurig te toetsen. In het experiment dat wij uitvoeren vinden we dat onze 
resultaten de uitkomsten van ACDC schragen.  Daarnaast ondersteunen de 
uitkomsten van het experiment ook de belangrijkste voorspelling uit hoofdstuk 
2, namelijk dat meer macht tot meer helderheid leidt. 
Hoofdstuk 5 omvat het thema van de politieke besluitvorming. Vanuit een 
speltheoretisch oogpunt is politieke besluitvorming een groot 
onderhandelingsspel tussen politieke actoren met verschillende belangen. Ons 
onderzoek spitst zich toe op de vraag hoe de mate van formaliteit van het 
politieke besluitvormingsproces de uitkomst beïnvloedt. Politieke besluitvorming 
vindt namelijk gedeeltelijk plaats in formele situaties, zoals zittingen in de 
Tweede Kamer en gedeeltelijk in informele situaties, zoals in de wandelgangen, 
de achterkamertjes en, in Nederland, ‘het Torentje’. Dit hoofdstuk bevat een 
speltheoretische en experimentele vergelijking van een informeel en een formeel 
onderhandelingsspel. Het informele onderhandelingsspel biedt zoveel strategische 
mogelijkheden dat haast alle uitkomsten een evenwicht vormen. Een gevolg 
hiervan is dat de huidige speltheorie geen voorspelling kan maken over de 
invloed van formaliteit. Een experiment kan wel licht werpen op deze kwestie. 
Om deze reden hebben we een experiment uitgevoerd, waarin we deelnemers 
laten onderhandelen in een formele en een informele situatie. De belangrijkste 
experimentele bevinding is dat formaliteit van belang is. In het bijzonder zien 
we dat de speler met de beste uitgangspositie gebaat is bij informele 
onderhandelingen. Een verklaring hiervoor is dat informele onderhandelingen 
hem meer ruimte geven om deze uitgangspositie uit te buiten. Dit impliceert in 
concreto dat een middenpartij, zoals het CDA, liever achterkamertjes politiek 
bedrijft dan onderhandelt in de Tweede Kamer, omdat zij zo beter de partijen 
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aan de ﬂanken tegen elkaar kan uitspelen. Een extreme partij, zoals de PVV of 
de SP, is juist gebaat bij formele procedures, omdat dit haar verzekert dat haar 
meningen en voorstellen gehoord worden.  
